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Abstract
Traditionally, projects tend to strive for increased predictability by managing details 
and attempting to bring all variables under control. However, experience shows that 
the chance of realising a plan without major amendments decreases with an increasing 
time horizon, which points to a need for flexible projects. A number of scholars argue 
that flexibility is necessary to face changes and uncertainty in the business 
environment. On the other hand, flexible projects are generally not described as 
desirable in project management literature. These conflicting approaches to flexibility 
have justified an analysis of the dynamics related to project flexibility, both from a 
theoretical and an empirical perspective. Such an analysis is presented in this thesis, 
based on analyses of large engineering projects in Norway. Most of the projects are 
governmental investments.  
This thesis aims at structuring knowledge on project flexibility. Two types of results 
have emerged; the first related to how to analyse project flexibility, and the second 
related to how to manage flexible projects. Based on studies of different parts of the 
life cycle of projects, the research provides indications as to how flexibility can be 
addressed in the front-end phase of large public investments. A framework for 
analysing project flexibility is also proposed. 
Chapter 1 discusses flexibility in a project management perspective, and raises key 
research questions. The research presented in this thesis addresses the dynamics 
between utilising benefits from flexible approaches and avoiding drawbacks. Being 
flexible is characterised by a capability to adapt to new, different or changing 
requirements.  
Flexibility is used in a rather wide sense in the thesis, but is always related to the 
managing effects of uncertainty. Project flexibility includes adjustments and 
preparations in response to both internal and contextual uncertainty, such as for 
example, scope change management, iterative decision process and adjustments 
related to uncertain funding. Chapter 1 ends with two key research questions related 
to how to analyse and manage project flexibility. 
Chapter 2 presents the research design. The thesis is based on nine papers. These 
papers are summarised in part one of the thesis. Three main data sources have been 
used, along with complementary information. First, project evaluations and 
summaries of 18 Norwegian investment projects have been analysed. Second, this 
research has benefited from access to an established database for major governmental 
investments, including results from 48 front-end assessments of large governmental 
projects. Third, a wider range of data has been collected in a multi-case study of four 
Norwegian railway projects.
The research is based on an inductive-deductive approach, using a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative information. Validity and reliability associated with the 
data used in this thesis are not sufficient to provide solid answers, taken in isolation. 
As is common in project management research, the small samples in the studies 
generally do not support statistical analysis of the data, particularly when subgroups 
of the material are subject to analysis. However, the research has taken previous 
xstudies of related issues into account. The results presented in the thesis support many 
of the findings from other studies, but also indicate some nuances to common 
understanding of project flexibility. Further research is needed to clarify to what 
extent these indications are of a general nature or project-specific. 
Chapter 3 discusses project flexibility in different project phases. A distinction is 
made between three project phases: front-end, planning and execution. Both this 
thesis and previous research point to a flexible front-end phase as the least 
controversial aspect of project flexibility. Low flexibility after the front-end phase 
increases the likelihood of projects being completed on time, within budget and 
according to specifications. Some models and measures of project flexibility in a time 
perspective are also presented in this chapter.  
Chapter 4 analyses project flexibility from a stakeholder perspective. Project 
stakeholders are actively involved in a project, or their interests may be positively or 
negatively affected by the project. Project flexibility is perceived differently by 
different stakeholders. Flexibility for one project stakeholder can be another 
stakeholder’s risk.
An analysis of flexibility in stakeholder perspective called for a distinction between 
internal and external project flexibility. Project internal flexibility relates to flexibility 
within defined scope – how requirements are to be met. External flexibility refers to 
adjustments of project scope – what requirements are to be met. Project internal 
flexibility appears to be particularly desirable to project managers and contractors. 
Project external flexibility is more likely to be looked upon favourably by users and 
project owners. Incentives open to stakeholders affect their approaches to project 
flexibility. In general, flexible projects have a value for stakeholders which benefit 
from adjustments and come at a cost for those who have to adapt.  
Chapter 5 highlights the relevance of efficiency and effectiveness when discussing 
flexible projects. In general, efficiency is related to producing direct project outputs, 
often measured in terms of cost, time and quality. Effectiveness is related to added 
value for owners and users. The case in favour of flexibility emphasises the possibility 
to increase a project’s effectiveness. The case against project flexibility highlights the 
negative effects on efficiency due to changes and the possibilities for frustration due 
to lack of decisions and commitments.  
Analyses presented in this thesis indicate challenges in materialising the expected 
benefits of flexible projects. On the other hand, the expected decrease in efficiency in 
flexible projects has been frequently observed throughout the analysis. Chapter 5 also 
addresses redundancy as an enabler for project flexibility. Redundancy is created 
when more resources than strictly necessary are available. The logic behind 
redundancy is that a project with redundant resources will be efficient because it can 
be executed as planned, compared to a project with no redundancy that turns out to be 
error-prone in reality.
Chapter 6 discusses flexibility related to modularity, flexible decision processes and 
flexible final products. Flexibility in the decision process means that decisions and 
commitments in projects are made sequentially over phases. Flexibility in the product 
is achieved when the final product that a project is to produce is prepared for 
xi
alternative use. There are indications that flexible projects utilise both flexible 
products and flexible decision processes, rather than emphasising one of these 
dimensions at the expense of the other. When analysing flexibility in decision 
processes, there was a need to make a distinction between planned and actual 
approaches to flexibility. Actual approaches turn out to be different from planned 
ones.
Modularity can be an enabler for flexible project management. On a macro level, 
modularity means that projects are divided into independent sub-units. Decision 
makers can then make incremental commitments to each sub-unit at a time. In the 
studied projects, macro modularisation was associated with cost control but also with 
lower benefit realisation than planned. On a micro level, modularisation means a 
decomposition of a product into modules with specified interfaces. Such 
modularisation can reduce the ‘knock-on’ effects of design changes.
Chapter 7 summarises a framework for analysing project flexibility and indicates 
guidelines for managing flexible projects. The framework for analysis consists of 
project flexibility categorisations, perspectives of analysis, and flexibility drivers and 
enablers. Approaches for the management of project flexibility are also suggested in 
Chapter 7. Successful strategies for project flexibility either aim at avoiding flexibility 
or at enabling projects to be flexible. Projects can avoid adjustments or live with 
them. One key to successful flexibility management in projects lies in the transition 
from an initial open-minded environment to the subsequent focused phases. Based on 
the results in the thesis, an attempt is made to list approaches to project flexibility 
management. 
Even though the results are based on studies of only a few projects, there are 
indications that the drawbacks of flexible projects are largest when projects do not 
prepare for future adjustments. This notion is consistent with previous works on 
flexibility, which highlight that flexible decisions require a structural framework of 
strategies and guidelines. The suggested approaches and categorisations related to 
project flexibility are intended as an input to such a structural framework. 
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1. Introduction  
This chapter discusses different approaches to project management from a flexibility 
perspective. One purpose of the chapter is to define how project flexibility is 
understood in this thesis, but also to give some illustrations of how others have used 
the concept of flexibility. Key research questions related to project flexibility are 
stated in this chapter. These questions have in common that they address the dynamics 
between utilising benefits from flexible approaches and avoiding drawbacks. The 
thesis is designed to address these questions. 
A number of scholars have argued that flexibility is necessary to face the changes and 
uncertainty in the business environment. On the other hand, a wide range of studies 
indicate that a clear project definition and minimisation of changes also are critical 
factors for the success of projects. These approaches to project flexibility, which can 
appear as conflicting, have justified the study of the dynamics related to project 
flexibility that is presented in this thesis. The subject is analysed both from a 
theoretical and an empirical perspective.  
1.1 Perspectives on project management
In a wide sense, projects include any activity that meets the characteristics of projects 
listed by the PMI (Project Management Institute) (2004: 5): ‘A project is a temporary 
endeavour undertaken to create a unique product or service’. Common characteristics 
of projects include: finite budgets and schedule constraints, complex and interrelated 
activities, clearly defined goals, and uniqueness (PMI 2004).
Projects are traditionally seen as temporary organisations designed for unique tasks 
(Cleland 2004), often in contrast to the mass producing core activities of 
organisations. Projects are initiated to solve tasks of almost any type (Engwall 2003) 
to such an extent that Western society seems to be heading towards a projectified 
society (Lundin & Söderholm 1998, Gareis 2004). A major benefit of organising a 
task as a project is the freedom to create an organisation more or less from scratch. 
While uniqueness is the competitive advantage of projects as a way of organising, 
changes and lack of predictability are commonly seen as the major pitfalls of projects. 
Successful projects are often claimed to be characterised by control and governance 
(Hall 1980, Morris & Hough 1987, Miller & Lessard 2000). 
Söderlund (2004) discusses two main theoretical traditions in project management 
research. The first tradition has its roots in engineering science. Planning techniques 
and methods of project management, including the recent emphasis on uncertainty 
quantification and risk management, have been the major focus. This is in accordance 
with Packendorff (1995), who claims that a number of writers trace the intellectual 
roots of project management research and knowledge to various types of planning 
techniques, such as PERT (program evaluation and review technique) and CPM 
(critical path method). The other tradition has its intellectual roots in the social 
sciences and focuses especially on the organisational and behavioural aspects of 
projects. Söderlund (2004) terms these the engineering tradition and the social 
science tradition, respectively. In a similar distinction between project management 
traditions, Crawford & Pollack (2004) use the terms ‘hard’ and ‘soft’. Crawford & 
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Pollack relate ‘hard’ project management approaches to objectivist, scientific 
approaches and that have parallels to Söderlund’s (2004) engineering tradition. The 
‘soft’ project management approaches stem from interpretivist and constructivist 
schools of thought, and share similarities with Söderlund’s (2004) social science 
tradition.
1.2 Uncertainty 
The uncertainty of a decision in a project can be described as ‘the gap between the 
amount of information needed to perform at task and the amount of information 
already possessed by the organisation’ (Galbraith 1973: 5). Christensen & Kreiner 
(1991) make a distinction between operational and contextual uncertainty. They 
relate operational uncertainty to uncertainty within the defined scope of a project, and 
contextual uncertainty to the project context. Karlsen (1998) discusses environmental 
uncertainty, which represents uncertainty generated by factors outside a project’s 
system boundaries, and task uncertainty which relates to factors within project 
boundaries. Jensen et al. (2006) divide environmental uncertainty into two categories:
institutional and interactional uncertainty. The purpose is to identify interactional 
uncertainty as representing environmental explanations necessary for understanding 
the circumstances of a project without including everything outside the projects. 
This thesis does not aim at covering the issue of uncertainty in a broad perspective. 
However, the distinction between the two types of uncertainty that Karlsen (1998) and 
Christensen & Kreiner (1991), among others, discuss has implications for the analysis 
of project flexibility. This thesis uses the terms contextual uncertainty and internal
uncertainty. Internal uncertainty is related to operational uncertainty (Christensen & 
Kreiner 1991) or task uncertainty (Karlsen 1998).
1.3 Flexibility
The term flexibility is used in a rather wide meaning in this thesis, but generally 
related to managing effects of uncertainty. Bahrami & Evans (2005) list 11 concepts 
related to flexibility: adaptability, agility, elasticity, hedging, liquidity, malleability, 
mobility, modularity, robustness, resilience, and versatility. According to the 
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (2006), being flexible is ‘characterised by a 
ready capability to adapt to new, different, or changing requirements’, a definition of 
flexibility which is also used in this thesis. With such a wide definition, project 
flexibility includes preparations to manage both internal and contextual uncertainty, 
such as scope change management, iterative decision process, and adjustments related 
to uncertain funding in general.
In a planning perspective, Sager (1994) presents flexible planning as a proper 
response to an environment aiming at conflict solutions, since it favours democracy in 
collective choice processes. Further, Sager makes a distinction between opportunism
and rigidity, and places ‘flexibility’ in between these two extremes. Rigidity implies 
unwillingness or lack of ability to adjust to a changing situation. In contrast, 
opportunism can be described as a policy of extreme adapting to new circumstances, 
without being guided by any rules or overall strategy. He points out that flexibility 
refers to future choices among satisfactory alternatives, and that flexibility implies 
adjustments in accordance with principles and criteria.  
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Flexible projects are generally not described as desirable in project management 
literature. In other management disciplines, such as in strategic management, 
flexibility is an established enabler to manage uncertainty (see, for example, 
Mintzberg 1994). Flexibility is so well acknowledged as a key success factor of 
competitive organisations that Bahrami & Evans (2005) used the term ‘super-
flexibility’ to describe the most flexible companies.  
1.4 Project flexibility 
Project flexibility is part of a fundamental dilemma in project management. On the 
one hand, projects need stability and control to be executed efficiently, typically 
measured in terms of time, cost and meeting specifications. In this perspective, 
flexibility should be minimised. On the other hand, important decisions in projects 
must be taken based on limited information in an unpredictable world, creating a need 
for flexibility options. 
The PMI (2004: 368) defines project management as ‘the application of knowledge, 
skills, tools, and techniques to project activities to meet project requirements’. In this 
terminology, project management is aimed at meeting project requirements, and not 
necessarily related to meeting the overall objectives of projects. The PMI (2004) and 
Bahrami & Evans (2005) argue that projects and project management are applied once 
an organisation has decided to escalate initial activities in a focused implementation. 
Other authors (e.g. Miller & Lessard 2000, Samset 2001) highlight the front-end 
phase in relation to project management.  As discussed in Paper 7, the emphasis on 
the front-end phase in project management is related to how “project management” is 
defined by different authors. As an example, it is not entirely clear if PMI (2004) 
considers selecting the right project as a part of project management.  
Mikkelsen & Riis (2003) have identified a dilemma in project planning: namely, that 
the importance of decisions is highest at the when the availability of information is at 
its lowest. A common way of reducing this dilemma is to increase the available 
knowledge about the project. A project flexibility approach to address this dilemma is 
to postpone irreversible decisions until more information is available. 
The engineering tradition of project management, referred to by Söderlund (2004) and 
Crawford & Pollack (2004), focuses on stability for projects, particularly in their later 
phases. The social science tradition has a greater understanding of the benefits of 
project flexibility. Kreiner (1995) points out that the traditional focus on stability 
becomes challenged under conditions of uncertainty, which creates what he calls 
‘drifting environments’. The drifting environments of a project are not necessarily 
caused by actual changes but may also result when the project owners, users or other 
stakeholders gain a better understanding of, and ability to express, their actual needs. 
The results presented in Paper 4 indicate that flexible projects are generally not 
desirable when the unit of analysis is limited to the project itself, but can be rational 
when a wider context is included in the analysis. 
Real options represent one approach to project flexibility (see, for example, Amram & 
Kulatlaka 1999, Brennan & Trigeorgis 2000). Real options illustrate the value of 
flexibility based on theory related to financial options. Flexibility is compared to 
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owning an option – the right, but not the obligation to take an action in the future 
(Amram & Kulatlaka 1999). The real options paradigm recognises that decisions are 
made sequentially over phases. Uncertainty can increase the value of a project as long 
as flexibility is preserved and resources are not irreversibly committed. The value of 
flexibility can be quantified in monetary terms. Uncertainty about the future 
profitability of an investment project makes it often optimal to postpone commitment 
to a project, compared to a situation in which there is no uncertainty (Brennan & 
Trigeorgis 2000). 
Koskela (2000) describes how production principles, such as just-in-time, have been 
adopted in a theoretical framework aimed at the construction industry under the term 
lean construction. In this framework, the term ‘last responsive moment’ is used to 
achieve flexibility in projects (Ballard & Howell 2003). According to Ballard & 
Howell (2003), the last responsive moment means that decisions must be made within 
the lead time for realising alternatives and that a decision should not be made until it 
has to be made.  
1.5 Efficiency versus effectiveness  
A project’s ability to produce its immediate outcome can be measured in terms of 
efficiency. It is a question of doing things right and producing project outputs in terms 
of the agreed scope, quality, cost, and time. It is a measure internal to the project and 
restricted to the project or contractor’s perspective. The longer-term effects of the 
project can be measured in terms of effectiveness – or, in other words, doing the right 
things. It is an external measure. Eikeland (2001) relates effectiveness to how the 
results of a project contribute to added value for owners and users. In OECD terms, 
effectiveness measures the realisation of the project’s objectives (OECD 2000). This 
is the perspective of the project owner or financing party, who in many types of 
projects might have a perspective similar to that of the users. 
Performance measurement systems in organisations frequently strive to capture a 
range of performance aspects (see, for example, Sink & Tuttle 1989). Figure 1 shows 
that these aspects often include measures of efficiency, effectiveness and 
changeability. Project success is commonly measured in terms of efficiency and 
effectiveness. It is less common to measure changeability, or flexibility, in project 
management. While a high degree of flexibility is desirable to many organisations, it 
is more often mentioned as a threat than a key success criterion for projects.
Efficiency
Changeability
Performance
Effectiveness
Figure 1. Performance measurement dimensions. (Moseng & Bredrup 1993) 
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A literature review in an early part of the work on this thesis (Paper 4) gave 
indications that flexible projects are primarily enablers for improvement of 
effectiveness rather than efficiency. This notion has served as guidance for the 
methodological choice of data collection and projects to be studied.
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of two parts. Part one serves three main purposes. First, it states 
the key research questions that the whole thesis addresses. The research questions are 
presented in the next section of this chapter. Second, part one discusses the applied 
methodology of the thesis as a whole. The studies presented in each paper are utilised 
with the aim of making the whole thesis more than just the sum of its individual parts. 
Finally, part one provides a summary of results from the research. 
Part two consist of nine papers. Paper 1, 2 and 3 present results relating to studies of 
major engineering projects, most of them governmental. One aim of these papers is to 
analyse similarities and differences between projects and flexibility approaches. Paper 
4 consists of a literature study on flexibility. The next paper, Paper 5, focuses on 
railways. Railway investment projects were chosen for in-depth studies of one 
particular type of governmental investment. Another sector-specific study related to 
hospitals is presented in Paper 6. Paper 7 and 8 benefited from the analyses presented 
in the preceding papers, but also contribute other aspects to the subject.
1.7 Research questions 
The purpose of this research is to structure knowledge on project flexibility. Based on 
studies of different parts of the life cycle of projects, the research aims at providing 
indications as to how flexibility can be addressed in the front-end phase of large 
public investments.  
The following two key research questions are addressed in the thesis: 
How can different aspects of flexibility in projects be analysed? 
Flexibility is discussed as a blessing and a curse. Flexibility for one stakeholder is 
often viewed as another stakeholder’s risk. The thesis also aims at identifying other 
aspects of flexibility which can contribute to an analysis of the issue. These aspects 
will be summarised as an analytical framework for project flexibility. 
After studying project flexibility, what are the implications for project front-end 
management?
The thesis aims at identifying characteristics of successful project flexibility 
management. Such knowledge may prove valuable in the preparations of future 
projects. The results will be summarised as generic approaches for flexibility 
management.  
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6
2. Study design
7
2. Study design 
The research design of the thesis as a whole is presented in this chapter. Empirical 
evidence used in the thesis is also presented, including how it was obtained and why 
this particular information was chosen. Based on the empirical evidence and the 
design of the study, there is also a discussion of the quality of the data and how the 
evidence may be interpreted. In addition, the applied methodology in each study is 
presented in more detail for each of the included papers. 
2.1 Research approach 
In this thesis, one phenomenon – flexibility – is analysed in a complex environment 
with several influencing factors. Investigating project flexibility from different angles 
has provided a multidimensional view of the subject. A combination of qualitative 
and quantitative information has been used. The thesis provides opportunities for 
triangulation, as described by Fellows & Liu (2003). An advantage of using multiple 
sources of information lies in the development of converging lines of evidence. To 
achieve a triangulation effect, information from two or more sources has been used to 
address the same research questions.   
The research is based on an inductive-deductive approach, described by Fellows & 
Liu (2003). Inductive research explores an issue through observation. The aim is to 
establish explanatory principles or hypotheses. In deductive research, hypotheses are 
tested against observations.  
Case studies included in the thesis apply a research methodology based on the works 
of Yin (2003). Three important principles in the research have been: (a) multiple 
sources of information, (b) use of case study databases to assemble evidence related to 
the cases, and (c) maintaining a chain of evidence with links between the questions 
asked, data collected and conclusions drawn.
2.2 Empirical evidence 
Several different information sources have been used. The main sources are: 
1. Evaluations of Norwegian public investments 
2. Ex-ante uncertainty analyses of major governmental investments 
3. Case studies of Norwegian railway projects 
In addition, the thesis benefits from case studies of the effects of the quality assurance 
of major governmental investment, railway traffic analyses and experiences from 
hospital projects. 
To analyse project flexibility, information was needed to cover both efficiency and 
effectiveness aspects of projects. As the prime source of information regarding 
efficiency, major governmental investments were chosen. Work related to 
preparations and execution of the Norwegian quality-at-entry regime provided data 
that covered enough projects to justify some quantitative analysis. The quality-at entry 
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regime was introduced in 2000 by the Norwegian Ministry of Finance. It calls for 
mandatory quality assurance and uncertainty analysis of all governmental investments 
in Norway exceeding NOK 500 million (c.60 million USD). To achieve a wider 
perspective, the same type of information was also obtained for a limited number of 
non-governmental projects. Analysing effectiveness required a different approach 
regarding the number of projects as well as type of information. Railway projects 
were chosen because of the possibilities to gather information for a number of years.  
In the following, the main information sources are described. Each of the papers in the 
annexes gives additional details.
Evaluations of Norwegian public investments 
A set of independent project evaluation reports was collected. Personal experience 
from projects was also utilised. To analyse the information related to the projects, 
codified data were entered into a database. This included information on the general 
characteristics of the project. On the basis of the descriptive information, an 
assessment was made of approaches to project flexibility. This was based on 
subjective assessments made by the researcher.   
Ex-ante uncertainty analyses of major governmental investments 
The thesis has befitted from access to reports from assessments made under the 
Norwegian quality-at-entry regime. These assessments are made by consultants prior 
to the parliament’s appropriation of the projects. Information from the quality 
assurance reports has been entered into a database. The information is relatively 
detailed, but limited to the situation at the time of approval of the project investments 
in parliament. Transportation infrastructure includes roads, bridges and tunnels, and 
railways account for more than one-third of these projects. Defence-related projects 
also represents more than one-third. The remaining group of projects includes public 
buildings, hospitals and IT systems. 
Case studies of Norwegian railway projects 
The benefits of projects materialise after the projects have been commissioned, calling 
for a rather long time perspective of the analysis. Railway projects were chosen 
because of the possibilities to gather information for fairly long time spans. The 
availability of timetables means that it is possible to measure key benefit elements 
such as travel time and frequency based on documentation. In addition, data on 
number of travellers and punctuality were included in the analyses. Being a multi-case 
study in the terminology used by Yin (2003), the analysis of four railway projects is 
based on multiple information sources. The most important sources are: 
x Documents from the involved organisations, as well as publicly available 
information. This includes reports, evaluations and quantitative information, 
such as timetables and statistics. 
x Interviews 
x Participant observation in meetings and other arenas where the projects have 
been discussed.
A summary of the most important information used in this thesis is shown in Table 1. 
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Information  Content N= Paper Type of 
information 
Sources 
Evaluations of 
Norwegian public 
investments 
Public and private 
sector projects 
from different 
sectors. 
Projects initiated 
1986-2000 
18 Paper 1  
Paper 3 
Primarily 
qualitative  
Evaluation reports; 
personal experience 
Ex-ante 
uncertainty 
analyses of major 
governmental 
investments  
Governmental 
investments 
projects approved 
2000-2004 
48 Paper 2 
Paper 3 
Primarily 
quantitative 
Consultant reports 
Case studies of 
Norwegian 
railway projects 
Railway
investment 
projects 1986-
2000 
4 Paper 5 Qualitative 
and
quantitative 
Interviews; 
statistics;
evaluation reports; 
personal experience 
Table 1. The primary information sources upon which the thesis is based. 
2.3 Quality of information 
Because of the design of the study, the possibilities to assert the validity or test the 
reliability of the findings are limited. It cannot be statistically proved that the findings 
are generally applicable. 
Reliability is related to consistency of a measure. Information is reliable if the 
measurement procedures provide the same result if applied repeatedly, even by 
different researchers. In this type of study, reliability cannot be ensured through large, 
representative samples of research material. The methods to extract and codify 
information may be affected by judgemental subjectivity. The problem of reliability 
may therefore be considerable in each of the sub-studies. To compensate for this, 
several sets of samples of research material have been used.  
Validity concerns how well a measure does in fact measure what it is intended to 
measure. To address validity in this thesis, several indicators are used. The combined 
use of indicators gives a better measure than each of the indicators independently. 
According to Yin (2003), case studies using multiple sources of evidence are 
generally rated as having a higher quality, compared to those that rely only on single 
sources of information.  
Validity and reliability associated with the data used in this thesis are not sufficient to 
provide solid answers, taken in isolation. However, the research has taken previous 
studies on related issues into account. To a large extent, the results found in this thesis 
are consistent with results in previous studies. Trustworthy results can only be 
established through a series of replications and validations. When the number of 
studies with consistent results grows, the confidence in the findings should increase. 
The thesis has to a certain extent indicated some nuances to common understanding of 
project flexibility. Further research is needed to clarify to what extent these 
indications are of a general nature or project-specific. 
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3. Flexibility in different project phases 
This chapter discusses project flexibility in different project phases. With efficiency in 
mind, both this thesis and previous research point to a flexible front-end phase as the 
least controversial aspect of project flexibility. From the same perspective, a flexible 
execution phase is generally not desired. One purpose of the chapter is to illustrate 
and analyse the background to these statements. In addition, an attempt is made to 
quantify some measures on project flexibility in a time perspective. 
This thesis makes a distinction between three different project phases: front-end, 
planning and execution. The front-end phase covers the activities prior to the final 
decision to go ahead with the project. Even though planning is a part of the front-end 
phase, most projects also have a planning phase for more detailed preparation after 
the project has been decided upon. Projects are implemented in an execution phase,
which ends when the project outputs are realised.
Authors on project management, including Morris & Hough (1987) and Miller & 
Lessard (2000), frequently warn against changes in projects once specifications have 
been established. Lundin & Söderholm (1995) describe how a project moves from 
relative openness at the beginning of the project, to being relatively closed in the 
execution phase. In the execution phase the predetermined action is supposed to be 
carried out according to the plans, in a ‘planned isolation’. The concept of project 
flexibility in the execution phase disturbs this planned isolation. In a similar way, 
Mahmoud-Jouini et al. (2004) characterise project management by the speed of three 
project phases: preparation, freezing and implementation.  
In the study of 18 projects presented in Paper 1, changes and iterations were observed 
in all phases of the projects, but particularly during the planning phase. Highly 
flexible planning phases, and to a certain extent also execution phases, were pointed 
to as a major problem during the preparations for the quality assurance regime for 
major governmental investments (Berg et al. 1999). 
3.1 A time perspective on projects 
Many textbooks on project management present models to illustrate how project 
attributes change during different project phases. Figure 2 is an attempt to summarise 
the different models. Even though the shapes of the curves vary between different 
authors, they have many similarities. Uncertainty, significance of decisions and the 
degree of freedom to manoeuvre are typically high at the beginning of the project, and 
low at the end. At the same time, variables such as the accumulated cost, available 
information and cost of changes begin at low levels and reach high levels at the end of 
a project.
Even though this type of figure as shown in Figure 2 is very common and appears 
logical, the models are primary illustrations, and appear to a lesser extent to be based 
directly on empirical evidence. There are obvious challenges in quantifying and 
measuring the different variables. One study in Miller & Lessard (2000: 34) shows 
that for one particular project, regulatory, political and financial risks were at their 
highest during the middle of the project.  
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High
Low
Project time
Accumulated cost/
Available information/
Amendment cost
Uncertainty/
Significance of
decisions/
Degree 
of freedom
to manoeuvre
Figure 2. Development of selected project characteristics in a time perspective. 
(Paper 3, fig. 1. Based on Christensen & Kreiner 1991: 40, Midler 1995: 369, 
Samset 2001: 33, Mikkelsen & Riis 2003: 47) 
The ‘high to low’ curve may represent different variables, but the underlying message 
is similar. Christensen & Kreiner (1991: 40) use Galbraith’s (1973) definition of 
uncertainty as the difference between the required information and the information 
available. As the available information increases, the uncertainty decreases through 
the project. Samset (2001) uses a similar definition of uncertainty. Eikeland (2001), 
on the other hand, equalises ‘room for manoeuvring’ with the internal uncertainty of 
the project, related to internal decisions that will be, but are not yet taken. A decision 
is within the room for manoeuvring if it does not violate the consequences of previous 
decisions. Midler (1995) relates the decreasing degree of freedom to manoeuvre with 
an increasing degree of irreversibility in project decisions. Mahmoud-Jouini et al. 
(2004: 361) describe the descending curve as ‘possibilities of action in the project’. 
Mikkelsen & Riis, (2003: 47) let the ‘high to low’ curve represent the importance of 
decisions.
The ‘low to high’ curve usually represents either accumulated cost (Eikeland 2001), 
relative amount of information or knowledge available related to the project (Midler 
1995, Mikkelsen & Riis 2003, Mahmoud-Jouini et al. 2004), or amendment cost 
(Samset 2001).  
3.2 Quantifications of flexibility based on scope reduction options 
In the quality assurance reports for major governmental investments, it is a part of the 
consultants’ assignment to identify potential project scope reductions. These are 
reductions that can be carried out if other parts of the project turn out to be more 
costly than planned. If necessary, these parts of the scope can be taken out of the 
projects without threatening the fundamental functionality of the delivery. These 
possible reductions are summarised as reduction lists, where the potential cost 
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reductions are described. In the studied projects, even though it was not a formal 
requirement, many of the consultants chosed to add due dates for the scope 
reductions, to indicate when decisions had to be made to realise any cost saving from 
the reductions. 
Reductions in quality or functionality were proposed in almost half of the studied 
projects. These were reductions that lowered the quality, but the volume of core 
deliveries from projects remained the same as planned. For road projects, the length 
of the new road was not changed. A common type of reduction for roads was to 
reduce planned improvements of existing roads, in connection with the new 
construction. Adjustments of ambitions related to the aesthetic quality of the project 
deliveries were common. Examples of this category include planting fewer trees, 
establishing smaller lawns and reducing the aesthetic quality of concrete walls.
Reduction lists provide an illustration of the reductions that were judged to be 
manageable from a project management point of view. The need for fast decisions 
regarding possible reductions was very commonly emphasised. As a rule of thumb, 
reductions in system architecture and quality standards have to be made early in the 
projects. It is possible to make reductions in volume and visual impression at later 
stages, depending on the contract structure. Another comment was that the potential 
volume of the reductions was so small that it did not justify setting up a system to 
manage the reductions. Finally, it was frequently commented that the due dates for the 
reductions typically came before it was realistic for project management to have 
updated cost estimates that could indicate any potential overruns.
A quantitative analysis of flexibility in different project phases is included in Paper 3, 
using data from reduction lists in quality assurance reports for major governmental 
investments. For about half of the projects, the reduction lists also included due dates 
to define when the window of opportunity closed for each item on the reduction list. 
Based on the reduction lists and due dates, it was possible to illustrate how the due 
dates of the items on the reduction list expired as time passes. This means that a part 
of the curve for the freedom to manoeuvre in Figure 2 could be drawn based on the 
empirical data presented in Paper 3.The relative size of the remaining open reductions 
can be seen as an illustration of the ‘room for manoeuvring’. Figure 3 shows the curve 
generated from the reduction lists in relation to a whole project time span. The size of 
reduction list is indicated by the grey area in Figure 3. At the time of parliamentary 
approval, the total value of all possible reductions on the reduction lists was in the 
range of 5–7% of total project costs. It should be noted that the size of remaining 
items on the reduction lists drops relatively sharply after this point. The size and 
shape of the grey area in Figure 3 supports the illustrative models used in many 
textbooks, which were referred to in relation to Figure 2.
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Figure 3. The relative size of the reduction lists as a percentage of the total 
budget at different phases of the projects. N=19 
Another way of quantifying the remaining flexibility options at the time of final 
approval of projects is to look at the reduction lists and allocated reserves in 
combination. On average, the reduction lists amounted to 6% of the total project 
budget. At the same time, an average of 8% of the project budgets was allocated as 
reserves, to cover unexpected expenses. Adding these two types of flexibility gives an 
approximate total remaining flexibility of 14% of the total budget at the time of 
parliamentary approval. The remaining flexibility options ranging between 10% and 
15% of the total budget appeared to be manageable at the time of final project 
approval, measured by the relative size of reduction lists and allocated reserves. 
The Norwegian building and civil engineering contract, NS 8405 (Norsk bygge- og 
anleggskontrakt NS 8405 2004), states that a project owner cannot demand changes 
exceeding 15% of the total contract value. This value corresponds fairly well with the 
results presented above. 
3.3 Flexibility visualisations 
According to Eikeland (2001), a decision is within the room for manoeuvring if it 
does not violate the consequences of previous decisions. As shown in Figure 4, the 
need for room for manoeuvring is within the actual room for manoeuvring in the early 
phase of projects (area A), but not during later parts of projects (area B). Eikeland 
(2001) also points out that a major challenge in project management is that the need 
for room for manoeuvring is typically at its highest when the actual freedom for 
manoeuvring has already decreased significantly. Area B represents situations when 
some stakeholders (for example, users or project owners) have a desired room for 
manoeuvring that is larger than the actual room. To satisfy the desire for adjustments, 
changes have to be made, because the adjustments violate previous decisions.  
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Figure 4. Consequences of different values of the uncertainty, significance of 
decisions and the degree of freedom to manoeuvre compared to the desired room 
for manoeuvring in different project phases. (Paper 7, fig. 6. Based on Eikeland 
2001: 40) 
With regard to Figure 4, this thesis has addressed two aspects. First, an attempt was 
made to quantify curves in the figure, as described earlier. Second, the work on the 
thesis has been a search for project management strategies that utilise the area shown 
as A. It should be noted that the critical measure is not necessarily the size of area A 
and B, but the time t1, when the curves for actual and desired freedom to manoeuvre 
cross. Area A actually represents a ‘flexibility surplus’ and area B a ‘flexibility 
undersupply’.
Based on product development projects, Midler (1995), Verganti (1999) and Bahrami 
& Evans (2005) identify strategies to increase area A and to reduce area B shown in 
Figure 4. The purpose is to avoid changes but to keep options open to satisfy as much 
as possible of the anticipated need for manoeuvring. Midler (1995) describes a 
management strategy for concurrent engineering projects. First, early commitment is 
prevented while as much information as possible is gathered on the project. In the 
second phase, the project is locked as precisely as possible. Finally, at the end of the 
project, speed is given maximum priority in order to solve the remaining technical 
obstacles.
Paper 1 and Paper 8 study observed flexibility in 18 projects. Most of these projects 
were subject to changes, extensions and iterations, i.e. they were in area B in Figure 4. 
When analysing project flexibility over time, there was also need to make a 
distinction between planned and actual approaches to flexibility. Approaches to 
flexibility changed during the projects and the actual approaches were not necessarily 
the same as the planned ones. 
Earlier in this chapter, it was noted that different stakeholders have different 
perspectives on projects flexibility in different project phases. This leads to the next 
topic: project stakeholders. 
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4. Project stakeholders 
This chapter analyses project flexibility from a stakeholder perspective. Project 
stakeholders are actively involved in a project, or their interests may be positively or 
negatively affected by a project. An analysis of flexibility in a stakeholder perspective 
called for a distinction between internal and external project flexibility. Project 
internal flexibility relates to flexibility within defined scope. Project external 
flexibility relates to adjustments of scope. The approach to flexibility held by the 
different stakeholders is closely related to the incentives open to the stakeholders. 
Flexible projects have a value for those who can align a project to their priorities, but 
flexibility represents a cost for those who have to adapt.
4.1 Stakeholders
According to McElroy & Mills (2000), project stakeholders are persons or groups of 
people who have a vested interest in the success of a project and the environment 
within which the project operates. In a study of large engineering projects, Olander & 
Landin (2005) found that it is important for a project management team to identify 
stakeholders that can affect a project, and then manage their differing demands 
throughout the project stages. Stakeholders may be organisations or individuals. The 
following discussion is focused on four types of project stakeholders: owners, users, 
project management, and contractors. 
It is the project owner that takes the risk related to the cost and future viability of a 
project. Both these risks can to a certain extent be transferred to other actors in a 
project.
Users can be described using a wide or a narrow definition. The wide definition of 
users includes all that use the result of the project (the hospital, railway companies, 
etc.). During the project preparation and execution, users are not easily identified. 
This means that projects usually interact with user representatives, who act on behalf 
of those who intend to use the result of the project. The narrow definition of ‘users’ 
refers to such user representatives.
The ‘project management’ stakeholder refers to the project manager acting on behalf 
of the project owner and the organisation supporting this function. Contractors are 
responsible for implementing the whole or part(s) of the project.
Results presented in Paper 4 indicate that project owners and users are more likely to 
be positive towards changes aimed at increasing the benefit side of the projects, or 
related to effectiveness. Stakeholders whose main responsibility lies on the cost side 
of the project, such as project management and contractors, are less likely to embrace 
changes. According to Kreiner (1995), the project management is made the guardian 
of efficiency. Müller & Turner (2005) claim that owners should impose medium 
levels of structure on project managers. Too much structure will not give the project 
manager sufficient flexibility to deal with any uncertainties that arise. Too little 
structure will lead to anarchy.
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4.2 Incentives
Incentives for different project stakeholders are strongly related to the contracting 
structure of a project and other financial obligations. A common tool for achieving 
flexibility in projects is the use of option-based contracts, which enable a continuous 
locking of the projects. Mahmoud-Jouini et al. (2004) point out that a key factor in 
creating win-win situations between the stakeholders in Engineering, Procurement 
and Construction (EPC) contracts lies in the flexibility of contracts and the implicit 
relations that are created by the contracts. Garel & Midler (2001) studied contractual 
structures that enable front-loading and coherent incentives for manufacturers and 
suppliers in the automotive industry. Their analysis is based on a game theory 
approach, where dealing with flexibility can be a win-win or zero-sum game between 
the stakeholders. In the co-development of automotive parts, the supplier receives no 
additional payments for late identification of the need for modifications in the design 
phase. The supplier therefore has strong incentives to provide engineering expertise to 
work closely with the manufacturer in order to understand the needs and the 
production process (Garel & Midler 2001).
The users are a group of stakeholders that often do not have contracts related to the 
projects. Their incentives are more likely to be related to quality than project cost. 
Even though Paper 1 found that the users in the studied projects favoured flexibility in 
general, especially one case showed that the users preferred bold commitments and 
clear answers in the front-end phase because they wanted to know as precisely as 
possible what they could expect from the project.
Flexibility also has to do with politics. In general, stakeholders are less likely to 
favour a continued flexible decision process when an initial decision has been taken in 
their favour. Consequently, a continued flexible decision process is valued by those 
who do not prefer an initial decision. Flexibility options might be used as a tool for 
stakeholders who want decisions to be remade. Flexible decision processes can be 
used to justify that decisions do not need to be taken or can be revised, thus becoming 
a tool for irresoluteness. 
4.3 Internal and external flexibility 
A distinction can be made between internal and external project flexibility. Project 
internal flexibility relates to flexibility within a defined scope – how requirements will 
be met. Project external flexibility relates to adjustments of project scope – what
requirements will be met.  
Project internal flexibility has its roots in an efficiency perspective. In an engineering 
tradition, the objective of front-end management is to provide a well-defined 
framework for efficient project implementation. This does not mean that flexibility is 
undesirable, but that adjustments are held within the defined project scope. This 
perspective is often held by project managers and contractors. It is also the approach 
to flexibility that is taken by lean construction (including Koskela (2000) and Ballard 
& Howell (2003)). To illustrate the need for internal flexibility Koerckel et al. (2005) 
claim that work flow reliability historically has been c.50% in construction projects, 
based on a one-week planning horizon, i.e. only 50% of the tasks scheduled for one 
week can be expected to actually be completed during that particular week. As 
discussed in Paper 3 related to major Norwegian governmental projects, the 
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mandatory quality assurance aims at defining the projects as precisely as possible, but 
still provides project management with the freedom to decide how the specifications 
are to be met and budgets to be upheld. In a similar way, Turner (2004) claims that 
one of four necessary conditions for project success is that the project manager is 
empowered. The project owner should give guidance on how the project can be best 
achieved, but allow project managers flexibility to handle unforeseen circumstances. 
Note that Williams (1997) claims that project risk management and empowerment of 
teams within a project compete with each other in complex projects, because of 
interconnection between the tasks of different project teams. 
Project external flexibility has its roots in an effectiveness perspective. Based on what 
is termed a social science tradition, an objective of the front-end phase is to align the 
content of the project to the objectives of the stakeholders. Objectives may be 
shifting; implying certain needs for flexibility. It is primarily the value of this type of 
flexibility that is quantified by real options (Amram & Kulatlaka 1999, Brennan & 
Trigeorgis 2000). This type of flexibility option appears particularly desirable to users 
and project owners.
Internal and external flexibility, on the one hand, and internal and contextual 
uncertainty on the other hand, are related issues. However, internal flexibility is not 
necessarily a response to internal uncertainty, and external flexibility can, but does not 
have to, be a response to contextual uncertainty. Figure 5 shows that all combinations 
of the two dimensions can be found. 
The empirical data that this thesis is based on provide mainly information about 
external flexibility. In-depth analysis of project internal flexibility would require 
different empirical sources. The distinction between project internal and external 
flexibility was made for two reasons. First, it is intended to clarify the flexibility 
approaches that have been the main focus in the thesis. Secondly, the distinction 
between project internal and external flexibility is intended as a contribution to the 
general framework for analysis of project flexibility. 
Internal
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Figure 5. Internal and external flexibility, combined with internal and contextual 
uncertainty. 
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Figure 6 is a summary of the observed approach on external flexibility seen in a time 
perspective, as presented in Paper 1. Project management was the only type of 
stakeholder that showed the expected shift from promoting a flexible front-end, 
hesitating towards a flexible planning phase and finally being negative to a flexible 
execution phase. As a possible explanation, the project management might be the 
stakeholder that is most likely to see the effects of flexibility, both on the benefit and 
cost side.  
In general, project owners appeared as advocates of flexible projects. Contractors 
were not observed as advocates of flexible projects. Figure 6 also shows that users 
and project management have different and potentially conflicting needs for external 
flexibility in different project phases. As long as the funding model for projects means 
that the users have nothing to lose from demanding changes and extensions, they have 
incentive to push for scope changes. This is typically, though not always, the case in 
the Norwegian public sector, which accounts for the majority of the projects in the 
analysis in Paper 1.   
--N/AContractor
-+/-+Project management
+++/-Users
+++Owner
ExecutionPlanningFront-end
Figure 6. Stakeholder perspectives on external flexibility in project phases.  
+ indicates that flexibility is advocated; - indicates a desire for flexibility 
minimisation; +/- indicates that both approaches were observed. (Paper 1, fig. 2.)   
Kreiner (1995) termed project management ‘the guardian of efficiency’. The results 
from Paper 1 indicate that this guardian role is dependent upon the organisational 
connection to the project owner. In cases where the project management was found to 
be in the same organisation as the owner, project management was more likely to be 
positive to flexibility, compared to cases where project management had a weaker 
organisational connection to the project owner and the guardian role could be 
exercised more freely.
Incentives open to the stakeholders is an explaining factor for the stakeholders’ 
perspective on project flexibility. Flexibility options have a value for stakeholders that 
benefit from changes and late locking of final scope. In the study presented in Paper 
1, the stakeholders that had their incentives related to achieving the project’s purpose 
were the advocates of flexibility. Stakeholders that had their incentives related to 
delivering the project on time and within budget saw flexibility as a threat. External 
flexibility usually means that the contractors have to spend resources on adapting. 
However, contractors may also have incentives to embrace change because this gives 
them room to ask for additional payments. This is discussed by Garel & Midler 
(2001) in relation to contract structures. 
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Based on results presented in Paper 1 and Paper 3, Figure 7 indicates that the room for 
external flexibility decreases over time. As the project scope becomes clarified, the 
relative focus on internal flexibility increases. The analysis of scope reductions 
presented in Paper 3 can be seen as an illustration of external flexibility. The shape of 
the right half of Figure 7 is based on these results, where external flexibility decreases 
rapidly after the final approval of a project. 
Front-end Execution
Internal flexibilityExternal flexibility
Project
time
Relative share
Figure 7. External and internal flexibility in a time perspective. 
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5. Effectiveness and efficiency 
Project success is often measured in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. In general, 
efficiency is related to producing direct outputs, and effectiveness is related to added 
value for owners and users. Changes usually reduce project efficiency. Flexible 
approaches in projects are frequently seen as enablers of effectiveness. One key 
purpose of project flexibility is to achieve flexible projects without creating a flow of 
scope changes. Cost of changes is a common argument against project flexibility. 
Changes are key issues when discussing flexibility, but project flexibility as discussed 
in this thesis is a wider concept than scope change management. 
5.1 Cost implications 
Figure 8 shows the relative cost in relation to the degree of flexibility. Two curves are 
drawn: one for internal (how?) flexibility and one for external (what?) flexibility. 
Increasing cost for high external flexibility is primarily related to external changes. To 
be highly flexible causes, on average, a higher cost, compared to a project that is less 
flexible. Increased cost of high flexibility comes either from redundant resources to 
manage changes and decision iterations, or unintended change to cost if such 
redundancy was not available but changes came anyway. This relation is similar to the 
traditional curve with increasing cost of changes over time in a project. It should be 
noted that increased cost can be compensated for by increased benefits. On the other 
hand, the cost curve related to internal flexibility decreases with higher flexibility. 
The fewer restrictions, the better opportunities a contactor or project manager has to 
optimise the use of available resources. This is a part of the logic behind lean 
construction.
The results presented in this thesis have shown significant cost overruns for highly 
flexible projects. Cost overruns have ranged at c.100% for highly flexible projects, as 
shown in Paper 7. These results have justified a steep rising cost curve for external 
flexibility in Figure 8. In comparison, Jacobsen (2006) refers to cost reductions 
related to high internal flexibility (or more precisely, related to lean construction 
implementations in the USA and Denmark) at c.10%. Koerckel et al. (2005) report 
that a lean construction initiative resulted in a 6.4% budget underrun on a railway 
investment project (related to the railway tunnel between Britain and France). The 
relatively flat curve related to cost reduction for internal flexibility is drawn with 
these numbers in mind.  
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Figure 8. Indications of cost in relation to the degree of flexibility for internal 
flexibility and external flexibility.  
Changes are a source of major disagreements between different project stakeholders. 
This issue deserves some attention, and is addressed in the next section. 
5.2 Changes
As pointed out by Williams (2000), change control is an established part of project 
management. Many textbooks on project management, including those by the PMI 
(2004) and Samset (2001), include explanations and illustrations which show that the 
scope change cost is typically low in the front-end phase of projects, and becomes 
increasingly higher with time. This increase in scope change cost over time is widely 
accepted, and is a major challenge to project flexibility. Once a project has been 
decided upon and the planning or execution has begun, scope changes are likely to 
reduce the efficiency of the project, as shown by Hanna et al. (2002).
The PMI (2004) defines the management of both changes and extensions as scope 
change control. A wide range of authors (including Morris & Hough 1987, Eikeland 
2001, Love et al. 2004) have pointed to scope changes as a key driver to cost overruns 
of projects. Based on a study of 448 projects, Dvir & Lechler (2004) showed that 
changes in both plans and goals of projects typically reduce both the efficiency and 
customer satisfaction of engineering projects. Scope changes are key issues when 
discussing flexibility, but project flexibility as discussed in this thesis is a wider 
concept than scope change management. A change requires that something already 
has been decided and a project baseline has been established (PMI 2004). One key 
purpose of project flexibility is to achieve flexible projects without creating scope 
changes in them. 
Typically, a scope change is proposed because the users or project owner want to 
increase the effectiveness of the project. As shown by Ibbs et al. (2001), using 
benefit-to-cost ratio, the reduction in efficiency might be compensated by a higher 
increase in effectiveness, depending on the timing and type of change. Two sources of 
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conflicts related to scope changes can be identified. First, conflicts may arise 
regarding quantification of the increase in effectiveness and reduction in efficiency. 
This is related to the high and unpredictable cost of change orders. The second 
conflict source is linked to allocating responsibility for reductions in efficiency. 
Challenges in estimating the effect of changes orders are discussed by Eden, Williams 
& Ackermann (2005). They particularly point to problems in finding a reference point 
which describes the performance of a project in a period when the project was not 
disturbed by changes. Eden, Ackermann & Williams (2005) describes underlying 
mechanisms for how changes can cause cost overruns. They point to non-linear 
relations between changes and cost development.  
Project internal processes can be simulated, either ex ante to predict the outcome of a 
particular project design or ex post to explain and illustrate causes and effects in 
projects. Kunz, Levitt & Jin (1998) and Christiansen (1993) describe how principles 
from general management research can be applied in a computer based simulation 
model. This type of simulation has been used as decision support to predict the 
outcome of a particular project, as shown by Kunz, Rivero & Levitt (2000) and DNV 
(2000). Williams (2003) proposes combined use of causal mapping and System 
Dynamics to analyse the effect of a delay upon a project.
To quantify the effect of changes, Cooper & Reichelt (2004) have performed 
simulations of the aggregated disruptions caused by changes. Their simulations 
predicted that a change equivalent to 10% of the total project budget would cause 
disruptions amounting to 2.8 times the estimated size of a change.  
Løken (2005) tested this estimate on a major scope change (called ‘U96’) in a 
Norwegian hospital project (Nytt Rikshospital). Based on a cut-off in year 2000, the 
scope change isolated was estimated to 424 million NOK, equivalent to c.10% the 
total cost. At the same cut-off time, total cost overruns were estimated to 1,105 
million NOK. Simulations of Cooper & Reichelt (2004) then predict that such a 
change causes disruptions in the order of 2.8 times the estimated size of a change, or 
1,013 million NOK. One interpretation of this is that disruptions from the scope 
change caused 92% the total cost overruns. This interpretation is supported by an 
evaluation report of the project (Arbeids- og administrasjonsdepartementet 2001). The 
evaluation report claims that this particular scope change was a major contribution to 
the total cost overruns, even though there were other additional factors.
Paper 3 studied how change management was approached in quality assurance 
reports. The strong emphasis on scope change management in the quality assurance 
reports indicates that changes and flexibility are primarily treated as something to be 
minimised, or at least to have a strict regime for. Management of changes was 
mentioned as a top issue in half of the projects. In most cases, the purpose was to 
establish a structured management of scope changes in order to minimise the amount 
and size of the changes.
Thus, at least two different strategies can be identified to manage scope changes: 
either to avoid changes or to reduce the negative impact from any changes that do 
arise. In the following, these two approaches for change management will be 
discussed in relation to redundancy. 
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5.3 Redundancy 
According to Galbraith (1973), a critical limiting factor of organisations is the ability 
to handle the non-routine events that cannot be anticipated or planned for. When the 
‘exceptions’ become too prevalent, they overwhelm the hierarchy’s ability to process 
them. Variations in organisation design arise from different strategies to increase 
planning ability and to reduce the number of exceptional events that management 
must resolve. 
Galbraith (1973) defines a number of organisational forms that firms apply to manage 
uncertainty. These are either designed to increase capacity for information processing, 
or to reduce the need for information processing. Improvements in vertical or 
horizontal information processing are used to increase capacity for information 
processing. Slack resources or creation of self-contained tasks are used to reduce the 
information processing need. Self-contained tasks will be discussed in the next 
chapter, in relation to modularity. 
Redundancy is an enabler for flexibility (Sager 1994). According to Landau (1969), 
redundancy is created by repetition, duplication and overlap. Galbraith (1973) points 
out that slack resources constitute an additional cost to an organisation. If a firm fails 
to actively create other strategies to address uncertainty, the slack resources strategy 
will occur by default. The logic behind redundancy is that a plan incorporating 
redundancy will be efficient because it can be executed as planned, compared to a 
plan with no redundancy that is vulnerable and error-prone in reality. Thompson 
(1967) also points out that the use of buffers or slack is common strategy for coping 
with uncertainty. 
In Figure 9, ‘precision’ is used to indicate low redundancy and ‘slack’ to indicate high 
redundancy. The figure is inspired by a table in Olsson & Haugland (2004). 
Management of changes is another characteristic of alternative project flexibility 
strategies. Flexibility approaches can either aim at avoiding changes or managing 
changes. Figure 9 shows how these two perspectives, degree of redundancy and 
change management, characterise different approaches to project flexibility 
management. In the following, the different strategies are briefly presented.
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Figure 9. Flexibility strategies in relation to redundancy and change 
management. (Paper 8, fig. 3) 
Avoid changes, high redundancy 
Redundancy can be achieved by over-specification of future functionality. Future 
needs may be met without physical changes. Such needs may emerge during the 
project execution, or after the project has been delivered. Redundancy can also enable 
front-end analyses of alternative project concepts, which require recourses and time 
but may avoid later changes.  
Avoid changes, low redundancy 
Aiming at a clear agreement on scope represents a traditional project management 
approach – to zoom in on project scope and then execute. After establishing the scope, 
project management aims at minimising external flexibility.  
Manage changes, high redundancy 
High redundancy indicates a general capacity to manage a wide range of changes. 
‘Slack’ is a keyword, including budget reserves, time slack in plans and organisation 
capacity to manage changes. On average, this increases project cost. However, it may 
still prove cost effective if the alternative is that the project will face changes which it 
does not have the resources to manage. 
Manage changes, low redundancy 
In the process of locking specifications, certain parts are locked later than others. Low 
redundancy requires ability to identify and hedge areas exposed to changes. The late 
locking items must therefore be well defined and of a limited relative size.  
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6. Project flexibility categorisations  
One aim of the thesis is to identify and describe different aspects of project flexibility. 
The previous chapters have discussed flexibility related to project phases, 
stakeholders and incentives, efficiency and effectiveness as well as redundancy.  
Regarding categorisations of project flexibility, a distinction has already been made 
between internal and external flexibility. This chapter discusses flexibility related to 
modularity, flexible decision processes and flexible final products. The results of the 
analysis indicated that it was appropriate to make a distinction between planned and 
actual flexibility approaches. 
6.1 Producing a flexible result or producing the result in a flexible manner 
Flexibility in a project can be associated with the decision process or the final 
product. This chapter describes these two dimensions of flexibility, and investigates 
interaction between them. 
Flexibility in the decision process is based on an approach where decisions and 
commitments in the projects are made sequentially over episodes. The use of decision 
gate models provides a successive commitment to a project, as shown by Eskerod & 
Östergren (2000). Iterative and successive project decisions were also recommended 
by SIS TR 321 (Systems development reference model). The philosophy of not taking 
decisions until the last responsive moment, as shown by Ballard & Howell (2003), is 
also an example of flexibility in the decision process. 
Flexibility in the product means that the design of the final product (what the project 
will produce) has taken into consideration possible future changes in use or 
requirements. If requirements are altered, no changes are needed because the design 
can accommodate the revised requirements. Flexibility in the product is achieved 
when the final product of the project is prepared for alternative use. As described by 
Brand (1994) and Blakstad (2001), this approach to flexibility is used in building 
construction. According to Arge & Landstad (2002), a commonly used classification 
of building adaptability was made in Sweden during the 1960s and 1970s. Based on 
this classification, generality is the ability of the building to meet shifting demands 
without physical changes. In this terminology, flexibility is related to possibilities for 
technical changes with minimum cost and disturbance. Lastly, elasticity means the 
potential for adding to or reducing the size of the building. In this thesis, all three 
characteristics collectively are referred to as flexibility.  
Flexibility in the decision process and the product has been analysed independently by 
researchers previously (e.g. Brand 1994, Slaughter 2001, Boehm & Turner 2003). 
However, fewer studies have been made on the interaction between dimensions, Gill 
et al. (2005) being a notable exception. Flexibility in the decision process and the 
product may interact for any given project. Different types of interaction are depicted 
in Figure 10, each characterised by high or low flexibility in the process and product 
respectively. In Figure 10, high flexibility in the decision process in the study includes 
changes, extensions and iterations in the project preparations. A high flexibility in the 
product means that the result of the project is prepared for alternative use.
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The situation with low flexibility in both the product and the decision process means 
that no preparations for project flexibility are made. A strategy characterised by high 
flexibility in the product and low flexibility in the process is termed a ‘robust 
concept’. One assumption was that the decision process related to this type of project 
can be fairly straightforward because the result of the project is prepared for 
alternative use.  
A basic principle in the situation with low flexibility in the product, and high 
flexibility in the process is that final decisions can be postponed in order to gain as 
much knowledge as possible. The situation with high flexibility in both the product 
and the process contains many of the aspects related to the other two strategies with 
high flexibility in either the process or the product. 
The degree of flexibility in the product is typically intentionally established at an 
early stage in a project. On the other hand, a flexible decision process may either be 
intended or ad hoc. 
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Figure 10. Flexibility in the product and the decision process. (Based on Paper 1, 
fig. 1) 
Paper 1 describes studies of observed flexibility in 18 projects. Less than one-third of 
the projects had prepared for flexible decision processes. Paper 7 analyses flexibility 
in the decision process and the product related to cost overruns for the same 18 
projects. Regardless of flexibility in the product, the 10 projects with highly flexible 
decision processes resulted in more than a 100% cost overrun, compared to the initial 
budgets. Most of these projects were subject to changes, extensions and iterations 
(summarised as ‘flexibility in the decision process’).
There are indications that projects with highly flexible product designs also had 
flexible decision processes as a response to contextual uncertainty. If this is the case, 
flexible products and flexible decision processes cannot compensate for each other as 
clear-cut as described in connection to Figure 10. It should be noted that the results 
are based on studies of few projects, especially when the projects are divided into 
subgroups.
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6.2 Modularity
Flexibility can be related to the degree of modularity in projects. Modularity refers to 
the possibility to divide a project into more or less independent sub-units. According 
to Miller & Lessard (2000), modularity can enable projects to cope with uncertainty 
because individual components do not have a critical role. 
Design modularity is a common approach to achieve flexibility (Thomke 1997, 
Hellström & Wikström 2005). Hellström & Wikström (2005: 394) define 
modularisation as ‘decomposition of a part of a product into building blocks 
(modules) with specified interfaces, driven by company-specific reasons’. Thomke 
(1997) claims that modularisation in product development projects is primarily a tool 
to improve project efficiency. One benefit of design modularity is that the ‘knock-on’ 
effects of changes can be reduced. 
Galbraith (1973) defined organisational forms that firms apply to manage uncertainty. 
One strategy for reducing the need for information processing is the creation of self-
contained tasks. This can be seen as a form of modularisation. 
An approach of minimal commitment at each decision stage is a part of the ‘anti-
disaster methodology’ proposed by Hall (1980: 267). According to Hall (1980: 272) 
‘this would generally mean an incremental or adaptive approach to development of 
any kind, rather than a new major departure; it would suggest enlargement and 
adaptation of existing airports rather than building new ones’. Lee & Xia (2005) 
found that smaller and shorter information systems projects experienced fewer 
changes than larger projects and were more efficient in dealing with changes. They 
advise that projects with a duration of more than three to six months can be divided 
into time-boxes with well-defined deliverables. Another approach to incremental 
decision making is also found in real options (Amram & Kulatlaka 1999, Brennan & 
Trigeorgis 2000).
Civil engineering projects are often seen as indivisible and irreversible. Statements 
such as ‘we do not build half a bridge’ are used to argue against flexibility and 
modularisation. Miller & Lessard (2000) point to the irreversibility of large 
engineering projects and the importance of bold commitment from key stakeholders. 
In contrast, Genus (1997) advocates flexible and incremental decision making in large 
engineering projects, based on experiences from the Channel Tunnel between Britain 
and France.  
The results presented in Paper 1 and Paper 8 also indicate that modularity frequently 
is an enabler for flexible decision processes. Highly modular projects were found 
likely to have highly flexible decision processes.
Modularity has been presented as an enabler for flexible project management. 
Modularity can be applied on a micro and macro level. On a micro level, design 
modularity is a tool for efficiency, including minimising the negative effect of 
changes. On a macro level, modularity is an enabler for flexible decisions processes. 
By dividing projects into independent sub-units, decision makers can make the 
incremental commitments.  
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As an example of modularisation on macro level, major infrastructure investments can 
be treated as one entity, or be divided into smaller, more or less independent projects. 
To analyse the effect of dividing a major project into a set of smaller ones, four 
railway investments have been analysed in Paper 5.  
Figure 11 visualises that the four projects all had different characteristics regarding 
how they were planned, and how they actually were carried out. In Figure 11 ‘Planned 
approach’ relates to how the project was intended to be decided upon and executed in 
the front-end phase; ‘Actual approach’ describes how the projects were finally 
decided upon and executed.
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Figure 11. A model for planning and execution of railway investment projects, 
and how the studied projects fit the model. (Paper 5, fig. 2) 
Figure 12 shows the location of the studied projects in the Norwegian railway 
network.
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Figure 12. The Norwegian rail network and location of studied projects (in grey). 
The size and location of the new built rail lines are only for illustrational 
purpose. (Paper 5, fig. 1) 
Table 2 presents a summary of the impact of the four railway projects studied. A 
comparison was made between the forecast and actual outcome of selected variables: 
travel time, frequency, punctuality, and number of travellers. The analysis also 
included a comparison between the situation before and after the investments. The 
study presented in Paper 5 indicates that the major drawback with section-by-section 
investments is that the traffic is not adjusted when each new railway section opens. 
Timetables must be adjusted to utilise new and potentially faster railway sections. 
Results presented in Paper 5 indicate that a critical mass of potential improvement is 
needed to justify timetable changes that utilise new infrastructure. Investments that 
are executed as integrated projects appear to be more likely to achieve timetable 
adjustments, compared to investments built and decided upon section by section.
Actual project 
approach 
Development in 
number of travellers, 
compared to before 
Train traffic 
compared to before 
Cost 
Section by section Small changes Moderate 
improvements 
Control 
Integrated Major increase Major improvements Overruns 
Table 2. Observed impact from the studied project strategies. (Paper 5, table 8) 
A real options approach to railway investment aims at maximising the benefit/cost 
ratio by sequenced decisions, continuously utilising updated information. The study in 
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Paper 5 questions the possibilities to actually achieve reliable information related to 
benefits. The effects of investments do not materialise until the combined investments 
on a line reach a certain level. Dividing an investment into a series of sections, 
decided upon individually, may therefore result in lower benefits in terms of, for 
example, travel time, compared to an integrated project approach. These results are 
contrary to common understanding in the project management field, where flexibility 
usually is seen as a means of achieving increased benefit from a project, as described 
in Paper 4. 
If modularisation of railway investments has disadvantages related to the realisation 
of benefits, it appears to provide cost control. These results are in accordance with 
Flyvbjerg et al. (2004), who point out that cost escalation of major transportation 
investments is highly dependent on the length of the project implementation phase. 
Longer implementation causes higher cost escalation.   
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7. Conclusions
This thesis aimed at structuring knowledge on project flexibility. Based on studies of 
different parts of the life cycle of projects, it was hoped that the research would 
provide indications to how flexibility can be addressed in the front-end phase of large 
public investments. This chapter summarises the findings and implications from the 
research. It should be borne in mind that it cannot be statistically proved that the 
findings are generally applicable. Validity and reliability associated with the data used 
in this thesis are not sufficient to provide solid answers, taken in isolation. Further 
research is needed to clarify to what extent these indications are of a general nature or 
project-specific. 
7.1 How can different aspects of flexibility in projects be analysed? 
One aim of the thesis is to identify different aspects of flexibility and to discuss how 
they can contribute to analysis and management of project flexibility. Figure 13 
shows how the different aspects can be put together as a framework for analysis of 
project flexibility. The framework for analysis consists of project flexibility 
categorisations, perspectives of analysis, and flexibility drivers and enablers.
Four categorisations of project flexibility have been discussed: planned flexibility 
versus actual flexibility approaches; internal flexibility versus external flexibility; 
flexible decision processes versus flexible final products; and modularity on macro 
and micro level.  
Three perspectives on project flexibility are used. Project flexibility is seen from the 
perspective of different stakeholders, in different project phases and related to 
efficiency and effectiveness. 
Finally, drivers and enables of project flexibility are listed and discussed. Uncertainty, 
project duration, conflicts, and insufficient project preparations are highlighted as 
flexibility drivers. The enablers are degree of redundancy, incentives open to the 
stakeholders, and modularity. The thesis has discussed flexibility, both related to each 
aspect in the framework individually, and seen in combination. When analysed in 
combination, the aspects have been combined two and two. 
Flexibility
categorisations
Planned vs. actual flexibility
Internal vs. external flexibility
Decision process vs. products
Enablers
Redundancy
Incentives
Modularity (micro and macro)
Project phases
Stakeholders
Efficiency vs. effectiveness
Perspectives
of analysis Drivers
Uncertainty
Duration
Conflicts
Insufficient preparations
Flexibility options 
Figure 13. Framework for analysing project flexibility. (Paper 8, fig. 1) 
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Flexibility categorisations 
The following is a short summary of findings related to the applied flexibility 
categorisations. 
Planned flexibility versus actual flexibility approaches 
Approaches to project flexibility have been analysed over time. In the studies, there 
was a need to make a distinction between planned and actual approaches to flexibility. 
Approaches to flexibility changed during the projects. Actual approaches turned out to 
be different from planned approaches.  
Internal flexibility versus external flexibility 
Another distinction was made between internal and external project flexibility. When 
flexibility is discussed in the literature and in general, it is most often related to 
external flexibility, referring to adjustments of project scope. This was also the case 
for the early work on this thesis. Project internal flexibility relates to flexibility within 
a defined scope – how requirements are to be met. Particularly, analyses of 
stakeholder approaches to flexibility are highly dependent upon whether internal or 
external flexibility is the subject of discussion. Internal and external flexibility are 
responses to contextual and internal uncertainty. However, internal flexibility is not 
limited to being a response to internal uncertainty. External flexibility can be, but 
does not have to be, a response to contextual uncertainty. All combinations of the two 
dimensions can be found. 
Flexible decision process versus flexible final products 
Project flexibility was divided into flexibility in the decision process and the product 
may interact for any given project. For the purpose of categorising flexibility, a 
distinction between the flexibility types has been meaningful. This thesis has also 
made an attempt to study the interaction between flexibility in decision processes and 
the product. It was expected that flexible final products would compensate for less 
flexible decision processes and vice versa. The results show that this interaction is not 
as visible as first expected. This may be due to the small sample of projects. It may 
also be an indication that flexible projects utilise both flexible products and flexible 
decision processes, rather than emphasising one of these dimensions at the expense of 
the other. 
Perspectives of analysis 
The results indicate that project flexibility is perceived differently depending on 
whose view one takes, and which part of a project’s life cycle is subject to analysis.  
Stakeholders
As mentioned above, incentives open to stakeholders affect their approaches to 
project flexibility. Flexible projects have been presented as a blessing and curse. One 
aspect of this duality is that the flexibility for one project stakeholder can be another 
stakeholder’s risk. Project internal flexibility appears to be particularly desirable to 
project managers and contractors. Project external flexibility is more likely to be 
looked upon favourably by users and project owners, than by project managers and 
contractors.
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Project phases 
Flexibility in the front-end phases is the least controversial aspect of project 
flexibility. This is particularly related to external flexibility. One objective of front-
end management is to provide a well-defined framework for efficient project 
implementation. Project flexibility can then be restricted to adjustments within the 
strategic framework. The thesis has discussed the theoretical foundation for this 
approach, and shown empirically that minimising external flexibility after the front-
end phase increases the likelihood of completing projects on time, within budget and 
according to specifications.  
Efficiency and effectiveness 
Project flexibility has been studied from both efficiency and effectiveness 
perspectives. The case in favour of flexibility emphasises the possibility to increase a 
project’s effectiveness. As indicated in Figure 14, effectiveness is primarily addressed 
by external flexibility. Project scope is adjusted to utilise benefit opportunities. 
Regarding efficiency, such adjustment of project scope typically causes cost of 
changes. The net effect comes from a balance between the values of benefit 
opportunities and incurred cost of changes.
Internal flexibility (within the scope of a project) is primarily linked to cost reduction 
opportunities, which can be utilised by project management or involved contractors.
Efficiency Effectiveness
External
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(What?)
Internal
flexibility
(How?)
Change
costs
(Limited
Impact)
Benefit
opportunities
Cost reduction
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Figure 14. Internal and external flexibility versus efficiency and effectiveness. 
The analyses presented in this thesis indicate a major challenge in materialising the 
expected benefits. On the other hand, the expected decrease in efficiency as a 
consequence of project flexibility has been frequently observed throughout the 
analysis.
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Drivers
In this context, drivers are factors that create needs or impose pressure on projects to 
be flexible.
Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is the key driver for project flexibility, and arguably the only one. The 
other drivers mentioned below are in fact only highlights of selected types of 
uncertainty. In this thesis, uncertainty has been related to a gap between the amount of 
information needed to make a decision and the amount of information available 
(based on Galbraith 1993). In order to manage this information gap, flexibility is 
primarily a way of reducing the amount of information needed. Other project 
management approaches often focuses on increasing the available amount of 
information. 
Duration
The longer the duration of a project, the more likely it is that some prerequisites 
become no longer valid. Long duration is likely to result in more or less suppressed 
need for scope changes. Both cost and demand estimates are more uncertain the 
longer the time perspective is. What is ‘long’ duration is highly dependent upon the 
type of project. Experiences from previous projects of the same type provide 
indications of how long prerequisites are likely to stay sufficiently stable.
Conflicts 
Flexible projects can contribute to conflict solutions. However, conflicts that arose 
during the preparation or execution of a project have been observed as an important 
driver for flexibility. Project flexibility can also be an issue of conflict. Flexible 
decision processes are likely to be valued by those who do not prefer an initial 
decision. Stakeholders who benefit from the initial decisions are less likely to favour a 
continued flexible decision process.
Insufficient preparations 
Even though it is not a recommended situation, projects that for political or other 
reasons are pushed to a premature go-ahead decision are likely to need an active 
approach to flexibility. This type of project has been observed to be flexible, not 
because of opportunities for increased benefit or reduced cost, but to be possible to 
implement. For such projects, project flexibility serves as a cover-up for a lack of 
preparation.
Flexibility options  
Availability of flexibility options and redundant resources can serve as an invitation to 
make adjustments. Of the studied projects, those with a high planned flexibility in the 
decision process also had a high actual flexibility in the decision process. If there are 
possibilities for adjustments and iterations, it is likely that flexibility options will be 
utilised. This means that the presence (or knowledge) of flexibility enablers can work 
as a flexibility driver. 
7. Conclusions
39
Enablers
This thesis refers to enablers as factors that contribute to making it possible for 
projects to be flexible.
Degree of redundancy 
Redundancy has been presented as an enabler for flexibility. Redundancy can be 
applied to flexibility in both the product and decision process. Flexibility in the 
product may be achieved by over-specification of future functionality. A flexible 
decision process calls for redundant recourses and time to perform analyses of 
alternative project concepts. The rationality behind the use of redundancy is that this 
use of resources is cost effective compared to later major changes.  
Incentives
Incentives for different project stakeholders are strongly related to the contracting 
structure of a project and other financial obligations. A common tool for achieving 
flexibility in projects is the use of option-based contracts, which enable a continuous 
locking of the projects. Flexibility has a value for those that can benefit from 
adjustments, and it is a cost for those who have to adapt. The fewer restrictions on 
their part of the project, the better opportunities there are for any stakeholder to 
optimise the use of available resources.  
Modularity on macro and micro level 
Modularity has also been identified as an enabler for flexible project management. On 
a micro level, design modularity is a tool for efficiency because it may reduce 
negative effect of changes. On a macro level, it has been shown that modularity can 
be an enabler for flexible decision processes because decision makers can make the 
incremental commitments. Macro modularisation of projects usually means that each 
module can be produced over a shorter time period than would have been the case for 
an integrated project. Shorter execution time reduces the probability for major 
adjustments during the project. Modularity on macro level was analysed for railway 
investment projects. In the studied projects, macro modularisation was associated with 
cost control but also with lower benefit realisation than planned. 
7.2 What are the implications for front-end management?  
Successful strategies for project flexibility either aim at avoiding flexibility in projects 
or enabling projects to manage flexibility. Projects avoid adjustments or live with 
them. To be more specific and using the terminology presented in the thesis, 
successful strategies aim either at avoiding external flexibility after the front-end 
phase, or at managing external flexibility during the planning and execution phases. 
The following discussion is related to external flexibility. Project internal flexibility 
has not been analysed enough in this thesis to provide implications for project 
management. 
The longer the time-frame of a project, the less likely it is that prerequisites will 
remain unchanged. This means that the longer the time-frame of a project, the more 
important it is to prepare the project to either avoid or manage changes. 
Even though the results are based on studies of a few projects, this thesis has shown 
that the potential drawbacks of flexible projects are substantial, both in terms of 
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efficiency and effectiveness. There are also indications that the drawbacks are largest 
when projects do not prepare for subsequent adjustments. This notion is consistent 
with previous works on flexibility, including Sager (1994), Volberda (1997), Abbot & 
Banerji (2003), and Turner (2004), that view managing flexibility as an orderly 
response to a changing world.
The thesis has identified some characteristics of successful project flexibility 
management. These findings can be of value in front-end preparations of future 
projects. The following summary is based on results presented in the literature, along 
with results from the studied projects. Four approaches to project flexibility 
management are presented in Table 3, together with a summary of strengths and 
weaknesses for each approach.   
Objective Approach Strengths Weaknesses Applications 
Avoid
adjustments 
(after locking of 
scope)
1. Late locking 
of project scope 
and fast 
execution
Utilises the 
strengths of 
front-end
(openness) and 
execution phase 
(focus)
Depends on fast 
locking of scope 
and execution. 
Lack of 
decisions in 
front-end phase 
can cause 
frustration.
Product
development 
projects
Manage
(limited) 
adjustments 
2. Shield off 
areas of 
uncertainty 
Allows the 
major part of a 
project to be 
executed
without
adjustments 
Still-open items 
must be of 
limited size 
(max. 10-15%). 
Identifying the 
right items 
Technical
installations in 
buildings finally 
specified later 
than the rest of 
project
Avoid
adjustments (in 
modules); 
Manage
adjustments 
(between
modules) 
3. Incremental 
commitments 
Allows each 
module to be 
executed
without changes 
Each module 
will provide 
benefits. Longer 
total
implementation 
time
Roads or 
railways divided 
into sections 
Manage
adjustments 
4. Absorption More cost 
effective than 
dealing with 
adjustments 
with no 
available
resources
Amount of 
adjustments can 
escalate beyond 
control
Over-
specification of 
functionality. 
Redundant
engineering
capacity 
Table 3. Approaches to external flexibility management. 
The four approaches are described in more detail in the following. Each approach is 
illustrated, including a comparison to the generic figures in Figure 2 and Figure 4. The 
dashed ‘high to low’ curve that illustrates decreasing freedom for manoeuvre is the 
same in Figure 15, Figure 16, Figure 17, and Figure 18. This curve represents a 
‘traditional’ project preparation and implementation. The purpose of Figure 15, Figure 
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16, Figure 17, and Figure 18 is to illustrate how each approach differs from a 
‘traditional’ project. In reality, most projects are likely to choose a combination of the 
suggested approaches. 
1. Late locking of scope and fast execution 
After an extensive front-end phase, the project scope is defined and the project is 
executed. This is similar to a traditional project management approach, but 
emphasises a fast transition from front-end to execution. The approach means 
minimising external flexibility after the scope is established.
High
Low
Degree 
of freedom
to manoeuvre
Project
time
1.
Figure 15. Illustration of a situation of late locking of scope and fast execution. 
(Based on Midler 1995, fig. 5) 
2. Shield off areas of uncertainty 
In the process of defining project scope, certain parts may be defined later than others. 
This can be manageable, provided that the still-open items are well defined and of a 
limited relative size. Areas where there is substantial uncertainty can be identified. 
The bulk of the scope can be defined in the front-end phase, while some issues remain 
unsettled until later stages. There are indications that no more than 10–15% of the 
scope can be kept open in this way. 
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Project
time
Major
parts
of project
Shielded
parts
of projectHigh
Low
Degree 
of freedom
to manoeuvre
2.
Figure 16. Illustration of a situation of where areas of uncertainty are shielded 
off for late locking. (Paper 7, fig. 7) 
3. Incremental commitments 
In an incremental approach, projects are committed to piece by piece. Large projects 
are decided upon and executed as a series of smaller projects. Each module can be 
executed relatively isolated due to a relatively short implementation period. 
Modularising (on the macro level) of major projects offer flexibility options for 
decision makers. For modular projects, effectiveness may be low unless each module 
is designed to provide benefits as individual deliveries, and not only providing a 
foundation for future improvements. 
Project
time
3a. 3b. 3c.
High
Low
Degree 
of freedom
to manoeuvre
Figure 17. Illustration of a situation of incremental commitments, in three steps. 
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4. Absorption 
Absorption can be obtained by redundancy or decoupling of dependencies. Regarding 
the physical design, redundancy includes over-specification and other types of 
flexibility in the product. Decoupling of dependencies can be achieved by a modular 
design, which reduces domino effects from changes. As for the project organisation, 
‘slack’ is a keyword, including budget reserves, time slack in plans and organisation 
capacity to manage changes. In the studied projects, the lack of available resources 
has been observed more frequently than availability of such resources. With reference 
to Figure 18, means that a project is designed to address some of the desired room for 
manoeuvring that occurs, even if it violates the actual room for manoeuvring. In 
practice, this means to manage changes. 
High
Low
Degree 
of freedom
to manoeuvre
Project
time
Desired
room for
manoeuvring
Figure 18. Illustration of a situation where a project is designed to absorb 
changes. (Based on Figure 4) 
7.3 Generalising results 
The bulk of the research presented in this thesis is based on case studies. Case studies 
are generally not intended or suitable for generalisation of the results. The small 
samples in the studies do not warrant the use of statistical tools to test consistency and 
co-variation of data, particularly when subgroups of the material are subject to 
analysis.
Strictly speaking, the findings in this thesis are valid only for the scope of the 
observations made. However, all major Norwegian governmental investments (as this 
type of project was defined by the Ministry of Finance in 2001) that were approved 
between 2000 and 2004, have been included in the analysis. Among major Norwegian 
governmental investments carried out between 1986 and 2000, the sample is judged to 
be relatively representative. The studied railway projects include four of the largest 
railway investments in Norway since 1980. Regarding major Norwegian 
governmental investments, the sample is probably representative. To a certain extent 
the sample covers all applicable projects. Focusing on major Norwegian 
governmental investments, the major weakness of this thesis is probably not whether 
the studied projects are representative or not, but whether the studied aspects of the 
projects are comprehensive.   
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As mentioned, the vast majority of the studied projects are Norwegian governmental 
projects, and all projects were in a ‘public sector context’. While some of the 
principles discussed in the thesis are likely to be relevant for non-governmental 
projects, other aspects are likely to be different in commercial projects. 
Stakeholder roles are likely to be different in projects where there is a close business 
link between investment costs and realised benefits. A close business link means both 
in terms of short time horizon and accountability for investment costs. Such close 
business links can be present in investments in new production facilities. The 
investment cost will be compensated for by increased productivity and possibly 
increased production volume. In such situations, it is likely that more stakeholders 
will be involved in balancing cost/benefit ratios regarding project scope and 
adjustments. However, the results from this thesis are likely to be more relevant to 
commercial projects for which the business link is not so close. This is the case if 
there is a long time between a decision and the ‘moment of truth’ when the 
investment provides payback, or when accountability for investment costs is less 
direct.
Only Norwegian investment projects have been analysed. The presentation of 
previous research has not been limited to Norwegian studies. During the literature 
search, one possible difference was found between experiences from Norwegian 
projects and general experiences in the project management community. In a 
Scandinavian management tradition, user involvement is emphasised as a key success 
factor in projects involving organisational change (see, for example, Trist & Bamforth 
1951, Emery & Thorsrud 1976). The degree of user involvement is likely to vary 
between different countries and traditions. These variations may also influence other 
stakeholder roles in projects. On a detailed level, Paper 5 includes a discussion about 
the extent to which experiences from Norwegian railway projects are applicable to 
other countries. 
7.4  Further research 
This thesis has explored project flexibility in a general perspective. An analysis of 
project flexibility in relation to project types; including industry, uncertainty level and 
degree of innovation is recommended. Industry-specific models and guidelines for 
project flexibility are likely to appeal to practitioners within the project management 
field. Further research is needed to map the implementation and effects of different 
approaches to flexibility in different types of projects. 
Four approaches to flexibility management were proposed. A fifth approach can be 
imagined. With reference to Figure 18, this would mean to lower the ‘desired room 
for manoeuvring’-curve. In practice, this means to reduce the number and size of 
desired changes. To reduce user initiated changes, alignment, collaboration and 
communication in the front-end phase are likely issues. Computer-based visualisation 
tools can contribute to earlier and increased understanding of project deliveries. To 
anticipate and reduce owner initiated changes, selecting proper project concepts are a 
key issue, and it has to a certain extent been addressed in the thesis.  
7. Conclusions
45
There appears to be a gap between the resistance to flexible projects among project 
management practitioners on the one side, and the promotion of flexibility by 
academics and stakeholders with no incentives related to project efficiency on the 
other side. This calls for increased emphasis on active use of present and developing 
knowledge of project flexibility. In addition, the project management filed can benefit 
from a pragmatic convergence of an idealistic promotion of project flexibility on one 
side, and experience-based hesitation to flexibility on the other side.
Regarding change management, analysis of which types of scope changes can be 
managed without severe reductions in project efficiency is proposed. There exist some 
developed simulation tools and methods which can be used to illustrate the effect of 
changes. Further use of such models is suggested. In order to calibrate the models, 
and gain additional understanding, it is interesting to simulate well documented 
projects ex post, so that simulated and observed results can be compared for the same 
projects.
The thesis has discussed flexibility relating to selected aspects individually, and in 
two-dimensional combinations. With larger samples, this type of analysis would 
benefit from regression analysis along the different aspects.
Further research is also called for to investigate the connection between 
modularisation of infrastructure investments and the realisation of anticipated 
benefits. This was especially discussed in Paper 5 in relation to railway investments. 
One question that arose was whether relatively limited investments in transportation 
infrastructure, and railways in particular, should be evaluated based on the actual 
reduction in travel time, or rather the potential travel time.  
Finally, continued use of a combination of qualitative and quantitative research in the 
project management field is desirable. Such designs have the possibility to contribute 
to enhancing the credibility of project management as a research field. While 
structured qualitative research designs have been successfully applied, there is a 
potential for the increased use of quantitative research designs.
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Abstract
Project managers are challenged to keep their projects focused and at the same time support their organisations need to adapt to
changes and uncertainty in the business environment. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the dynamics related to project ﬂex-
ibility, both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective. To ensure the eﬃciency of the project organisations, ﬂexibility is usually
not desired in the late phases of projects. The projects in this study often applied ﬂexibility even during these phases, usually based
on initiatives from project owners or users. It is paradoxical that while ﬂexibility was frequently needed in the studied projects, it was
rarely prepared for. As a consequence, structured approaches to project ﬂexibility management are called for. The study indicates
that the opinion on project ﬂexibility held by the involved stakeholders can to a large extent be explained by their incentives related
to the projects. The empirical results in this paper are based on a multi-case study covering 18 projects.
 2005 Elsevier Ltd and IPMA. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Managing projects; Implementing strategy; Flexibility; Adjustments
1. Introduction
In a changing world, there is a desire of project own-
ers and users to have ‘‘room to manoeuvre’’; to be able
to adjust projects as they gain knowledge about their
needs and changes in the project context, as discussed
by Midler [1]. A number of scholars, including Kreiner
[2], argue that ﬂexibility is necessary to face the changes
and uncertainty in the business environment. On the
other hand, a wide range of studies (including [3–5])
indicates that a clear project deﬁnition is a critical suc-
cess factor for projects.
This paper analyses ﬂexibility in large investments
projects. To begin with, project ﬂexibility is discussed
from a theoretical standpoint. In order to illustrate dif-
ferent aspects of ﬂexibility, 18 Norwegian projects have
been analysed. The projects include a wide range of dif-
ferent industries, project sizes and types. Most of the
projects are publicly ﬁnanced.
2. Perspectives on project ﬂexibility
Flexibility management is not a new concept. Sager
[6] found several examples of ﬂexibility as one approach
to prepare for the eﬀects of uncertainty in planning.
However, Sager also notes that ﬂexibility is an impor-
tant term often used by planners but rarely scrutinised
theoretically. Kreiner [2] points out that the traditional
focus on stability in project management becomes chal-
lenged under uncertainty. This creates ‘‘drifting environ-
ments’’. Kreiners drifting environments are not
necessarily caused by actual changes in the project con-
text. They may also occur when project stakeholders get
a better understanding of their actual needs and im-
proved ability to express the needs. Flexibility can also
be seen as a response to environmental uncertainty, as
0263-7863/$30.00  2005 Elsevier Ltd and IPMA. All rights reserved.
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discussed by Karlsen [7]. Real options are an established
perspective on project ﬂexibility with roots in ﬁnancial
options theory; see for example Brennan and Trigeorgis
[8]. In this perspective, the value of ﬂexibility can be
quantiﬁed in monetary terms. Amram and Kulatilaka
[9] compare ﬂexibility to owning an option – the right,
but not the obligation to take an action in the future.
According to the real-options paradigm, uncertainty
can increase the value of a project, as long as ﬂexibility
is preserved and resources are not irreversibly
committed.
Mandelbaum and Buzacott [10] uses the number of
the remaining alternatives after a decision has been ta-
ken as a measure of ﬂexibility. In a similar manner as
Midler [2], Eikeland [11] discusses project ﬂexibility re-
lated to ‘‘room for manoeuvring’’. The ‘‘room for
manoeuvring’’ is made up by future yet undetermined
internal decisions, and may also be seen as a measure-
ment of internal uncertainty of the project. According
to Eikeland [11], a decision is within the room for
manoeuvring if it does not violate the consequences of
previous decisions. Terms like adaptability and robust-
ness are often used when discussing issues related to
what this paper calls ﬂexibility. Flexibility may also be
described as a way of making irreversible decision more
reversible or postponing irreversible decisions until more
information is available. Husby et al. [12] deﬁnes project
ﬂexibility as ‘‘the capability to adjust the project to pro-
spective consequences of uncertain circumstances within
the context of the project’’. The use of the term ﬂexibil-
ity in this paper is based on this deﬁnition.
2.1. Flexibility in the process and the product
The capability of projects to adjust can be related to
how the projects are executed and to how adaptable the
ﬁnal product will be, once it has been produced. Flexi-
bility in the decision process is based on an approach
where decisions and commitments in the projects are
made sequentially over episodes.
Three strategies to achieve ﬂexibility in the decision
process may be identiﬁed. Firstly, a ‘‘late locking’’ of
project concepts, speciﬁcations and organisation can
be used, as discussed by Miller and Lessard [5]. Miller
and Lessard refer to late locking as an exploring, itera-
tive front-end process. They claim that late locking is
as key success criteria for large engineering projects.
Once the projects are locked, they are executed in a tra-
ditional way. The second strategy is related to a contin-
uous step-by-step locking of the project by a successive
commitment to projects. This may be achieved by the
use of decision gates models, as shown by Eskerod
and O¨stergren [13] or by incremental decision making,
as advocated by Genus [14]. The third strategy is found
in contingency planning, where a set of base plans is de-
ﬁned, but also a set of alternative plans that can be acti-
vated if needed. According to Chapman and Ward [15],
contingency plans reﬂect anticipated potential depar-
tures from the deﬁned plans for a project. Contingency
plans are alternative plans that can be used if the base-
line plans cannot be executed. Chapman and Ward
point out that it is important to restrict the development
of detailed contingency plans in order to reduce plan-
ning cost.
Flexibility in the product is achieved when the ﬁnal
product of the project is prepared for alternative use.
As described by Brand [16] and Blakkstad [17], this ap-
proach to ﬂexibility is used in building construction.
According to Arge and Landstad [18], a commonly used
classiﬁcation of building adaptability was made in Swe-
den during the 1960s and 1970s. Based on this classiﬁca-
tion, generality is the ability of the building to meet
shifting demands without physical changes. In this ter-
minology, ﬂexibility is the possibility for construction
and technical changes with minimum cost and distur-
bance. Finally, elasticity means the potential for increas-
ing or reducing the size of the building. In this paper, all
these three characteristics are summarised as ﬂexibility
in the product.
2.2. Interaction between ﬂexibility in the decision process
and the product
Flexibility in the decision process and the product
may interact for any given project. The real options ap-
proach treats ﬂexibility in the decision process and the
product relatively similar. However, from a project
management point of view, it makes a major diﬀerence
if the ﬂexibility lies in the product or the decision pro-
cess. Diﬀerent strategies for project ﬂexibility manage-
ment are identiﬁed in Fig. 1, each characterised by
high or low ﬂexibility in the process and product,
respectively.
As indicated in Fig. 1, the situation with low ﬂexibility
in both the product and the decision process assumes sta-
ble environments. This does not necessarily mean that
the environments are actually stable. It only means that
the project concept and the management of the project
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Fig. 1. Flexibility in the product and the decision process.
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are not designed for adjustments within the project time
frame. A strategy characterised by high ﬂexibility in the
product and low in the process is termed ‘‘robust con-
cept’’ in Fig. 1. This project situation assumes that the
decision process related to the project can be fairly
straight forward because the result of the project is pre-
pared for alternative use. An argument against such a
strategy is that ﬂexibility in the product can be costly.
It is also challenging to target the ﬂexibility to where it
is needed. Flexibility in the product that turns out to
not be used, can be seen as a waste of resources.
A basic principle in the situation with low ﬂexibility
in the product, and high ﬂexibility in the process is that
ﬁnal decisions can be postponed (for example, the freez-
ing of speciﬁcations) in order to gain as much knowl-
edge as possible. A low ﬂexibility in the product is
desirable when ﬂexibility in the product is costly. A po-
tential drawback of this strategy is that it might cause
frustration among project stakeholders, due to a lack
of commitment and perceived uncertainty.
Fig. 1 also includes the situation with high ﬂexibility
is both the product and the process. ‘‘Flow’’ has been
used as a description of this situation. It contains many
of the aspects related to the other two strategies with
high ﬂexibility in either the process or the product.
2.3. Modularity
Flexibility can be related to the degree of modularity
in the projects. Modularity refers to the possibility to di-
vide the project into more or less independent sub-units.
According to Miller and Lessard [5], modularity can en-
able projects to cope with uncertainty because individual
components do not have a critical role. Major ‘‘one-
piece’’ projects such as bridges and tunnels have a low
level of modularity, based on the ‘‘we do not build half
a bridge’’-approach. Projects that are assumed to have
higher levels of modularity include IT-system develop-
ment and road improvement projects.
2.4. Flexibility in diﬀerent project phases
This paper makes a distinction between three diﬀer-
ent project phases: front-end, planning and execution.
The front-end phase covers the activities prior to the ﬁ-
nal decision to go ahead with the project. Even though
planning is a part of the front-end phase, most projects
also have a planning phase for more detailed prepara-
tion after the project has been decided upon. Projects
are implemented in an execution phase, which ends
when the project outputs are realised.
Most authors agree on the value of ﬂexibility in the
front-end phase of projects while ﬂexibility is commonly
seen as undesirable in the execution phases of projects.
Lundin and So¨derholm [19] describe how a project
moves from relative openness in the beginning of the
project, to relative closeness in the execution phase. In
the execution phase, the predetermined action is sup-
posed to be carried out according to the plans, in a
‘‘planned isolation’’. The concept of project ﬂexibility
in the execution phase disturbs this planned isolation.
In a similar way, Mahmoud-Jouini et al. [20] character-
ises project management by the speed of three project
phases: preparation, freezing and implementation.
Many authors on project management, including
Morris and Hough [4], warn against changes in projects
once speciﬁcations have been established. Miller and
Lessard [5] point out the irreversibility of large engineer-
ing projects and the importance of bold commitment
from key stakeholders. They argue against ﬂexibility
once the front-end phase is over.
2.5. Eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness
Eﬃciency is linked to the immediate outcome of a
project. It is a question of doing things right and pro-
ducing project outputs in terms of the agreed scope,
quality, cost and time. It is an internal measure. Eﬀec-
tiveness, on the other hand, is linked to the longer-term
eﬀects of the project, or to do the right things. Eﬀective-
ness is an external measure. Eikeland [11] relates eﬀec-
tiveness to how the results of a project contribute to
value added for owners and users. According to Samset
[21], eﬀectiveness concerns the extent to which the pro-
jects tactical objective, or the goal, can be achieved.
The literature review [22] found that ﬂexibility is pri-
marily an approach to improve eﬀectiveness of projects
rather than eﬃciency. Major drawbacks of ﬂexibility are
related to reductions in eﬃciency. Flexibility was seen as
a threat to delivering the project on time and within
budget. In order to maximise eﬃciency, projects needs
to be clearly deﬁned in the front-end phase and executed
according to the plans. Adjustments or remaining deci-
sions shall be minimised. Flexibility promoters empha-
sise the possibility for increased eﬀectiveness. A project
with suﬃcient ﬂexibility to utilise opportunities to in-
crease the value for owners and users might in the end
prove to be more eﬀective, as discussed in [2] and quan-
tiﬁed by the real options approach [8].
2.6. Project stakeholders
Key stakeholders who are directly linked to most pro-
jects are; project owners, users, project management and
contractors. Olsson [22] analysed the expected opinion
on project ﬂexibility. That project owners and users
are likely to be more positive towards changes aimed
at increased eﬀectiveness. Stakeholders those main
responsibility lie on the cost side of the project, such
as project management and contractors, are less likely
to embrace changes. According to Kreiner [2], the pro-
ject owner is made the guardian of relevance and there-
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by the projects eﬀectiveness. The project manager is
made the guardian of eﬃciency.
2.7. Changes and extensions
Changes and extensions are a source of major dis-
agreements between diﬀerent actors in projects. PMI
[23] deﬁnes the management of both changes and exten-
sions as scope change control.
Many authors, including [1,4,24], have pointed to
scope changes as a key driver to cost overruns of pro-
jects. From a project management and contractor per-
spective, scope changes are generally seen as
undesirables, even though contractors can see changes
as a possibility to improve the proﬁt from the projects
[25]. Scope changes are key issues when discussing ﬂex-
ibility, but project ﬂexibility as discussed in this paper is
a wider concept than scope change management.
A typical scope change is proposed because the users
or project owner wants to increase the eﬀectiveness of
the project. As shown by Ibbs et al. [26] using beneﬁt-
to-cost ratio, the reduction in eﬃciency might be com-
pensated by a higher increase in eﬀectiveness, depending
on the timing and type of change. Two sources of con-
ﬂicts related to scope changes can be identiﬁed. Conﬂicts
may arise regarding: (a) the quantiﬁcation of the in-
crease in eﬀectiveness and reduction in eﬃciency; (b)
the responsibility for the reduction in eﬃciency.
Based on a study of 448 projects, Dvir and Lechler
[27] showed that changes in both plans and goals of pro-
jects typically reduce both the eﬃciency and customer
satisfaction of engineering projects.
Many textbooks on project management, including
[3,28], include explanations and illustrations that illus-
trate that the scope change cost is typically low in the
front-end phase of projects, and getting higher and high-
er as time goes by. This increase in scope change cost
over time is widely accepted as a rule of thumb, and is
a major challenge to project ﬂexibility. Once a project
has been decided upon and the planning or execution
has begun, changes are likely to reduce the eﬃciency
of the project, as shown by Hanna et al. [30]. However,
Poppendieck and Poppendieck [29] argue that the al-
most exponential increase in scope change cost over time
in a project is not always applicable to IT-projects.
Some types of changes are less damaging to eﬃciency
than others. An alternative approach to project ﬂexibil-
ity is to identify areas or types of changes that are less
challenging to accommodate in projects than other
changes. Thus, at least two diﬀerent strategies can be
chosen to manage scope changes: (a) to avoid them or
(b) to reduce the negative impact from changes that do
come. A change requires that something already has
been decided. One key purpose of the ﬂexibility strate-
gies identiﬁed in Fig. 1 is to achieve ﬂexibility without
creating scope changes in the project. In this way, scope
changes might be avoided or reduced by the use of late
locking of projects and by not taking decisions until one
really have to. Scope changes may also be avoided by
the use of ﬂexibility in the product.
2.8. Contracting and incentives
Incentives for diﬀerent project stakeholders are
strongly related to the contracting structure of a project
and other ﬁnancial obligations. A common tool for
achieving ﬂexibility in projects is the use of option based
contracts, which enables a continuous locking of the
projects. Mahmoud-Jouini et al. [20] discusses time
management in projects. Their discussion also includes
ﬂexibility aspects. They point out that a key factor in
creating win–win situations between the stakeholders
in Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPS)
contracts lies in ﬂexibility of contracts and the implicit
relations that are created by the contracts. Garel and
Midler [31] studied contractual structures that enable
front-loading and coherent incentives for manufacturers
and suppliers in the automotive industry. Their analysis
is based on a game theory approach, where dealing with
ﬂexibility can be a win–win or zero-sum game between
the stakeholders. In co-development of automotive
parts, the supplier gets no additional payments for late
identiﬁcation of need for modiﬁcations in the design
phase. The supplier therefore has strong incentives to
provide engineering expertise to work closely with the
manufacturer in order to understand the needs and the
production process [31].
The users are a group of stakeholders that often do
not have direct contracts related to the projects. Their
incentives are therefore less connected to the direct cost
of the project, and more often connected to the quality
and usability of the ﬁnal result.
3. Empirical indications
A study was carried out to investigate to what extent
the results from the theoretical review of project ﬂexibil-
ity corresponds with observations from a number of
projects. This section of the paper describes the data
material, discusses the applied methodology and pre-
sents the results from the study.
3.1. Data collection and analysis
A qualitative case study research approach has been
used in this study. In the terminology of Yin [32], the
analysis is a multi-case study. The study is based on an
analysis of 18 Norwegian projects. Information related
to the projects has been obtained from two main sources:
third party evaluation reports and personal experience
from consulting and applied research engagements. The
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third party reports usually have a high professional stan-
dard and analyse the projects in depth as well as in a
broad perspective. Of the projects, 15 are described pri-
marily based on third part reports. For three of the pro-
jects, information is based on both third part reports and
personal experience. Case study reports have been estab-
lished for the projects that have personal experience as a
data source. The analysed projects have been carried out
between 1986 and 2003, the majority between 1995 and
2000. A wide variety of projects have purposely been
analysed in order to capture diﬀerent aspects of project
ﬂexibility. The type of projects in the study is shown in
Table 1.
On the basis of the descriptive information, an assess-
ment was made of the project ﬂexibility characteristics.
Due to the size of the projects, the analysis is based on
the strategies of the projects and major events.
To analyse the information related to the projects,
codiﬁed data were entered into a database. Table 2
shows the project attributes that were used in the study.
The table also shows the alternatives and scales that
were used. Some of the information relates to the project
itself, such as industry and project budget. The analysis
includes information related to approaches to ﬂexibility
that were planned for or observed, including scope
changes, delays and postponed decisions. In addition,
the observed opinion on ﬂexibility for diﬀerent stake-
holders is included in the analysis. In order to validate
the data, informants with experience from analysed pro-
jects have reviewed the relative scores of the projects.
4. Results
In the following, the results from the study are pre-
sented. The results are divided into diﬀerent sections,
in order to address key research questions.
4.1. What type of ﬂexibility has been used and when?
Changes and extensions are commonly used, and are
observed in 11 projects, covering most types of projects.
A late locking was applied in 4 projects. One defence
project used a contract with predeﬁned options as way
of achieving a continuous locking of the project. Contin-
gency planning was the main ﬂexibility approach in one
project. In only one project, a college building construc-
tion, ﬂexibility was not applied.
Flexibility was used in all phases of the projects, but
particularly during the planning phase. Three projects
had need for ﬂexibility in the execution phase, two of
them being hospitals. One of these projects had exten-
sive changes and extensions, followed by large cost over-
runs. The other project applied a late locking of the
speciﬁcation related to key medical equipment. Late
locking was related only to a limited part of the project.
This project was delivered on time and budget. The third
project with ﬂexibility need in the execution was a reno-
vation of an old public building. Requirements related
to preservation of cultural and historical features of
the building proved to be challenging to specify before
the work was started. These results are summarised in
Table 3.
4.2. Stakeholder perspective on project ﬂexibility
As shown in Table 4, the project owners and the users
appear to look favourably upon ﬂexibility. In only one
project, the users were negative to ﬂexibility. This was
a school building project, where the users (primarily
teachers and parents) wanted predictability in the
Table 1
The studied projects by industry and size of project
Number
Type of project (n = 18)
Oﬀshore 1
Hospitals 3
Transportation infrastructure 7
Defence 3
Public buildings 4
Project size (n = 17)
<15 mill euros (100 mill NOK) 3
15–60 mill euros (100–500 mill NOK) 8
60–250 mill euros (500–2000 mill NOK) 3
>250 mill euros (2.000 mill NOK) 3
Table 2
The parameters used in the analysis
Dimension Scale/alternatives
Type of project/industry Transportation infrastructure;
public buildings; hospitals;
defence; oﬀshore (oil and gas)
Size of project Actual cost for ﬁnished projects,
latest known budget for on-going
projects
Speciﬁc type of ﬂexibility Change; extension; contingency
planning; late locking;
continuous locking, none
Project phase Front-end; planning; execution;
none
Flexibility in the product Low; medium; high
Flexibility in the decision
process (planned and actual)
Low; medium; high
Degree of modularity Low; medium; high
Stakeholder who initiated
the use of ﬂexibility
Users; owner; project
management; contractor; none;
N/A
Stakeholder attitude
to ﬂexibility
(project owner, user,
project management
and contractor)
Negative; neutral; positive; N/A
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front-end phase regarding the time and scope of the
school building refurbishing. The study indicates a
mixed opinion on ﬂexibility among project manage-
ment. Contractors were overall negative (even though
the contractors opinion is based on fewer observations
than the other categories).
Regarding project management, there are indications
that they look favourably upon ﬂexibility use in the
front-end or planning phase, but not in the execution
phase. Furthermore, project management appear to be
positive to ﬂexibility in projects where they and the pro-
ject owner are found in the same or closely related
organisations. This was usually the case in transporta-
tion infrastructure projects. When the project manage-
ment and the project owner are in diﬀerent
organisations, project management had a negative view
on ﬂexibility. This was typically the case for public
building construction.
Table 4 also illustrates that the stakeholders that
most often initiate the use of ﬂexibility, are also most
positive to ﬂexibility. Among the studied projects, it
was mostly project owners and users who initiated the
use of ﬂexibility in the projects.
4.3. Modularity, ﬂexibility in the decision process and in
the product
As seen in Table 5, the majority of the projects
planned for low ﬂexibility in the decision process. Table
5 also shows that many projects had a high actual ﬂex-
ibility in the decision process. A high degree of planned
ﬂexibility in the decision process indicates that the pro-
jects were prepared for an iterative decision, planning or
execution process. Projects that clearly illustrated that
ﬂexibility, or related terms, in the product was intended
are rated as having a high ﬂexibility in the product. Pro-
jects that are registered as having a low ﬂexibility had no
stated or observed intentions of ﬂexibility. Medium ﬂex-
ibility indicates that the projects planned for ﬂexibility in
some phases or some areas, but not as a key issue.
A technical analysis of how diﬀerent changes have af-
fected the ﬂexibility in the product was beyond the scope
of the present analysis. In Table 5, ﬂexibility in the prod-
uct is therefore not divided into planned and actual, but
treated as a characteristic of each project as a whole.
Most projects had a low modularity, particularly
public buildings. To achieve a high modularity, two
transportation infrastructure projects (one road con-
struction and one railway line) were divided into sec-
tions, which could be built fairly independently. The
two defence projects with a high modularity were related
to system development and acquisition, were the systems
were possible to divide into modules, both from a tech-
nical and a contractual point of view. Finally, one
school building project had a high modularity because
the project actually consisted of upgrading of a fairly
large number of school buildings. Even if the plans for
each school had consequences for the other schools
and the decision process addressed the whole upgrading
plan, each school building could be managed as a sub-
project (and some would argue that this ‘‘project’’ was
a ‘‘programme’’, and each school was a project).
An attempt was made to investigate the relation be-
tween modularity and ﬂexibility in the decision process.
If a project was highly modular, ﬂexibility in the decision
Table 3
Flexibility use by type and project phase
Number
Type of ﬂexibility applied in the projects (n = 18)
Late locking 5
Continuous locking 1
Extensions 4
Changes 6
Contingency planning 1
None 1
Project phase for main use of ﬂexibility (n = 18)
Front-end 4
Planning 10
Execution 3
None 1
Table 4
Diﬀerent perspectives on project ﬂexibility hold by project stakeholders
Project owner Users Project management Contractor None
Stakeholder opinion on ﬂexibility Positive 12 9 6 0 0
Neutral 4 3 5 3 0
Negative 0 1 7 4 0
n = 16 13 18 7 0
Stakeholder who initiated the use of ﬂexibility
(n = 16)
8 5 2 0 1
Table 5
The analysed attributes related to ﬂexibility in the projects
Low Medium High N total
Flexibility in the product 8 8 2 18
Flexibility in the process, planned 13 2 3 18
Flexibility in the process, actual 2 6 10 18
Modularity 8 5 5 18
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process was likely to be utilised. A high modularity ap-
pears also to be the major way of achieving a high
planned ﬂexibility in the process, which frequently re-
sulted in a high actual ﬂexibility in the process. The com-
bination of high modularity and low actual ﬂexibility in
the decision process was not observed.
5. Discussion
In the following, the results are discussed in relation
to the theoretical overview of project ﬂexibility. At the
end of the section, some implications for project man-
agement practice are listed.
5.1. Diﬀerent stakeholders have diﬀerent perspectives to
project ﬂexibility
It was expected that project owners and users were
more likely to be interested in ﬂexibility than the project
management and contractors. On average across the 18
projects, this study supports this assumption.
In the studied projects, users were generally positive
to ﬂexibility. However, one case showed that the users
did not uniformly favour ﬂexibility in the front-end
phase, because they wanted to know what they could ex-
pect from the project. Fig. 2 gives a summary of the ob-
served opinion on ﬂexibility seen in a time perspective.
Owners of the studied projects appear to be clear in their
support of ﬂexibility, and contractors in their dislike.
Most authors agree on the value of ﬂexibility in the
front-end phase of projects, and on the undesired eﬀects
of ﬂexibility in the execution phase. In this study, project
management appeared to be the only type of stake-
holder that showed the expected shift from being posi-
tive to ﬂexibility in the front-end, less positive in the
planning phase and ﬁnally negative in the execution
phase. As a possible explanation, project management
might be the stakeholder that is most likely to see the ef-
fects of ﬂexibility, both on the beneﬁt and cost side.
Fig. 2 indicates that users and project management
have diﬀerent needs for ﬂexibility in diﬀerent project
phases. As long as the funding model for a project
means that the users have nothing to lose from demand-
ing changes and extensions, they have incentive to push
for scope changes. This is typically, though not always,
the case in the Norwegian public sector from which the
majority of the projects in the study come.
Kreiner [2] termed project management ‘‘the guard-
ian of eﬃciency’’. Results from the studied cases show
that this guardian role is depending on the organisa-
tional connection to the project owner. In cases where
the project management was found in the same organi-
sation as the owner, project management was more
likely to be positive to ﬂexibility, compared to cases
where project management had a weaker organisational
connection to the project owner and the guardian role
could be exercised more freely.
The opinion on ﬂexibility held by the diﬀerent stake-
holders can also be explained based on the incentives
faced by the stakeholders. Flexibility has a value for
the stakeholders that beneﬁt from changes and late
locking of projects. In this study, the stakeholders that
have their incentives related to achieving the projects
purpose were the advocates of ﬂexibility. Stakeholders
that have their incentives related to delivering the pro-
ject on time and within budget saw ﬂexibility as a
threat. Flexibility usually means that the contractors
have to spend resources to adopt. This disturbs the eﬃ-
ciency of their organisations and typically causes wait-
ing or rework. Note that this study has been carried
out on rather strategic level. Garel and Midler [31]
show that the contractors, depending on the contract
structure, may have incentives to embrace changes be-
cause this gives them room to ask for additional
payments.
5.2. If ﬂexibility is prepared for, it will be used. It will
often be used even if it is not prepared for
In the analysed projects, changes and extensions were
found in more than half of the projects, in spite of the
well-known risk for cost overruns in such occasions.
This may be characterised as a traditional type of ﬂexi-
bility. The structured approaches to project ﬂexibility
that are discussed in the literature are also found, but
in a minority of the projects.
It appears to be a strong desire to use ﬂexibility in the
studied projects. This was particularly the case when it
was prepared for, but also when it was not. Most pro-
jects did not plan for ﬂexibility in the decision process,
but used ﬂexible approaches anyway. All projects with
a high planned ﬂexibility in the decision process also
had a high actual ﬂexibility in the decision process. Flex-
ibility in the product could only to a limited extent result
in less use of ﬂexibility in the decision process. This indi-
cates that if there is a possibility for ﬂexibility in a pro-
ject, it will probably be utilised.
Front-end Planning Execution
Owner + + +
Users +/- + +
Project
management + +/- -
Contractor N/A - -
+   = Positive opinion on project flexibility
- = Negative opinion
+/- = Mixed opinion
Fig. 2. Stakeholders opinion on ﬂexibility in diﬀerent project phases.
72 N.O.E. Olsson / International Journal of Project Management 24 (2006) 66–74
5.3. Implications for project management practice
In the studied projects, ﬂexibility was often managed
in a traditional way. It appears to be a potential for
more frequent use of structured approaches to manage-
ment of project ﬂexibility.
Flexibility in the front-end phase is the least contro-
versial part of project ﬂexibility. The study indicates that
after the front-end phase, ﬂexibility in well-deﬁned parts
of the projects can be managed without major reduc-
tions in eﬃciency. To manage ﬂexibility, it is beneﬁcial
to identify critical part of projects where ﬂexibility is
needed. It is likely that these parts of the projects are
similar to the critical parts that are identiﬁed in project
uncertainty analyses. In the next step, appropriate strat-
egies for project ﬂexibility of the identiﬁed areas are cho-
sen. In this way, project ﬂexibility can enable utilisation
of the often neglected opportunity side of uncertainty
management.
Note that ﬂexibility as discussed here is not seen as an
alternative to strategic management, but as a means to
help realising a strategy. This is in accordance with Sam-
set [28] who argues that successful projects are charac-
terised by a distinct strategy in combination with
suﬃcient tactical ﬂexibility.
The observed tendency for users to advocate ﬂexibil-
ity in late phases of projects indicates that projects with
a high user inﬂuence should have a higher need for an
active approach to project ﬂexibility than other projects.
Even though it is not a recommended situation, projects
that for political or other reasons are pushed to a prema-
ture go-ahead decision also need an active approach to
project ﬂexibility.
6. Conclusions
This study indicates a paradoxical approach to pro-
ject ﬂexibility: ﬂexibility is frequently used but rarely
prepared for. As Engwall [33] and Jugdev [34] point
out, current project management knowledge is a prac-
titioner-driven theory focusing on supporting advices
to the project manager. In this perspective, eﬃciency
is the prime focus and ﬂexibility should de minimised
once the front-end phase is over.
Projects in this study often had need to be ﬂexible
even after this point, usually based on initiatives form
the project owners or users. Current project manage-
ment theory then proposes a stronger emphasis on
the front-end phase in order to prepare the projects
as well as possible. Given the volume of ﬂexibility
use in the studied projects and generally changing envi-
ronments of projects, it seems unrealistic to strive for
an elimination of project ﬂexibility. Flexibility appears
to be so commonly used that it must be addressed
seriously.
The opinion on ﬂexibility held by the diﬀerent
stakeholders appears to be related to the incentives
faced by the stakeholders. In general, ﬂexibility has a
value for the stakeholders that beneﬁt from changes
and late locking of projects, and it is a cost for those
who have to adopt. In this study, the project owners
and users had their incentives related to achieving
the projects purpose and they were often the advo-
cates of ﬂexibility. The stakeholders that have to
adapt to diﬀerent forms of ﬂexibility were primarily
the project management and contractors. Changes,
late locking and other forms of ﬂexibility usually dis-
turb the eﬃciency of their organisations and typically
cause waiting or rework. Project management had
their incentives either primarily related to the project
purpose, or the delivering the project according to
speciﬁcation, on time and within budget. The opinion
on ﬂexibility among project management appears to
vary accordingly. Incentives related to project purpose
increases the likeliness that ﬂexibility is look favour-
ably upon. Stakeholder incentives related to direct
project outcome increases the likeliness that ﬂexibility
is looked negatively upon.
Interesting areas for further research include studies
of actual use of diﬀerent approaches for ﬂexibility in dif-
ferent types of projects. In addition, analysis of which
types of scope changes that can be managed without se-
vere reductions in project eﬃciency is proposed.
Acknowledgements
The author thanks two anonymous referees for
their valuable comments on a previous version of this
paper.
References
[1] Midler C. ‘‘Projectiﬁcation’’ of the ﬁrm: the renault case. Scand J
Manage 1995;11(4):363–75.
[2] Kreiner K. In search of relevance: project management in drifting
environments. Scand J Manage 1995;11(4):335–46.
[3] Hall P. Great planning disasters. London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson; 1980.
[4] Morris PWG, Hough GH. The anatomy of major projects. A
study of the reality of project management. Chichester, UK: Wi-
ley; 1991.
[5] Miller R, Lessard D. The strategic management of large
engineering projects, shaping institutions, risks and gover-
nance. USA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology; 2000.
[6] Sager T. Notions of ﬂexibility in planning-related literature,
Nordic Institute for Studies in Urban and Regional Planning,
Publication No. 1990:5; 1990.
[7] Karlsen JT. Mestring av omgivelsesusikkerhet. Ph.D. thesis, The
Norwegian University of Science and Technology; 1998.
[8] Brennan ML, Trigeorgis L. Project ﬂexibility, agency, and
competition: new developments in the theory and application of
real options. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2000.
N.O.E. Olsson / International Journal of Project Management 24 (2006) 66–74 73
[9] Amram M, Kulatilaka N. Real options: managing strategic
investment in an uncertain world. Financial management
association survey and synthesis series. Boston: Harvard Busi-
ness School Press; 1999.
[10] Mandelbaum M, Buzacott J. Flexibility in decision making. Eur J
Oper Res 1990;44:17–27.
[11] Eikeland PT. Teoretisk analyse av byggeprosesser, Samspill i
byggeprosessen, prosjektnr. 10602 (Title in English: ‘‘Theoretical
analaysis of the construction process’’); 2001.
[12] Husby O, Kilde HS, Klakegg OJ, Torp O, Berntsen SR, Samset
K. 1999. Usikkerhet som gevinst. Styring av usikkerhet i
prosjekter: mulighet, risiko, beslutning, handling, The Norwegian
Centre for Project Management at the Norwegian University of
Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway. Report No.
NTNU 99006 (Title in English: ‘‘Uncertainty as beneﬁt. Manag-
ing project uncertainty: possibility, risk, decision, action’’); 1999.
[13] Eskerod P, O¨stergren K. Why do companies standardize projects
work? Proj Manage 2000;6(1).
[14] Genus A. Managing large-scale technology and inter-organisa-
tional relations: the case of the channel tunnel. Res Policy
1997;26(2):169–89.
[15] Chapman C, Ward S. Project risk management. processes,
techniques and insights. West Sussex, UK: Wiley; 1997.
[16] Brand S. How buildings learn, what happens after theyre
built? NewYork: VikingPenguin, PenguinBooksUSAInc.; 1994.
[17] Blakstad SH. A strategic approach to adaptability in oﬃce
buildings. Ph.D. thesis, The Norwegian University of Science and
Technology; 2001.
[18] Agre K, Landstad K. Generalitet, ﬂeksibilitet og elastisitet i
bygninger. Prinsipper og egenskaper som gir tilpasningsdyktige
kontorbygninger, Prosjektrapport 336, Norges byggforskningsin-
stitutt, Oslo(Title in English: ‘‘Generality, ﬂexibility and elasticity
in buildings. Principles for adaptability of oﬃce buildings’’); 2002.
[19] Lundin RA, So¨derholm A. A theory of the temporary organiza-
tion. Scand J Manage 1995;11(4):437–55.
[20] Mahmoud-Jouini SB, Midler C, Garel G. Time-to-market vs.
time-to-delivery managing speed in engineering, procurement and
construction projects. Int J Proj Manage 2004;22(5):359–67.
[21] Samset K. Project evaluation: making investments suc-
ceed. Trondheim: Tapir Academic Press; 2003.
[22] Olsson NOE. Flexibility in engineering projects: blessing or curse?
Paper presented at the NORDNET 2004. In: International PM
conference, Helsinki, Finland, 29.9.–1.10 2004.
[23] PMI, A guide to the project management body of knowledge,
PMBOK Guide 2000 edition. Newton Square, PA: Project
Management Institute; 2000.
[24] Love PED, Irani Z, Edwards DJ. Learning to reduce rework in
projects: analysis of ﬁrms organizational learning and quality
practices. Proj Manage J 2003;34(3):13–25.
[25] Christensen DS, Gordon JA. Does a rubber baseline guarantee
cost overruns on defence acquisition contracts? Proj Manage J
1998;29(3):43–51.
[26] Ibbs CW, Wong CK, Kwak YH. Project change management
systems. J Manage Eng 2001;17(3):159–65.
[27] Dvir D, Lechler T. Plans are nothing, changing plans is
everything: the impact of changes on project success. Res Policy
2004;33:1–15.
[28] Samset K. Prosjektvurdering i tidligfasen: Fokus pa˚ konseptet.
Tapir Akademisk Forlag, Trondheim (Title in English: ‘‘Project
evaluation in the front-end phase: focus on the concept’’); 2000.
[29] Poppendieck M, Poppendieck T. Lean software development: an
agile toolkit. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley; 2003.
[30] Hanna AS, Calimic R, Peterson PA, Nordheim EV. Quantitative
deﬁnition of projects impacted by change orders. J Constr Eng
Manage 2001;128(1):57–64.
[31] Garel G, Midler C. Front-loading problem-solving in co-
development: managing the contractual, organisational and
cognitive dimensions. Int J Automob Technol Manage
2001;1(2/3):236–50.
[32] Yin RK. Case study research: design and methods. 3rd ed. Lon-
don: Sage Publications; 2003.
[33] Engwall M. No project is an island: linking projects to history and
context. Res Policy 2003;32:789–808.
[34] Jugdev K. Through the looking glass: examining theory develop-
ment in project management with the resource-based view lens.
Proj Manage J 2004;35(5):15–25.
74 N.O.E. Olsson / International Journal of Project Management 24 (2006) 66–74
Paper 2. 
Magnussen, O.M. & Olsson, N.O.E. 2006. Comparative analysis of cost estimates of 
major public investment projects. International Journal of Project Management 24:4, 
281–288.
Comparative analysis of cost estimates of major public
investment projects
Ole M. Magnussen a,*, Nils O.E. Olsson a,b,1
a The Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Department of Civil and Transport Engineering, N-7491 Trondheim, Norway
b SINTEF Technology and Society, N-7465 Trondheim, Norway
Received 24 May 2005; received in revised form 11 October 2005; accepted 11 November 2005
Abstract
This paper reports ﬁndings from a study of cost estimates of 31 major public investment projects in Norway. It is aimed at analysing
the development of cost estimates before the decision to execute the projects and in what way the scheme of mandatory quality assurance
inﬂuences this process. Two important results are highlighted and discussed: The diﬀerences in the proposed cost estimates appear to
have decreased systematically since the introduction of the quality assurance and the project owners rely to a large extent directly upon
the cost estimates from the quality assurance when the decision to execute the project is taken.
 2005 Elsevier Ltd and IPMA. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
To meet the demand for better management and control
of major public investment projects, an arrangement for
external Quality-at-entry analyses of all public investments
in Norway with an expected budget larger than NOK 500
million (EUR 60 million)2 has been established. This so-
called Quality-at-entry Regime became operative from year
2000 and was the result of an initiative from the Norwegian
Ministry of Finance. The main factors leading to the estab-
lishment of a mandatory external assessment of public
multi-million projects were the poor performance of many
such projects especially in terms of cost. The introduction
of the Regime was, among other factors, an attempt to
avoid and control cost overruns [1].
This paper is the ﬁrst attempt to analyse the develop-
ment of cost estimates in the early stages of the quality
assured projects. Very few of the projects have yet reached
completion, which explains why studies of actual costs do
not constitute a part of the present research. The objective
is to develop an understanding of the current Quality-at-
entry Regime and to point out its relevance and impact
on the cost estimation process and how it could contribute
to more realistic budgets. The paper is thus concerned with
impacts of quality assurance concerning the eﬃciency issue,
i.e., focus on the cost criterion. In a broader perspective,
however, it also concerns the more substantial issues of
project viability and long term eﬀects since the end result
of inaccurate estimates could be that nonviable projects
are prioritized (a central perspective in [2,3] for example).
2. The scope of the paper
The scope of this paper is to consider the relevance and
signiﬁcance of the current Quality-at-entry Regime on cost
estimation in major public projects. Our preconception is
0263-7863/$30.00  2005 Elsevier Ltd and IPMA. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ijproman.2005.11.011
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21.
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2 EUR 1 = NOK 8. Expected budget > NOK 500 million is the general
rule. This general rule does not prevent the possibility for a Quality-at-
entry analysis carried out on projects with expected budget less than NOK
500 million.
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that studying the development of the cost estimates from
diﬀerent actors through the stage of quality assurance
can tell us something about how this aﬀects the decision.
In studying the divergence we are in eﬀect studying the
extent to which estimates may be biased.
3. Cost overrun and its causes
Nijkamp and Ubbels [4] point out the need for better
insight into cost estimation. It is because cost estimation
play a major role in the decision-making process of the
government.
Studies of major projects show that cost overruns are
not uncommon. Morris and Hough [5] suggest that cost
overruns in large projects are typically between 40% and
200%. The study of large transportation infrastructure pro-
jects reported in Flyvbjerg et al. [6] shows that 9 out of 10
projects fall victim to cost escalation, actual costs are on
average 28% higher than estimated costs, and it appears
to be a global phenomenon observed over a long period
of time. Kolltveit and Gro¨nhaug [7] include an example
of costs in Norwegian large-scale projects varying from
6% saving to 160% overrun.3
The causes of the observed tendency seem to be con-
nected to factors not only hard to predict but also diﬃcult
to manage. Morris and Hough [5] point out that overruns
are caused by circumstances outside the projects area of
control. According to them, many projects overrun because
of factors like price escalation, government action, strikes
and so on. A big issue is then related to the ability to pre-
dict such factors and their potential impact.
Flyvbjerg et al. [8] attempt to explain the causes of cost
overrun in projects. They found that cost escalation was
strongly dependent on the length of the implementation
phase. Delays and long implementation phases translate
into risks of substantial cost escalations. They also observe
that projects grow larger over time, and for some project
types, larger projects have larger percentage cost escalation.
That bigger projects having a larger risk of cost escalation
than smaller ones (for all project types) is not supported by
their data, but they emphasize that the risk of substantial
cost escalation is high for all project sizes and types. Since
the same percentage cost escalation would typically cause
more problems in terms of budgetary, ﬁscal, administrative
and political dilemmas in a large project than in a small
one, they conclude that an increase in project size translates
into a need for improved planning processes.
Nijkamp and Ubbels [4] found on the basis of their
study that the inﬂuence of inﬂation was clearly large in
the projects they studied. Because of the length of planning
and construction, price rises played a major role. What
they call incompleteness of the estimations, the practice
that some elements of costs are omitted or not included,
are also important. They argue that project changes also
is an important cause of underestimation, which lead to a
conclusion that the estimates in their sample were rather
reliable.
The cost estimation process, which can be viewed as a
factor more closely related to the project organization,
has also received some attention among authors in this ﬁeld
of research. Flyvbjerg et al. [6] deliver an interesting contri-
bution on this issue. First of all, it must be noted that their
study focuses on a certain category of projects, so-called
transportation infrastructure projects, and secondly, the
data comes from projects all around the world from a per-
iod of time stretching from 1910 to 1998. They study the
diﬀerences between actual and estimated cost and argue
that ‘‘the cost estimates used to decide whether such projects
should be built are highly and systematically misleading.’’ [6,
p. 279] This underestimation could, according to Flyvbjerg
et al. [6], best be explained by strategic misrepresentation.
Olsson et al. [9] suggest that ‘‘strategic budgeting’’ is a com-
monly used technique in major public projects. This tech-
nique includes using a budget that only visualises part of
the total cost in order to initiate the project, and then
exploit the fundamental logic that a project, when deﬁned
and planned, is less likely to be reversed or terminated.
Nijkamp and Ubbels [4] discuss a similar explanation when
investigating the reliability of cost estimates in infrastruc-
ture projects.4 They state that at the time of the decision
to build:
‘‘One may safely assume that the costs of the project at that
stage are as low as possible to ensure that the project will be
executed. This suggests that the cost may be somewhat
underestimated at the beginning of a project.’’ [4, p. 3]
They further state that there is some space for negotia-
tions in the cost estimation process since estimators tend
to take the demands of governmental institutions into
account.
Nijkamp and Ubbels [4] conclude that, since large
changes is a major cause of cost escalation, it is necessary
to increase the importance of the ﬁrst planning phases. In
recent years more authors seem to agree on the importance
of a better design process in order to create more successful
projects [10–12].
4. Ensuring Quality-at-entry
The initiative to investigate the need for better manage-
ment and control of major public investment projects in
Norway was based on the understanding that a number
of large projects did not accomplish according to the
requirements vital for the decision to execute the project.
Additionally, large cost overruns and change of scope dur-
ing implementation were observed. After a closer study of
3 The example included only 5 projects and was used to illustrate the
challenges of the construction and building industry.
4 It must be noted that the study in Nijkamp and Ubbels [4] includes a
total of only 8 projects and that they describe this cause of underestima-
tion as less important.
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11 projects, where 6 of them showed cost overrun, a gov-
ernment committee concluded that failures in the initial
phases of the projects were the main cause of the cost esca-
lation during implementation [1].
4.1. Description of the current Quality-at-entry Regime
The Quality-at-entry Regime is in this paper a label for
the formal requirements that public investment projects
must meet before the preparation of proposal for the Par-
liament. The basic exercise connected to the present
Regime is mandatory quality assurance and uncertainty
analysis of the project carried out by external consultants
on behalf of the responsible ministry, the so-called quality
assurance 2 (QA2). In this paper the term ‘‘quality assur-
ance’’ is used shorthand instead of referring to the ‘‘exer-
cise under the present Quality-at-entry Regime’’. The aim
of the Regime so far has been to evaluate the quality of
the foundation for the chosen alternative. The more partic-
ular focus regarding revision of cost estimates and identify-
ing major risks must be seen in light of the speciﬁc goal for
the quality assurance. It is a tool for evaluating the quality
of information and for providing new information on the
basis of which the decision makers can judge the project.
4.2. The quality assurance – when and how
The quality assurance, which typically takes place at the
pre-planning stage, and the cost estimates provide an
opportunity to track how three main stakeholders; the pro-
ject organisation, the external consultant, and the Parlia-
ment,5 view the project cost at this stage.
An illustration of the process and how the cost estimates
relate to a certain stakeholder and point in time is given in
Fig. 1.
The duration between the steps in the process varies
from project to project, and it is not uncommon to observe
a time-span from several months up to a year between 1
and 3 in the ﬁgure. A suitable question here is: As some ele-
ments of the project may change in the course of its devel-
opment, how is it possible to compare the cost estimates
connected to the diﬀerent points in the process? The ques-
tion is a fundamental one, and a brief explanation is appro-
priate. First of all, the formal requirement is that the
project does not proceed beyond the pre-planning stage
until it is approved by the Parliament. Secondly, the quality
assurance does not take place until updated project docu-
mentation exists, and the cost estimate is a central part of
this information. This pertains to the situation between 1
and 2 in the ﬁgure. Information concerning the expected
budget of a project is crucial when deciding to go ahead
with the project. In this way it is safe to assume that the
recommended budget from the external consultant and
the approved budget fundamentally refer to the same pro-
ject, unless it would be explicitly stated. This pertains to the
situation between 2 and 3 in the ﬁgure.
The cost estimate connected to 1 in the ﬁgure stems from
the uncertainty analysis conducted by the project organisa-
tion. This is an expression of the project organisations view
concerning the project cost. The consultants deliver an
external evaluation of the project and give their recommen-
dation of a budget for the project based on an independent
uncertainty analysis (2 in the ﬁgure). The end of the pre-
planning stage is the parliamentary approval of a budget
and permission to implement the project (3 in the ﬁgure).
4.3. The estimates and how they are prepared
The prevailing method among project organisations and
consultants in the projects studied here is the stochastic
uncertainty analysis regarding the project cost. The estima-
5 Formally, the decision to go ahead with the project and the ﬁnancing
lies in the hands of the Parliament. In practice, however, the budget
decided by the Parliament corresponds with that proposed by the
responsible ministry (the project owner).
Fig. 1. The estimates prepared in the QA-process – the arrow represents phases in the project life cycle.
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tion technique is the so-called judgmental forecasting and
the forecast serves the purpose of predicting the future fac-
tors that may inﬂuence project costs. A statistical model
where it is assumed that the uncertainty is normally distrib-
uted is used [3]. The proposed budget for the project, pre-
pared by the project organisation before the quality
assurance takes place, pertains in most cases to the 50%
subjective probability, i.e., there is a 50% expected proba-
bility that the project will be completed within this cost.
The recommendation from the external consultant consists
of the expected cost and total budget, most often based on
50% and 85% probability, respectively. The uncertainty
analyses performed by the project organisation and the
external consultant represent the basis when the project
owner decides upon the estimates that are to be presented
in the national budget or in a separate project-speciﬁc Gov-
ernment white paper. Formally, the Parliament reaches
whatever conclusion on the matter it would ﬁnd appropri-
ate. In practice, however, the estimates presented in the
national budget or the project-speciﬁc white papers are
sanctioned by Parliament without changes.
4.4. The new approach to project costs
Olsson et al. [9] describe the situation that, as a conse-
quence of the Quality-at-entry Regime, a more sophisti-
cated overview of the project cost is presented. The
external consultant recommends a total budget that is
expected to cover the consequences of the identiﬁed uncer-
tainties. The reserves are, however, not expected to be used,
and speciﬁc rules for the management of reserves have been
established. The budget allocated to the executing govern-
ment agency is the basic budget plus expected extra costs
(based on 50% subjective probability), which also was the
typical standard before the Quality-at-entry Regime was
established. Use of the reserves must be approved by the
responsible ministry. This implies that there is a binding
upper ﬁnancial level for the projects and a new control
scheme for budget compliance. Olsson et al. [9] point out
the need for management of project reserves for portfolios
of projects since a project owner often deal with many
major projects at the same time. If this succeeds, it is
expected that the new approach will reduce the need for
additional funding and result in increased reliability of
the cost estimate. Attempts to summarise some of the
eﬀects of quality assurance suggest that:
‘‘The involved ministries, being projects owners, have
expressed a general satisfaction with the analyses, since they
give a ‘‘second opinion’’ of the projects. They also feel that
they get a better basis to prepare the decision proposal for
the Norwegian parliament.’’ [9, p. 38]
The new approach also raises some concerns. Olsson
et al. [9] refer to the situation that some projects may
become more expensive as a result of the allocated reserves.
Planned use of the reserves could occur, and this could
enhance the observed tendency that projects at least ﬁll
their allocated budget. Some claim that costs might soar
because of the situation that the external consultants have
no responsibility for the actual budget. They recommend a
budget, but have no role in the execution of the project.
This could lead to a situation where the external consul-
tants systematically exaggerate the recommended total
budget in order to reduce the risk that cost overruns could
occur. On the other hand, if cost elements are omitted in
the initial estimates, quality assurance is designed to inter-
vene, and in this respect have a rather direct impact on the
cost estimation process.
5. Data collection and reﬁnement
The quality assurance report, which is a compilation of
the results from quality assurance, represents the funda-
mental data source in our research. From the quality
assurance report it is possible to obtain cost estimates pre-
pared by the project organisation/the executing govern-
ment agency and of course the recommendation from the
external consultant. The project budget approved by the
Parliament is obtainable from the national budget or pro-
ject-speciﬁc Government white paper presented by the
responsible ministry. When it was deemed to be necessary
to ensure the quality of the data, projects were contacted
separately via e-mail.
To compare the cost estimates presented at the speciﬁc
points in the process (cf. Fig. 1), cost data had to be cor-
rected for inﬂation. This basically means that cost data in
each individual project are brought to the same price level
as the approved budget, either with the aid of speciﬁc meth-
ods for the single project, or by appropriate indices for
discounting.
Before a presentation of the important ﬁndings from
analyses done on the existing material, it should be noted
that the aim of this paper is not to present a ﬁnal evalua-
tion of the eﬀects of the quality assurance scheme, since
most of the projects are still in the planning stages or in
the early stages of implementation.
6. Presentation of important ﬁndings
The collected data are stored in a research database.
Proper storage and the possibilities for fast retrieval of
large quantities of data seem to be the most important
characteristics of a database [13]. Fifty-two projects have
been through the quality assurance procedure between
2000 and 2004. On the basis of these projects a sample of
31 projects representing a broad range of project types
was established (cf. Table 1).
6.1. The external consultants recommended budget – project
reserves
In this section a closer look at the recommendation of
the external consultant is presented. A special interest is
connected to the size of the reserve. The allocation of pro-
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ject reserves in major public projects is a fundamentally
new approach in Norway [9].
Table 2 describes the size of the project reserves recom-
mended by the external consultant with respect to project
type (upper part of the table) and size (lower part of the
table). Since the reserves are not expected to be used, they
are here presented as a mark-up above the 50% probability
budget.
The fundamental information provided by Table 2 is
that the size of the typical project reserve lies in the area
between 8% and 11%. The average reserve in this sample
is a 9% mark-up. An analysis based on a categorisation
with respect to project type (transportation infrastructure,
building, defence procurement, and IT) shows that the sub-
category mean values deviate little from the overall mean.
Table 2 also shows that there is no obvious connection
between the project size and the size of the reserve
expressed in per cent. The three sub-categories including
projects from NOK 300–750 million, NOK 750–1500 mil-
lion and projects larger than NOK 1500 million all show
mean values close to the overall mean value. One might
expect that it would be more diﬃcult to predict all aspects
that could have an impact on costs in large projects. The
intention with the allocated reserve is to mitigate project
risks that can not be fully predicted [14]. Seen in relation
to the literature referred to above, where it was stated that
major projects often suﬀer from cost overrun, one might
expect that large projects would call for larger reserves.
This is contradicted by the unsubstantiated notion that in
major projects there exist more alternative courses of
action, i.e., there are more opportunities to inﬂuence costs.
The results here are nevertheless not surprising. The rec-
ommended reserves basically reﬂect the uncertainty in the
performed calculations. As described above, the size of
the reserve in most cases is the diﬀerence between the
50% and the 85% subjective probability, which roughly
equals one standard deviation. The robustness of the result
from the uncertainty analysis depends on the ability to pre-
dict possible factors and their inﬂuence on project cost.
Table 2 indicates that there is a rather typical reserve per-
centage, independent of project size or type. Building and
information technology projects display a somewhat higher
mean reserve and standard deviation than transportation
infrastructure and defence procurement projects, but the
existing material does not allow us to draw sharp conclu-
sions whether there is a pattern here. The results from ana-
lyzing projects categorized by size, show even smaller
diﬀerences between the sub-categories.
One of the major concerns has been the possibility that
actual costs will be higher with the new approach, where
reserves are allocated, compared to the old procedure.
The point here is that it is questionable to assume anything
about actual costs as long as the projects have not been
completed yet, and adequate measures to obtain more real-
istic budgets have been established. Many authors empha-
size the importance of better planning in the early stages of
large projects to increase the potential for project success
and reduce the occurrence of cost overrun.
6.2. The diﬀerence between the proposed estimate from the
project organisation and the recommendation from the
external consultant
The main issue here is related to the signiﬁcance of qual-
ity assurance on the cost estimation process. This is the
background for the attention paid to the comparison
between the initial estimate and the revised estimate.
When comparing the estimates, ﬁxed prices are used,
and the numbers describe the ‘‘same project’’, which means
that it has been controlled whether fundamental elements
of the project have been changed between the proposed
estimate and the recommended estimate (cf. the discussion
above concerning that a project could be subject to modi-
ﬁcations over time). This is an important prerequisite,
because when the cost focus and control aspect is dominat-
ing, one must not only consider the diﬀerent answers, i.e.,
the numbers from the uncertainty analyses. One must also
ask whether they are answers to the same question.
To present an aggregate view of the data, the diﬀerences
have been calculated in percent and divided into categories
based on the size of the diﬀerence.
Table 3 shows that the recommendation from the exter-
nal consultant is lower or equal to the projects proposal in
8 out of 31 projects (26%). For the majority of the projects
(74%), the external consultants recommend higher budget
limits, in some cases up to 15% or more. On average the
Table 2
Size of the recommended reserves (after project type and size)
Type of project Number
of projects
Mean reserve
percentage
(sub-category)
Standard deviation
percentage
(sub-category)
Transportation
infrastructure
12 8 3
Building 9 11 6
Defence
procurement
8 7 4
Information
technology
2 11 5
Total 31 9 4
Size of project
(million NOK)
300–750 13 8 4
750–1500 12 9 4
1500– 6 10 6
Total 31 9 4
Table 1
The sample
Type of project Number of projects Per cent
Transportation infrastructure 12 39
Building 9 29
Defence procurement 8 26
Information technology 2 6
Total 31 100
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external consultants recommended 5% higher budgets.
Some might argue that the observed diﬀerences are rather
small. Why should we deal with diﬀerences that in an ana-
lytical sense equal the uncertainty in the results? First of all,
even a 5% diﬀerence in projects of this scale could,
expressed in money, be substantial. Secondly, it must be
kept in mind that studies of initial estimates and actual
costs that show deviations up to several hundred percent
could include large distortions for instance with respect
to inﬂationary backgrounds. This study is diﬀerent, obvi-
ously because initial estimates from two diﬀerent actors
rather than initial estimates and actual costs are compared,
but also because price escalations, project changes and
other factors are not an issue or have been accounted
for. The compared ﬁgures are indeed ‘‘answers to the same
question from two diﬀerent actors’’. With this in mind, one
question immediately arises: What could explain the
observed result? An exact explanation must be left open
at this stage, but a closer look into the sources can be a
basis for discussion. It could be that the external consul-
tants apply a broader view and include more elements
assumed to have an impact on the cost of the project.
The project organisations major concern is the implemen-
tation of the project according to speciﬁc requirements.
The external consultants must also consider the potential
impact of factors that to the project organisation may
appear to be of a more unpredictable and unmanageable
character. These could be factors connected to the market,
ﬁnancing, and changes imposed by the government.
It must also be recognized that the prevailing methods
to calculate the estimates rely on subjective assessments.
As described by Olsson et al. [9], in some cases diﬀerent
estimates have been a source of discussion between the pro-
ject organisation and the external consultant. In cases
where there are fundamentally diﬀerent subjective views
concerning central uncertainty elements, this will clearly
be manifested in the results. Still, this does not explain
why the external consultants present a higher estimate in
so many cases.
Some may claim that this indicates an exaggeration of
the estimates from the external consultants. Since they do
not have any responsibility for the actual budget compli-
ance and it is claimed that nobody wants the label that they
underestimate costs, this could lead to a situation where
extra costs are included just to be sure. It would be hard
to establish data that could describe this issue, because this
fundamentally is an assumption about the intentions of
actors.6 It must otherwise not be forgotten that the founda-
tion for the external consultants recommendations are
explained in the reports from the quality assurance exer-
cises. In this way the underlying premises for the recom-
mended estimate can be veriﬁed.
The major question in this paper is the Quality-at-entry
Regimes inﬂuence on the initial decisions connected to the
projects. Does it lead to diﬀerent practices and other meth-
ods? In this perspective an analysis that maintains the time
dimension is presented.
The diﬀerence between the proposal from the project and
the revised estimate is calculated in percent. A plot of the
diﬀerences for all the projects in the sample against the
month of presented report and the result is shown in Fig. 2.
Visual inspection indicates that the largest diﬀerences
occurred when the quality assurance scheme was new,
and interestingly, no revised estimate substantially lower
than the initial estimate is observed before late 2002.
Another indication from Fig. 2 is the clear decrease in
the diﬀerences from the ﬁrst quarter of 2002.
What explanations are there? A number of possible fac-
tors spring to mind. One possibility might be that the focus
on more realistic cost frames launched by the Regime has
led to an increase in the use of relevant methods by the pro-
ject organisations to identify the uncertainties in the early
stages of the projects. Observations made during the collec-
tion of the data suggest that more equal estimates coin-
cided with a more consistent use of the most commonly
used terms. At the same time, the Ministry of Transport
and Communications, which accounts for a large number
of the projects in the sample (cf. Table 1), speciﬁed how
the results from the quality assurance of projects in their
area of responsibility should be employed. This indicates
that a change in practice and learning has taken place.
The literature referred to above suggest that so-called
‘‘strategic budgeting’’ could be a cause of underestimation
in public projects. This is based on the assumption that
projects that appear to be inexpensive have a greater
chance of being prioritized. It is easy to predict that the
Quality-at-entry Regime could have a rather direct impact
on strategic budgeting; assuming that such practice actu-
ally has taken place. It is, however, impossible to answer
this question on the basis of this study. The diﬀerences
observed here could just as much be explained by overesti-
mation from the external consultant as underestimation
from the project organisation, and a possible interpretation
of the development towards more equal estimates could
also be that an adjustment to the demands of governmental
institutions has taken place, either by external consultants,
project organisations, or both.
Table 3
External consultants revised estimate compared to the project organisa-
tions initial estimate
Revised estimate is (compared to
proposed estimate)
Number of
projects
Per cent
Lower 5–10% lower 3 9.7 26
5% lower than or equal to 5 16.1
Higher Up to 5% higher 7 22.6 74
5–10% higher 8 25.8
10–15% higher 5 16.1
More than 15% higher 3 9.7
Total 31 100.0
6 Flyvbjerg et al. [6, p. 289], face the same problem when trying to
answer the question whether project forecasts are intentionally biased.
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6.3. The diﬀerence between the recommended budget from
the external consultant and the ﬁnal budget decided by the
Parliament
The formal approval and resolution on budget limits for
each single project is dealt with by the Parliament. In prac-
tice, however, the Parliament accepts the Governments
proposal without changes. The project presented to the
Parliament is prepared by the responsible ministry based
on the information from the subordinate agency responsi-
ble for the day-to-day activities in the project.
Table 4 shows that in 58% of the projects, the upper
ﬁnancial level decided for the project equals the total bud-
get recommended by the external consultant. This means
that in most cases, the project owners directly use the rec-
ommendation from the external consultant when submit-
ting the proposal. At least there is a strong tendency
toward this as reﬂected by the table. The table also clariﬁes
that the recommendation can be disregarded. It must also
be noted that in many cases new estimates are prepared
from the project as a response to quality assurance. To give
a closer illustration of how the recommendation is applied
by the project owner, i.e., the direct response to the results
from quality assurance, descriptions from some of the pro-
jects included in the sample are presented:
‘‘External quality assurance has taken place which gives an
estimate of NOK 738 million with 50% probability for budget
compliance, and NOK 788 Million with 85% probability.
Based on the quality assurance the Norwegian Public Roads
Administration has reviewed the project and presented a
revised estimate of NOK 718 million.’’ ([15, p. 117], authors
translation)
Another example describes a case where the diﬀerence
was rather small:
‘‘The quality assurance shows recommended budget numbers
marginally lower than those proposed by the Norwegian Pub-
lic Roads Administration. In the Ministry of Transport and
Communications opinion the quality assurance conﬁrms that
the Norwegian Public Roads Administrations estimate is on
an appropriate level.’’ ([16, p. 4], authors translation)
The examples illustrate how the external consultants
recommendation is used by the project owner to verify
the numbers proposed by the project organisation and that
the quality assurance could result in updated cost estima-
tions from the project organisation. It is shown that there
is no rule of thumb whether the ﬁnal decision is based upon
the project organisations or the external consultants esti-
mate. Each project is considered on an individual basis
by the responsible ministry and the project organisation.
An explanation to the observations made here can be
connected to some of the results from Olsson et al. [9]
where it was concluded that the project owner particularly
ﬁnds the quality assurance useful. The study reported in
Olsson et al. [9] was based on fewer projects and did not
include analyses of the cost estimates. The study in this
paper is a quantitative one, but it supports the results in
Olsson et al. [9] because it clearly states that the external
recommendation, at least concerning the project cost, is
followed up by the project owner. An important conclu-
sion, drawn from the analysis presented here, is that the
involved ministries, being the project owners, actively use
the information provided by the external analysis in the
preparation of the project. The cost estimates are a central
part of this information, and the fact that the project own-
ers in so many cases directly build upon the calculations
from the external consultants, is a strong indication con-
cerning the signiﬁcance of this contribution.
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Fig. 2. The diﬀerence between the projects proposal and the revised estimate from the external consultant.
Table 4
The approved budget is often based on the recommendation from the
external consultant
Sanctioned budget Number of projects Per cent
Lower than the revised estimate 7 23
Equal to the revised estimate 18 58
Higher than the revised estimate 6 19
Total 31 100
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7. Concluding discussion
The performed analyses show that the recommended
project reserves on average are 9%. It is furthermore
observed that no matter the scale of the project, the size
of the reserves measured in per cent appear to be rather
typical, which is rather surprising, when it is kept in mind
that existing studies report overrun up to several hundred
per cent.
A discussion concerning the potential cost eﬀect of the
stochastic cost estimation and budgeting in public projects
is conducted. It is concluded that a ﬁnal evaluation of the
cost development must be done when the actual costs are
available. Compliance to the approved budget rely to a
large extent on the management of the reserves and it is
also argued that it is questionable to judge projects not
yet completed against past experience, which indicates that
projects use at least their allocated budget, when adequate
measures to reach realistic estimates at an early stage have
been established.
It is possible to conclude from the present study that
there is a diﬀerence between the numbers proposed by
the project organisation and the revised estimates from
the external consultant. This is based on the observation
that the revised estimates were higher than the initial esti-
mate in 74% of the projects studied here. This is a rather
strong indication since the estimates compared here are
answers to the same question. The study also shows that
the diﬀerences were higher in the early stages of the
Regime. The observed diﬀerences have decreased systemat-
ically since quality assurance was initiated in 2000. Some
suggestions based on empirical observations, the prevailing
methods and diﬀerent views upon the analysed project are
discussed, but the most important result here is the
revealed tendency in the existing material.
The study further shows that for many projects in the
sample, the parliamentary decision directly rely on the esti-
mates provided by the external consultant. This supports
the claim that the involved ministries, i.e., the project own-
ers, beneﬁt from the external assessment of the project, and
actively use the provided information when preparing the
decision proposal for the Parliament.
The observations here lead to the identiﬁcation of impor-
tant issues that need to be addressed in further research. Are
the diﬀerences in the estimates systematic and statistically
signiﬁcant? Are the diﬀerences observed when the scheme
was new cost underestimation by the projects or overesti-
mation by the consultants? Does the systematic decrease
imply a learning curve, or does it indicate an adjustment
to external demands? A closer look at the historical records
will help to cast light on these issues.
This paper is a report from the ﬁrst analyses of cost esti-
mates in major public investment projects after the initia-
tion of the Quality-at-entry Regime. Some experiences
have been gained, but there are many questions that need
to be answered to get a picture of the eﬀect of this initiative
not only in terms of reduction of cost overrun but also
long-term feasibility and proﬁtability of public projects.
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Abstract 
This paper aims to use experiences from major governmental investment projects to illustrate aspects on project 
flexibility, both from a theoretical and empirical point of view. Projects appear to be trapped in their freedom. The 
potential freedom of projects as temporary organizations is so large that major management emphasis is directed 
towards reducing and controlling flexibility. The empirical study is partly prospective, in the meaning that the 
projects and parameters to be studied were selected prior to conducting the analyses. Based on empirical data, 
flexibility in different project phases is quantified for illustration. 
Keywords: Projects, Front-end, Flexibility, Quality-at entry 
31. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to use experiences from the Norwegian Quality-at-entry regime for major governmental 
investments to illustrate aspects on project flexibility. The paper is also an attempt to contribute with empirical 
results on some project management issues related to project flexibility.   
To begin with, theoretical traditions in project management are discussed. Some models for illustration of project 
flexibility are also presented. Secondly, the nature of the Norwegian quality-at-entry regime for major governmental 
investments is analyzed in general. Project flexibility is chosen as a perspective to illustrate some aspects of the 
regime in more depth. An attempt is also made to quantify one aspect in the general project flexibility models based 
on empirical data. Finally, the results are discussed and some models for explanation of the results are proposed.  
1.1 Project management 
Söderlund (2004) discusses two main theoretical traditions in project management research. The first tradition has 
its intellectual roots in engineering science. Planning techniques and methods of project management, including the 
recent emphasis on uncertainty quantification and risk management, have been the major focus. This is in 
accordance with Packendorff (1995), who claims that a number of writers trace the intellectual roots of project 
management research and knowledge to various types of planning techniques, such as PERT and CPM. The other 
tradition has its intellectual roots in the social sciences and is especially interested in the organizational and 
behavioral aspects of projects. Söderlund (2004) terms these “the engineering tradition” and “the social science 
tradition”, respectively. In a similar distinction between project management traditions, Crawford and Pollack 
(2004) uses the terms “hard” and “soft”. Crawford and Pollack (2004) relates “hard” project management 
approaches to objectivist, scientific approaches and has parallels to Söderlund’s (2004) engineering tradition. The 
“soft” project management approaches of Crawford and Pollack (2004) stem from an interpretivist and constructivist 
schools of thought, and share similarities with Söderlund’s (2004) social science tradition.  
According to Engwall (2003), research on project management has been dominated by what he calls “the lonely 
project” perspective, with little emphasis on project context and organizational history. Engwall (2003) and Jugdev 
(2004) point out that current project management knowledge is a practitioner-driven theory focusing on supporting 
advices to the project manager, apparently referring to the engineering tradition.   
The discussion on project management traditions can also be related to how “project management” is defined. One 
way is looking at it, is to consider the engineering tradition as a hard core of project management. This is not 
necessarily because it is the core competence in project management. The reason is that no or few other disciplines 
claim that this is also “their” area of competence, with the possible exception of operations research. As the 
perspective shift to the social science tradition, influence from other disciplines becomes stronger. In such a 
perspective, the social science tradition draws on experiences and research approaches from areas such as 
organizational science, planning, decision analysis and political science, all applied in a project context.  
1.2 Flexibility and project management 
Flexibility is one approach to prepare projects for the effects of uncertainty. Terms like adaptability and robustness 
are often used when discussing issues related to what this paper calls flexibility. Flexibility may also be described as 
a way of making irreversible decision more reversible or postponing irreversible decisions until more information is 
available. 
The uncertainty of a decision in a project can be described by the gap between the information needed to make a 
decision that is entirely consistent with the actual outcome, and the information available at the moment of decision 
making (Galbraith, 2001).  Mikkelsen and Riis (2003) identify a fundamental dilemma in project planning: that the 
importance of decisions is at the highest at the same time as the available information is at its lowest. A common 
way of reducing this dilemma is to increase the available knowledge about the project. One key idea in project 
4flexibility is to postpone irreversible decisions in the front-end phase of projects, in addition to (or instead of) 
gathering more information.   
The engineering tradition of project management, referred to by Söderlund (2004) and Crawford and Pollack (2004)
is focused on stability for the project, particularly in the later phases of a project. The social science tradition has a 
greater understanding of the needs for flexibility and adaptability. Kreiner (1995) points out that the traditional focus 
on stability becomes challenged under uncertainty, which creates what he calls “drifting environments”. The drifting 
environments (or “context” as termed by Engwall, 2003) of a project are not necessarily caused by actual changes in 
the project context, but may also be the result when the project owners and users stakeholders get a better 
understanding of, and ability to express, their actual needs. According to Samset (2003), contextual uncertainty is 
associated with the surroundings or context of a project and usually considered beyond the scope and authority of 
the project. The project has limited possibility to influence the contextual uncertainty. Olsson (2004) indicate that 
flexibility is generally not desirable when the unit of analysis is limited to the project itself, but it can be rational 
when a wider context is included in the analysis. 
Projects are traditionally seen as temporary organizations designed for unique tasks (Cleland, 2004), often in 
contrast to the mass producing core activities of organizations. At present, projects are initiated to solve tasks of 
almost any type (Engwall, 2003) to the extent that the Western society seems to be heading towards a “projectified 
society” (Lundin and Söderholm, 1998, Gareis, 2004). A major benefit of organizing a task as a project is the 
freedom to create an organization more or less from scratch. While uniqueness is the competitive advantage of 
projects as a way of organizing, changes and lack of predictability is commonly seen as the major pitfalls of 
projects. Successful projects are characterized by control and governance (Hall, 1980; Morris and Hough, 1991; 
Miller and Lessard, 2000). 
Permanent organizations, on the other hand, are traditionally seen as repetitive tasks, suitable for permanent 
organizations (Taylor, 1912). Focus in manufacturing and supply chains has moved from mass production, via lean 
to agile production, (Asbjørnslett, 2003). As a part of this development, the emphasis on flexibility has increased, to 
the extent that “changeability” is listed on equal terms as effectiveness and efficiency when establishing 
performance measurement systems (Andersen et al., 1998).  
We noted that the engineering tradition of project management is focused on stability while many other management 
sciences are focused on adaptability. Kaderfors (1995) illustrates a similar paradox regarding projects. Projects are 
on the one hand viewed as situation-specific organizations, designed to solve a specific and unique task. However, 
several project intensive industries, including construction, have a reputation of being conservative and slow to 
change. This indicates that the potential flexibility in projects is controlled by conformity in the working process, 
creating a conservative tradition.  
So far, flexibility has been discussed in general terms. The empirical part of this paper includes an analysis of 
observed flexibility aspects of projects. Flexibility is used in a rather wide meaning in this paper, based on the 
definition of Husby et al. (1999): flexibility is "the capability to adjust the project to prospective consequences of 
uncertain circumstances within the context of the project". In such a wide definition, flexibility includes preparations 
to manage both internal and contextual uncertainty, such as: scope change management, iterative decision process, 
adjustments related to uncertain funding in general and budget reserves in particular.  
1.3 Visualizing project flexibility 
Most authors agree on the value of flexibility in the front-end phase of projects while flexibility is commonly seen as 
undesirable in the execution phases of projects. Lundin and Söderholm (1998) describe how a project moves from 
relative openness in the beginning of the project, to relative closeness in the execution phase. In the execution phase 
the predetermined action is supposed to be carried out according to the plans, in a “planned isolation”. The concept 
of project flexibility in the execution phase disturbs this planned isolation. Midler (1995) describes a management 
strategy for modern concurrent engineering projects. First prevent early commitment while at the same time trying 
to gather as much information as possible on the project. In the second phase, the project is locked as precisely as 
possible. Finally, at the end of the project, speed is given maximum priority in order to solve the remaining technical 
obstacles. In a similar way, Mahmoud-Jouini et al. (2004) characterizes project management by the speed of three 
5project phases: preparation, freezing and implementation. A similar approach is discussed by Verganti (1999). He 
identifies two different approaches to achieve flexibility in product development projects; anticipating and reaction. 
Anticipating means that future requirements should be analyzed as early as possible in the front-end phase. In 
contrast, reaction is the capability to rapidly introduce changes late in the process. Using the untraditional reaction 
approach, choices are delayed until later in the projects, when information is available. Verganti (1999) shows that a 
combination of the two approaches typically are used by successful companies.  
Many textbooks on project management present illustrations concerning the relative size of project attributes during 
different project phases.  The attributes include uncertainty, significance of decisions, freedom to maneuver, 
accumulated cost and available information. Figure 1 is an attempt to summarize the different models. Even though 
the shapes of the curves vary between different authors, the models all have in common that the uncertainty, 
significance of decisions and the degree of freedom to maneuver are typically high in the beginning of the project, 
and low in the end. At the same time, variables such as the accumulated cost and available information begin at low 
levels and end up at a high level at the end of the project. Even though this type of figure is very common and 
appears to be logical, the models appears to primary serve as summaries and illustrations, and seems to a lesser 
extent to be based directly on empirical evidence. There are obvious challenges in quantifying and measuring the 
different variables. One study in Miller and Lessard (2000:34) shows that for one particular project, regulatory, 
political and financial risks were at there highest during the middle of the project. However, this type of models can 
be used to illustrate different issues related to project flexibility.  
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Figure 1. The uncertainty, significance of decisions and the degree of freedom to maneuver are typically high 
in the beginning of the project, and low in the end. The accumulated cost and available information have a 
reverse development through the project, beginning at a low level and ending at a high level. (Based on 
Christensen and Kreiner, 1991:40; Mikkelsen and Riis, 2003:47; Midler, 1995:369, Samset, 2000:32). 
The “high to low”-curve may have different direct meaning, but the underlying message is similar. Christensen and 
Kreiner (1991:40) uses Galbraith’s (1977) definition of uncertainty as the difference between the needed and the 
available information. As the available information increases the uncertainty also decreases through the project. 
Samset (2000) uses a similar definition of uncertainty. Eikeland (2001) on the other hand, equalizes “room for 
maneuvering” with the internal uncertainty of the project, related to internal decisions that will be, but are not yet 
taken. A decision is within the room for maneuvering if it does not violate the consequences of previous decisions. 
6Midler (1995) relates the decreasing degree of freedom to maneuver with a rising degree of irreversibility in project 
decisions. Mahmoud-Jouini et al. (2004:361) describes the descending curve as “possibilities of action in the 
project”. Mikkelsen and Riis, (2003:47) let the “high to low”-curve represents importance of decisions.  
The “low to high”-curve usually represents either accumulated cost (Eikeland, 2001) or the relative amount of 
information or knowledge available related to the project (Mikkelsen and Riis, 2003; Midler, 1995; Samset, 2000 
and Mahmoud-Jouini et al., 2004).  
1.4 Stakeholder’s opinion on flexibility 
Olsson (2004) analyzed the expected opinion on project flexibility. Project owners and users were likely to be more 
positive towards changes aimed at increasing the benefit side of the projects, or related to effectiveness. 
Stakeholders whose main responsibility lie on the cost side of the project, such as project management and 
contractors, are less likely to embrace changes. According to Kreiner (1995), the project management is made the 
guardian of efficiency. 
In manufacturing industry, it has long been established that task control is a key to achieve high efficiency and 
productivity. The theoretical foundation for this include scientific management theory (Taylor, 1912), administrative 
management theory (Fayol, 1949) and bureaucracy theory (Weber, 1922). These theories all have in common that 
they assume closed systems in order to minimize uncertainty and disturbance (Thompson, 1967). Stability, 
predictability and control are key elements. Project management techniques such as Work Breakdown Structure 
(WBS) and other elements of the engineering tradition in project management are descendants from these theories.  
Samset (2001:116) discusses and illustrates the need for a division between the project itself and the strategic frame 
of the project. While the financing party has limited possibility to influence the execution of the project, they have 
incentives to define the strategic prerequisites as precisely as possible. This reduces the tactical room for 
maneuvering, and consequently the chances that the project will be carried out as planned. In a similar way, Müller 
(2003) claims that the owner should impose medium levels of structure on the projects manage. Too much structure 
will not give the project manager sufficient flexibility to deal with uncertainties that arise. Too little structure will 
lead to anarchy.  
1.5 Flexibility as blessing and curse 
Project flexibility is part of a fundamental dilemma in project management. On one hand, projects need stability and 
control to be executed efficiently, typically measured by time, cost and meeting specifications.  Thus, flexibility 
shall be minimized. On the other hand, important decisions in projects must be taken based on limited information in 
an unpredictable world, creating a need for flexibility. We briefly discussed different approaches to this dilemma 
from a theoretical standpoint. In the following, methodology and results from a study is presented in an attempt to 
illustrate some aspects of project flexibility.  The empirical data are based on the preparation and execution of a 
Quality-at entry regime of Norwegian governmental investments. To begin with, this regime is presented.  
2. The quality-at-entry regime 
The largest public investment projects in Norway amount to about 3 billion USD per year totally, mainly channeled 
through the Ministries of Labor and Government Administration, Finance, Defense, and Transport and 
Communications (St.prp 1 (2001-2002)). In 1998, the Norwegian ministry of finance initiated an analysis of a 
number of major governmental investments. Effective from 2000, the Norwegian Ministry of Finance initiated 
mandatory quality assurance and uncertainty analysis of all governmental investments in Norway exceeding NOK 
500 millions (60 million USD), the so-called Quality-at-entry Regime. The regime was introduced in response to a 
situation with large overruns (Berg et al., 1999).  
As a consequence, the responsible ministries are required to undertake assessments prior to the parliament's 
appropriation of the projects, with a particular aim to review cost estimates and major risks that might affect the 
projects when implemented. Such analyses are given the short name Quality Assurance 2 (QA2). The aim is to 
7establish realistic cost and time frames for the projects. Four consulting groups were commissioned to undertake the 
assessments. Related to the project phases, the quality-at-entry analyses are made in the end of the front-end phase. 
Important elements in the QA2 Quality-at-entry assessments are (St.prp nr.  1. (1999-2000)): 
x Verify the cost estimates in order to achieve commitment for realistic project budgets 
x Establish a list that specifies how the cost can be reduced if the set budget cannot be met 
x Advice on budget reserves that can cover unforeseen cost. The reserves should serve as a realistic tool to 
ensure that the projects could be carried out based on the allocated funds and, if need be, by also using the 
reduction list 
x Advise on how the budget reserves should be managed, specifically who would have the authorization to 
use the funds.  
The Quality-at-entry assessments shall also address issues such as important prerequisites, contract management and 
project organization. 
The purpose of the QA2 assessments was to give the ministry of finance and other involved ministries an 
independent analysis of the project before approval in parliament. In the consultant’s mandates, it is clear that the 
controlling aspect is the main focus. Based on the chosen content of the Quality-at-Entry regime, it appears to have 
its roots in the engineering tradition of project management.  Main attention is paid on securing that he projects can 
be carried out as planned, with a particular emphasis on the budget. An important part of the QA2 assessments has 
been on stochastic calculations of the expected cost. Dedicated software tools are used for such calculations. Even 
though organizational aspects of the projects are included in the Quality-at-entry assessments, this is done from a 
controlling perspective: how do we secure that the projects can be carried out as planned? The reasons for such a 
perspective are documented in the preparations for the regime, were cost overruns and varying treatment of 
uncertainty in project estimates were identified as major challenges. 
Experiences from the quality-at entry QA2 regime have indicated a need to focus on the basic rationale of projects 
as to satisfy needs. The Quality-at-entry Regime has been revised and extended to include an external assessment of 
different project concepts. This new part of the regime is called Quality Assurance 1 (QA1). Quality assurance 
concerning the basic project concept has not yet taken place. Awarding of framework agreements to consultants was 
in progress at the time of writing.   
3. Method and material 
The methodological terminology used in this paper is inspired by methodology used in medical research. In clinical 
research, two common research designs are cohort studies and cross-sectional studies (Hulley et al. 2001). In cohort 
studies, a group of subjects is followed over time. In cross-sectional studies, observations are made on a single 
occasion.  Furthermore, two basic variations of cohort studies are possible: prospective and retrospective studies. In 
prospective studies, the investigator defines the sample and measures variables before any outcome have occurred. 
Studies in which the sample and data collections are made after the outcome have occurred are retrospective. While 
many studies in project management are of the retrospective type, the research material in this paper also includes 
prospective studies. The applied methodology is partly prospective, in the meaning that the results are generated 
from a trailing research were the projects and parameters to be studied were selected prior to conducting the 
analyses. 
In the medical tradition, retrospective cohort studies have the advantage over prospective ones of being much less 
costly and time-consuming. Prospective studies give the investigator better control over the study (Hulley et al. 
2001). The parallels between medical and project management research shall not be drawn too far, but the 
prospective design has contributed to a relatively consistent data material and overview of the data collection 
process.
Two data sets have been used. Table 1 gives an overview of some characteristics of the two data sets. The first data 
set describes the background for the Quality-at entry regime. This material includes 14 projects initiated between
1986 and 1998. The prime source is reports written as a preparation of the quality-at entry-regime. Theses analyses 
are well documented and submitted to public inquiry before a summary of the results were included in a 
8parliamentary bill. In addition, public evaluation reports of governmental projects that have been submitted to the 
parliament have been used. Both types of reports are comprehensive and quality assured analyses of the projects. 
The second source of information consists of 48 Quality-at entry reports carried out between 2000 and 2004. As a 
part of the Norwegian Quality-at-entry regime, a forum was established consisting of the involved consultants and 
ministries. A key issue if this forum was to ensure a uniform structure and terminology of the Quality-at entry 
reports. As a consequence, the research data used in this study has a uniform and quality assured structure. Both 
these data sets have been codified and entered into a research database. The purpose of the database was to provide 
proper storage of all relevant data regarding the projects.  
Data set 
Background for the Quality-
at entry regime 
Projects under the Quality-
at entry regime (QA2) 
Number of projects (N) 14  48 
Time if project initiation 1986-1998  2000 - 
Data source Evaluation reports Consultant reports 
Type of study Retrospective Prospective 
     
Project type Number Per cent Number Per cent 
Hospitals 2 14 % 1 2 % 
Transportation infrastructure 6 43 % 25 52 % 
Defense 3 21 % 16 33 % 
Public buildings 3 21 % 6 13 % 
 Total 14  100%  48  100%  
     
Project size (final or last known)         
<15 mill USD (100 mill NOK) 2 14 % 0 0 % 
15 - 60 mill USD (100-500 mill NOK) 4 28.6 % 5 10 % 
60 - 250 mill USD (500-2000 mill NOK) 4 28.6 % 34 71 % 
>250 mill USD (2 mrd NOK) 4 28.6 % 9 19 % 
Total 14 100% 48 100% 
Table 1. An overview of the two used datasets. 
As Table 1 shows, the material related to the preparations for the Quality-at entry regime is of a retrospective type. 
The data related to projects that were subject to analysis under the Quality-at entry regime is of a prospective type. A 
research program, CONCEPT, was established to do research on the effects of the new regime and to follow the 
projects that were subject to analysis. The projects to be studied were therefore defined before the data collection 
took place. The variables to be studied were also defined prior to the data collection based on the format of the 
Quality-at entry analyses.   
In addition to the written material, structured interviews are carried out with key stakeholders in many of the 
projects, including the ministries, government agencies and project organizations. The ministries and project 
organizations in eight of the first 20 projects were interview and the results are presented in Olsson et al. (2003). 
Further interviews of agencies and project managers in the Defense, the Public Roads Administration and the 
Directorate of Public Construction and Property were carried out and presented by Langlo and Olsson (2003). In 
relation to the mentioned previous studies, this paper aims to add results from a quantitative study to the previous 
qualitative studies and present an overview based on multiple data sources. 
94. Results 
In the following, the empirical data are presented. To begin with, we present results from a re-analysis of the 
material that served as a decision basing when the Quality-at entry regime was established. Secondly, there are 
results based on performed Quality-at entry analyses. Finally, there is a brief presentation of the next steps in the 
development of the regime.  
4.1 Background for the quality assurance regime re-analyzed 
Based on the available reports from the analysis that was done as a preparation for the Quality-at-entry regime, we 
have re-analyzed the projects in a flexibility perspective. The type of projects in this part of the study is shown in 
Table 1. The analyzed projects were been initiated between 1986 and 1998. 
The types of flexibility that was observed in the projects have been analyzed. As can be seen in Table 2, scope 
changes were common, particularly during the planning phase. Only one project could be executed as planned.  
The original analysis (Berg et al. 1999) claimed that unsatisfactory project results, mostly cost overruns, often came 
as a consequence of poor preparations of the projects before they were presented to the parliament for final approval. 
In a flexibility perspective, this re-analysis indicates that the analyzed projects were subject to project flexibility 
particularly in the planning and execution phases.   The background for the Quality-at entry regime therefore 
indirectly point to project flexibility as a major problem in governmental investments. 
 Front-end Planning Execution No phase 
Scope changes 0 7 2 N/A 
Iterations 2 2 0 N/A 
No flexibility 0 0 0 1 
Total 2 9 2 1 
Table 2. Type of flexibility applied in the first set of studied projects (N=14) 
4.2 Results from quality-at-entry reports seen in a flexibility perspective 
Mandatory Quality-at-entry analyses of governmental investments were carried out by external consultants on behalf 
of the responsible ministry.  The consultants present a report that compiles the results from the quality assurance. By 
the time this paper was drafted, 54 projects had been subject to quality-at-entry analysis. General information was 
obtainable for 48 of these projects. Table 1 shows a summary of the type and size of the projects. 
Flexibility is, with some exceptions, not directly addresses as a term by its own in the QA2 analyses. However, 
several issues discussed previously in this paper as different aspects of flexibility are to be found. The QA2 reports 
include an overview of critical success factors and pitfalls. Table 3 shows a summary of how frequent three aspects 
of flexibility were mentioned in the summaries of the Quality-at-entry reports. The aspects were change 
management, structured approach to flexibility and finally predictable funding. Issues related to scope change 
management are summarized in the column for change management in Table 3. Iterative decision processes and 
flexibility in the technical solutions are summarized in the column labeled structured approach to flexibility. This 
was the only area where the term “flexibility” was explicitly used. Finally, management of uncertain funding is 
covered in the column labeled predictable funding. Table 3 shows a summary of how frequent these aspects of 
flexibility were mentioned as one of the top issues in the project analyses. The overview only covers occurrence in 
the summaries of the reports, meaning that a prioritization has been made. 
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  Change management 
Structured approach to 
flexibility Predictable funding 
Pit fall 16 2 2 
Key success factor 13 3 1 
Pit fall or key 
success factor 24 5 3 
Table 3. Key project aspects related to project flexibility as mentioned in the summaries of the Quality-at-
entry reports (QA2). N=48
Management of changes was the most frequent issue. It was mentioned as a top issue in 24 of the projects, or 50%. 
In most cases the purpose was to establish a structured management of scope changes in order to minimize the 
amount and the size of the changes. For five projects, change management was mentioned as both as success factor 
and pit fall, usually addressing the same issue, in essence an emphasis of the importance of change management. 
The apparent “double counting” in five projects means that the total number of projects addressing change 
management are not equal to the sum of each issue individually in Table 3. Flexibility in the product or decision 
process was mentioned in 10% of the projects. The availability of predictable funding often was frequently 
mentioned in the text of the reports. However, it was only in three projects that it was listed among the top pit falls 
or key success factors in the summaries of the reports. 
4.3 Reduction lists 
It is a part of the consultants’ assignment to assess the possibility for potential reductions that can be carried out if 
other parts of the project turn out to be more costly than planned. These possible reductions are summarized as 
reduction lists. Reduction lists are the most explicit use of project flexibility in the Quality-at entry regime. These 
reduction lists cover parts of the project scope that are planned to be part of the projects. However, if necessary, 
these parts of the scope can be taken out of the projects without threatening the fundamental functionality of the 
delivery. The scope reductions shall be described, the cost reduction shall be estimated and a priority list shall be 
presented. Prerequisites and consequences shall also be described. Even though it was not a formal requirement, 
many of the consultants chose to add due dates for the scope reductions, to indicate when decisions have to be made 
to realize any cost saving from the reductions.
Information on reduction lists was possible to obtain from 42 of the projects. As shown in Table 4, reduction lists 
were used in 30 of these projects. For 23 of the projects, the reduction lists also included due dates to define when 
the window of opportunity closes for each item on the reduction list. The total value of all mentioned possible 
reductions was 7% if only the projects with reduction lists are used as basis for percentage calculation, and 5% if all 
projects are included, i.e. also those project without reductions lists. 
  Number 
Percentage 
(based on 47 
projects) 
Projects with reduction lists 33 70 % 
Projects that subtracted reductions in the 
recommended budget 18 38 % 
Projects with due dates in the reduction lists 24 51 % 
Table 4. Occurrence of reduction lists (N=47) 
Table 5 shows a categorization of the reductions, their frequency and total amount. Flexibility in the product 
represents primarily preparations for alternative use of for future projects. Reductions in quality or functionality 
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lowered the quality but the volume remained the same as planned. A common type of reduction for roads was 
related to planned actions on existing roads in connection to the new construction. These occasions are registered as 
reductions in quality. Adjustments of the ambitions related to the visual impression of the project delivery might be 
seen as a subgroup of quality reductions. Due to its frequency in transportation infrastructure projects in particular, it 
is presented as a separate category. Common examples of this category include planting fewer trees, lower ambition 
as to establishing lawn and lower ambitions for the esthetic appearance of concrete walls. Reductions in volume 
relate to number of items delivered, fewer kilometers of road etc. The dependencies between different projects were 
typically of the type that “if another project includes this particular delivery in their scope, we can take it out of our 
scope”.  Finally, any type of reduction that did not match the identified categories is listed as “other”. As can be seen 
in Table 5, quality and volume issues were most frequent and represented the largest monetary value.  
 Total observations Amount   
Type of reduction Number Percent Mill. NOK Percent 
Flexibility in the product 9 5 % 70 3 % 
Quality, functionality 71 42 % 804 36 % 
Visual impression 22 13 % 239 11 % 
Volume 48 28 % 864 39 % 
Dependencies between 
projects 4 2 % 41 2 % 
Other 15 9 % 221 10 % 
Total 169 100% 2 239 100% 
Table 5. Reductions by type, frequency and size. Based on data from 37 projects.
Several concerns regarding the scope reductions are raised. One issue is related to cost sharing between stake 
holders in the projects, for example between the government represented by the Public Roads Administration on the 
one hand, and the local counties on the other hand. Some type of scope reductions may only represent a relocation of 
the cost. 
A similar discussion related to weighing investments versus maintenance cost is also present for many projects. In 
some cases, it is commented that future maintenance cost becomes neglected by the use of a fairly high discount rate 
in cost/benefit calculations. 
In many cases, reductions are claimed to only be possible by reducing the volume of the projects, for example in 
terms of highway meters or defense equipment units. A common comment is that by reducing the volume, the unit 
cost will increase in the projects because of fixed costs. There is also a tendency towards frustration because the 
projects have been through several rounds of reductions to focus the scope prior to the external quality-at entry 
analysis, where a new round of reductions is asked for. 
The need for fast decisions regarding possible reductions is very common. According to one consultant, reductions 
in system architecture and quality standards have to be made early in the projects. Reductions in volume are possible 
to make at later stages, depending on the contract structure. Another common comment is that the potential volume 
of the reductions is so small that it is not justified to set up a system to manage reductions. 
The purpose of the reduction lists is to have possibilities to reduce the scope in response to cost overruns. A major 
challenge is that the due dates for the reductions typically comes before one can expect that project management 
have updated cost estimates that may indicate potential overruns.  
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4.4 Calculating the remaining flexibility of projects 
Based on the reduction lists and due dates, it was possible to illustrate how the due dates of the items on the 
reduction list expire on a time scale. Quality assurance reports were typically delivered a few months prior to the 
final decision in parliament to go ahead with the projects. The time span of the projects are equal to the time from 
the date of the quality assurance report, until the planned delivery date of the final project result. To perform the 
calculations, the time span of each of the projects was divided into quarters of years. For each quarter, the value of 
the still open items on the reduction list was calculated as percentage of the total project budget. Remaining 
flexibility of the project decreased each time a due date for an item on the reduction list passed. This value can be 
seen as an indication of the remaining flexibility, or room to maneuver. It was possible to perform such calculations 
for 19 of the projects. The shortest of these projects had duration of 1 year, the longest 10 years and average was 4.1 
years. 
Table 6 shows values of the remaining flexibility for each quarter of the projects. The value is presented as average, 
maximum, minimum and standard deviation, for each quarter. In this table, all projects are analyzed (and usually 
approved by parliament) at year number 0. In reality, all projects did not begin at the same time, but in a sequence, 
usually independent of each other. As the number of projects decrease in the right column, this indicates that the 
projects reach their completion. When the number of projects drops from 19 to 16 between year one and two, this 
means that the three shortest of the projects only had duration of less than two years. Only one project had duration 
over 7 years. The average remaining flexibility drops sharply during the first year of the projects, from almost six to 
less than two percent. After 6 years, none of the projects had any remaining items on their reduction lists. Only three 
projects had such long duration. 
Year Average St.dev Max Min N 
0 5,9 % 5,0 % 18,2 % 0,2 % 19 
1 1,8 % 2,1 % 7,4 % 0,0 % 19 
2 1,2 % 2,1 % 7,4 % 0,0 % 16 
3 1,0 % 1,7 % 5,2 % 0,0 % 12 
4 1,0 % 1,5 % 3,8 % 0,0 % 10 
5 0,3 % 0,5 % 1,2 % 0,0 % 7 
6 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 3 
7 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 1 
8 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 1 
9 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 1 
10 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 1 
Table 6. The size of the reduction lists as percentage of total budget at the end of each year of the project tine 
span, beginning from the date when consultants supplied their reports, and ending when the projects are 
delivered. 
To achieve a uniform presentation of the projects, regardless of their duration, the time scale was then converted to 
percentages of time span. Thus, all projects begin at 0% on the time scale. At this point, the initial remaining 
flexibility is represented by a full reduction list (on average 5.9%, the same as for year 0). The projects were 
completed at the 100% mark on the time scale, which in reality varied from a little more than one year to ten years, 
with an average of 4.1 years. At 50%, all projects were halfway between the delivery of the quality assurance report 
and their planned finish date. At this stage, the average project had open items on the reduction list equivalent to 
0.8% (and 3,4% at the most) of the total budget. Table 7 shows remaining flexibility presented as average, 
maximum, minimum and standard deviation on the uniform time scale.  
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Size of remaining items on reduction lists Percent of 
project on 
time scale Average St.dev Max Min 
0 % 5,9 % 5,0 % 18,2 % 0,2 % 
10 % 5,2 % 4,9 % 18,2 % 0,0 % 
20 % 2,9 % 4,0 % 17,2 % 0,0 % 
30 % 1,7 % 1,8 % 5,7 % 0,0 % 
40 % 1,5 % 1,7 % 5,4 % 0,0 % 
50 % 0,8 % 1,2 % 3,4 % 0,0 % 
60 % 0,4 % 0,9 % 3,4 % 0,0 % 
70 % 0,3 % 0,8 % 3,4 % 0,0 % 
80 % 0,2 % 0,8 % 3,4 % 0,0 % 
90 % 0,1 % 0,3 % 1,2 % 0,0 % 
100 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 
Table 7. The size of the reduction lists as percentage of total budget at different phases of the projects, 
beginning from the date when consultants supplied their reports, and ending when the projects are delivered. 
N=19
4.5 Reserves 
It is also a part of the consultants’ assignment to recommend a budget for the project. The projects are typically 
assigned a budget which consists of the expected cost including expected extras. In addition, reserves were allocated 
to the investments in order to avoid the need for additional funding. The intention with the allocated reserves was to 
mitigate project risks that could not be fully predicted
Basic
budget
Expected
additional
cost
Reserves
Reduction
lists
Percentage of total 
allocated budget
Cost
Managed 
by PM
Managed 
by agency
P50
P85
100%
92%
(N=30)
8%
(N=45)
94%
(N=30)
85%
(N=20)
Subjective
probability
Figure 2. Project budget and reserves 
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As Figure 2 illustrates, the external consultant recommends a total budget that is expected to cover the consequences 
of the identified uncertainties. The allocated budget shall represent the cost that has 85% probability of being met 
(referred to as “P85”), minus the identified potential for reductions. The reserves are, however, not expected to be 
used, and specific rules for the management of reserves have been established. The budget allocated to the projects, 
or the executing government agency is usually the most probable final cost (P50). The reserves were not managed 
by the project manager, and usually not even by the executing government agency. Use of the reserves must be 
approved by the responsible ministry. Reserves are not intended for expanding the scope of the projects, but solely 
to cover unexpected expenses. 
The size of the reserves recommended by the external consultants could be established for 45 of the projects. On 
average the external consultants recommended a 9 % reserve (interpreted as a mark-up above the expected cost). 
Viewed as a share of the total allocated budget the recommended reserve is 8 % on average. In 30 projects the 
external consultants directly recommended a budget managed by the subordinate agency, and in 20 projects a project 
manager cost target. 
A closer look upon the recommendation on how the reserves should be managed reveals that the subordinate agency 
on average is pointed out as responsible for 94 % of the total allocated budget. The recommended expected cost is 
on average 92 % of the total budget, which means that the subordinate agency is granted somewhat more than the 
expected cost. In the 20 projects where a project manager cost target was recommended, the analysis shows that the 
project manager is pointed out to manage less than the expected cost (85 % on average). This is supported by the 
fact that during the collection of the data it was observed that in many cases where a specific project manager cost 
target was not directly recommended. Instead, it was frequently mentioned that a reasonable level would be in the 
P45-P50 area. This was expected to launch a cost focus that ultimately would result in cheaper projects.   
4.6 QA1 - societal and stakeholder perspectives 
After presenting empirical results related to the preparations and execution of the Quality-at-entry regime, we now 
continue to a brief analysis of a new aspect of the regime. After the first round of four years, the Quality-at-entry 
Regime has been revised and new consultant contracts were awarded in June 2005. In the revision of the regime, a 
new part has been added that includes an external assessment of different project concepts, termed Quality 
Assurance 1 (QA1). Five years of trailing research served as input to the revision of the Quality-at-entry regime. 
Results from this research are presented by Olsson et al (2004) as well as Magnussen and Samset (2005). According 
to Magnussen and Samset (2005), QA1 is established based on a belief that in order to achieve substantial 
improvements of project performance, the basic concepts of projects shall be analyzed, not only the final proposal, 
as is done in QA2.  
At the time of writing this paper, no QA1 have been carried out and this short description is based on the description 
of the intentions of QA1. QA1 include an analysis of the prerequisites for a proposed project, a need analysis, 
analyses of the documented strategy and requirements and finally, a comparison of alternative concepts. An 
important element of QA1 is that at least three alternatives shall be analyzed, including a reference alternative which 
only includes maintenance and other actions needed to continue to use existing resources. QA1 has a wide 
perspective and focuses on the future users and society as a whole. The purpose is to identify the right project. The 
societal effects and the interest of different stakeholders are key criteria in the comparison of project alternatives to 
be carried out in QA1. 
5. Discussion 
The analysis indicates that flexibility was seen as one of the major problems with the governmental projects prior to 
the Quality-at entry regime. As discussed in the introduction section, the engineering tradition in project 
management theory then proposes a stronger emphasis on the front-end phase in order to prepare the projects as well 
as possible. In this perspective, one of the objectives of the Quality-at-entry regime was to reduce the flexibility of 
the projects. The purpose was to make sure that the project is well defined, both in terms of project scope and 
organization.  
The strong emphasis on scope change management in the QA2 reports indicates that changes and flexibility 
primarily are treated as something to be minimized, or at least to have a strict regime for. A structured approach to 
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flexibility is introduced by the use of reduction lists. However, the sole purpose of the reduction lists is to keep the 
project within budget. This might be described as a “negative” or internal freedom to maneuver. There is no 
intention to use the freedom to maneuver to increase the effectiveness, or the benefit side of the projects. In contrast, 
a “positive” or external freedom to maneuver would include options for increased user satisfaction with the projects. 
This can be explained by the background to the Quality-at entry regime, where the observed flexibility of the 
projects often was aimed at increasing the benefit from the projects for the involved stakeholders. This frequently 
resulted in cost increases.  A key purpose of the Quality-at entry regime was to stop this development. 
We noted that the possibility to establish a more or less customized organization for a unique task is one of the main 
reasons that projects are set up. As a contrast, control is a key issue in the Quality-at entry regime. Once established 
to have freedom and adaptability, project management, or at least the engineering tradition of project management, 
is focused on reducing or controlling this freedom of the projects. Projects appear to be trapped in their freedom. 
The potential freedom of projects is so large that major management emphasis is directed towards reducing and 
controlling flexibility. Permanent organizations have a different perspective. Repetitive tasks are traditionally 
organized in ways that utilize economies of scale and to utilize the learning curve. This has usually meant rigid 
processes and high investment. Coming from a tradition of repetitive tasks, successful permanent organizations are 
characterized by adaptability (Mintzberg, 1994). 
Permanent organization Project 
Strength Repeatability Flexibility 
Success criteria Flexibility Focus 
Table 8. Flexibility is a success criterion of permanent organizations and strength of projects. 
Table 8 illustrates, with the lack of nuances that comes with such matrixes, that flexibility is not the inherent 
strength, but a success criteria of permanent organizations. As a contrast, flexibility is the inherent strength of 
projects or temporary organizations, and controlling this flexibility by focus is a key success criterion of this type of 
organizations. The lack of nuances in Table 8 includes the fact pointed to by Engwall (2003) that many 
organizations are neither purely projects nor permanent. Reality is therefore more like a continuum of gray scales, 
where the degree of “permanent” or “project” character of organizations varies. The discussion above then relates to 
organizations with a high degree of repetitive tasks and “permanent” and similar for “projects”. 
It is claimed that QA2 aims to reduce flexibility, at least in the planning and execution phases of projects. Seen in 
isolation, this means a reduction of flexibility. However, the introduction of QA1 means a stronger emphasis on 
analyzing alternatives in the front-end phase than has previously been required in this manner. By seeing QA2 and 
QA1 in combination, the Quality at-entry regime is an opportunity to reduce flexibility options in the planning and 
execution phases, and to increase and structure these options in the front-end phase. 
Different aspects on the Quality at-entry regime have been presented from a flexibility perspective. This paper 
argues that QA2 to a large extent has its foundation in the engineering tradition, with its focus on control. Using the 
categorization of projects management perspectives, the intentions of QA1 are different from QA2 and bring 
associations to the social science tradition in project management.  
Some authors on project management, including Söderlund (2004), argue that the engineering and social science 
tradition are incompatible from a theoretical standpoint. The discussion about QA1 and QA2 indicate that the two 
perspectives might be practically compatible when analyzing one particular project, but with a displacement in time. 
The Norwegian Quality-at entry regime strives to utilize the best of the two perspectives, drawing on the social 
science perspective in the early phase (represented by QA1), and then switching focus to the engineering perspective 
in the execution phase (represented by QA2). The engineering tradition appears to have its strengths in the execution 
phases and the social science tradition in the front-end phase, as illustrated in Figure 2. The fact that these traditions 
co-exist in the minds of different actors involved in a project does not contradict Söderlund’s (2004) notion about 
the mutual incompatibility from a theoretical standpoint.  
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Social science tradition
Engineering tradition
Time
Front-end Execution
Figure 3. The relative impact of the social science and engineering traditions over time in a project
In accordance with the engineering tradition in project management, the Quality-at entry regime strives to provide 
the project owner and project management control over the environments related to the project, or a type of 
“framing” of the projects. To achieve a high efficiency in the projects, the stakeholders appear to strive for control of 
the prerequisites for their tasks. It is in accordance with the engineering tradition, with its roots in project planning, 
that project management shall strive for control of the environments related to the project. In the QA2 reports, this is 
represented by the high priority given to change management, as shown in table 3. As shown by the use of project 
reserves and reduction lists, stakeholders also strive for freedom to maneuver within the defined prerequisites. The 
QA2 aims at defining the projects as precisely as possible, but still provide project management with the freedom to 
decide how the specifications shall be met, work carried out and budgets to be held. In a similar way, Turner (2004) 
claims that one of four necessary conditions for project success is that the project manager is empowered. The 
project owner should give guidance on how the project can be best achieved, but allow the project manager 
flexibility to handle unforeseen circumstances as they chose. 
One purpose of this paper was to contribute with empirical data on some issues related to project flexibility. By 
using the results presented in Table 7, a part of the curve for the freedom to maneuver in Figure 1 can be drawn 
based on empirical data. The relative size of the remaining open reductions can be seen as an empirical illustration 
of the “room for maneuvering”.  Figure 4 shows the curve generated from the reduction lists placed into the whole 
project time span. To do so, another reference point on the scale of the room for maneuvering was calculated based 
on information from eight of the 48 projects. This reference point is located earlier in the front-end phase and is 
related to the first budget estimated budget of projects to be found in official documentation. This first estimate is on 
average 3.4 years before the final approval. As an illustration of the room for maneuvering at this point, the first 
budget is compared to the final approved. An average of 42% of the final budget was not locked at this point. 
Because all differences were positive, the final approved budget was on average 42% higher than the first estimate, 
with a standard deviation of 17%. The reference point in Figure 4 represents the average plus one standard 
deviation, in a similar way as for the curve based on the reduction lists. The position of the first estimate point in 
relation to the zero-point on the time scale raises questions – when does a project start? Previous experience 
indicates that this time span may vary from about 30 years to one or two. As an indication, this point is located at the 
equivalent to four years after project initiation in Figure 4. This was done because more than 50% of the projects are 
related to transportation infrastructure, and the strategic planning of such projects is repeated every four years in 
Norway.  
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Figure 4. The size of the reduction lists as percentage of total budget at different phases of the projects. The 
observations indicate average plus one standard deviation. The trend line is only a linearization between 
observations. N=19 
The observations and indicated curve in Figure 4 have similar features as the model presented in Figure 1, which 
means that these quantitative results support the illustrative models used in many text books.  
Another way of quantifying the remaining flexibility at the time for final approval of projects is to see the reduction 
lists and allocated reserves in combination. On average, the reduction lists amounted to 6% of the total project 
budget. At the same time, an average of 8% of the project budgets was allocated as reserves, to cover unexpected 
expenses. Adding these two types of flexibility gives an approximate total remaining flexibility of 14% of total 
budget at the time of parliamentary approval. This number shall be used as an approximation. Table 4 shows that 
when calculating the recommended budget, 13 out of 42 projects subtracted the reduction list value before the 
recommended budget was set. These numbers indicate that a remaining flexibility ranging between 9 and 14% of the 
total budget appears manageable at the time of final project approval, measured by the relative size of reduction lists 
and allocated reserves. 
6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was to use experiences from the Norwegian Quality-at-entry regime for major 
governmental investments to illustrate aspects on project flexibility. From a flexibility perspective, project 
management as a discipline was compared to other managerial disciplines. Projects are described as trapped in their 
freedom. The potential freedom of projects as temporary organizations is so large that major emphasis in project 
management must be directed towards reducing and controlling the freedom, or flexibility, of projects. 
Theoretical traditions in project management were discussed. The analysis of the Norwegian Quality-at-entry regime 
for major governmental investments indicate that the regime have its theoretical roots in the engineering tradition of 
project management. However, the extension to include an early analysis on project alternatives appears to have 
more in common with the social science tradition that the engineering one. This means that the quality assurance 
regime, including both QA1 and QA2, is an attempt to use the best of the two worlds divided by the time scale; use 
social science “glasses” when analyzing the alternatives, then switch to engineering “glasses” to execute the project.  
Models for illustration of project flexibility in a time perspective were presented. An attempt was also made to 
quantify one dimension in project flexibility models based on empirical data. Remaining flexibility has been 
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quantified during the life cycle of projects and the result is a curve similar to the illustrative models used in many 
text books on project management. Around the time for final approval, the project management consultants saw it 
manageable to have an average of 6% of the total project budget still open, with a standard deviation of 5%, 
maximum 18% and minimum 0.2%.  These numbers are based on the 23 projects that did use reduction list with due 
dates. Another representation of the remaining flexibility at the time of final approval is the fact that 8% of the 
project budgets were allocated as reserves, to cover unexpected expenses. An approximation of the manageable total 
remaining flexibility at the time of parliamentary approval is therefore estimated to be in the range between 9 and 
14% of total budgets.  
The applied methodology is partly prospective in the meaning that the projects and parameters to be studied were 
selected prior to conducting the analyses. The methodological discussion in the paper on prospective and 
retrospective research designs is inspired by medical research.  Regarding future research, continued use of 
prospective research designs in project management is interesting and desired. Such designs have the possibility to 
contribute to enhancing the credibility of project management as a research field.  
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ABSTRACT 
This paper gives an overview of research on project flexibility in engineering projects. Project 
flexibility is viewed from different perspectives. Firstly, the concept of flexibility in projects is 
discussed. Secondly, the cases against and in favour of flexibility are presented. Finally, a short 
overview is made to identify under which circumstances and during which part of a project that 
flexibility proves most useful and most damaging. The paper suggests that project owners are more 
likely to be in favour of flexibility than contractors. Viewed in a time perspective, flexibility in the 
front-end phase could help to increase the probability of success, while flexibility in the execution 
phase is claimed to reduce efficiency of projects. Furthermore, industrial development projects are 
more likely to benefit from flexibility than civil engineering projects are. Related to the degree of 
uncertainty, flexibility is claimed to be desirable in high uncertainty environments and less important in 
situations with low uncertainty. Flexibility is discussed as a double-edged sword. Flexibility for one 
stakeholder is often viewed as another's risk. The case in favour of flexibility emphasise the possibility 
to increase a project’s effectiveness while the case against flexibility highlights that it might reduce 
efficiency. Project flexibility can be used to increase the project owner’s value of a project. The major 
drawbacks lie in the negative effects of changes on the project organizations and a possible frustration 
regarding lack of decisions and commitment.  
KEYWORDS 
Project, Management, Flexibility, Efficiency, Effectiveness.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The ability to adapt to changes along with short response time is heavily emphasised in disciplines such 
as strategic management and supply chain management (Bettis & Hitt, 1995). However, study after 
study (including Hall, 1980; Morris & Hough, 1991; Miller & Lessard 2000) indicate that a clear 
project definition is a key success criterion for projects. It appears as a paradox that the mainstream of 
project management focuses on stability for the project, while major parts of other management 
disciplines strongly emphasise flexibility.  
The purpose of this paper is to give an overview of research on project flexibility in engineering 
projects. The following issues are covered: (1) the concept of flexibility in projects, (2) the cases 
against and in favour of flexibility and (3) under which circumstances and during which part of a 
project that flexibility proves most useful or most damaging. While many authors on the issue of 
flexibility have clear standing in favour or against the use of flexibility in projects, the paper is an 
attempt to summarise the arguments used by both sides.  
Research methodology 
The paper is based primarily on literature search of flexibility management in projects. However, the 
presentation is also influenced by a number of case studies and personal experience from consulting 
and research engagements. In the case studies, a research methodology based on the works of Yin 
(2003) regarding case studies as a qualitative paradigm has been used. One of the characteristics of 
case studies is that multiple sources of information are used, including archives, interviews and 
observations. The research has primarily been of a qualitative nature. 
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The concept of project flexibility 
Flexibility management as a systematic approach is not a new concept. Sager (1990) found several 
examples of flexibility as one approach to prepare for the effects of uncertainty in planning. However, 
Sager also points out that flexibility is an important term very often used by planners but rarely 
scrutinized theoretically.  
One approach to project flexibility is based on theory related to financial options, referred to by 
Brennan & Trigeoris (2000) as the real options paradigm. In this paradigm, flexibility is compared to 
owning an option - the right, but not the obligation to take an action in the future (Amram & Kulatlaka, 
1999).  
Koskela (2000) describes how production principles such as just-in-time has been adopted in a 
theoretical framework aimed at the construction industry under the term lean construction. In this 
framework, the term “last responsive moment” is used to achieve flexibility in projects (Ballard & 
Howell, 2003). According to Ballard & Howell (2003), the last responsive moment means that 
decisions must be made within the lead time for realizing alternatives and that a decision should not be 
made until it has to be made.  
Mandelbaum & Buzacott (1990) uses the number of the remaining alternatives after a decision has 
been taken as a measure of flexibility. Eikeland (2001) discusses “room for manoeuvring” related to 
project flexibility. He relates “room for manoeuvring” to the internal uncertainty of the project, 
represented by future yet undetermined internal decisions. According to Eikeland (2001), a decision is 
within the room for manoeuvring if it does not violate the consequences of previous decisions. Terms 
like adaptability and robustness are often used when discussing issues related to what this paper calls 
flexibility. Flexibility may also be described as a way of making irreversible decision more reversible 
or postponing irreversible decisions until more information is available.  
Note that flexibility as discussed in this paper is not seen as an alternative to strategic management, but 
as a means to help realising a strategy, in the way that Samset (1998) argues that successful projects are 
characterised by a distinct strategy in combination with sufficient tactical flexibility. 
Flexibility in the process and the product 
Flexibility in a project can be associated with the process or the product. The former refers to flexibility 
in the project’s decision process. The real-options paradigm recognises that decisions are made 
sequentially over episodes.  The use of decision gate models provides a successive commitment to a 
project, including the possibility of iterations, as shown by Eskerod & Östergren (2000). The 
philosophy of not taking decisions until the last responsible moment, as shown by Ballard & Howell 
(2003) is also an example of flexibility in the decision process. The latter refers to the effects of a 
project, in the sense that the final product of the project is prepared for alternative use. This approach to 
flexibility is used in office building construction, as described in Brand (1994) and Blakkstad (2001), 
where the need for adaptability is well known.  
Efficiency and effectiveness 
In this paper, the term efficiency is linked to the immediate outcome of a project. It is a question of 
doing things right and producing project outputs in terms of the agreed scope, quality, cost and time. It 
is an internal measure related to what Samset (1998) refers to as the project or contractor perspective.  
The term effectiveness is linked to the longer-term effects of the project, or in other words, to do the 
right things. It is an external measure. Eikeland (2001) relates effectiveness to how the results of a 
project contribute to value added for owners and users. According to Samset (1998), effectiveness 
measures the realization of the project’s purpose, or the project’s long-term consequences.  This is the 
perspective of the project owner or financing party, who to a large extent have a similar perspective as 
the users. 
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2. RESULTS 
The arguments against and in favour of project flexibility are summarised in the following. Different 
stakeholders in a project have different perspectives on flexibility. Flexibility is also seen differently 
depending upon the different phases of a project. The context and type of a project also influence the 
attitudes toward and benefits of flexibility.     
The case against project flexibility 
A wide range of studies and authors (including Morris & Hough, 1984; Eikeland, 2001 and Love et al. 
2003) have pointed to changes in specifications as a key driver in cost overruns of projects. Change 
orders are widely seen as undesirable, even if contractors do see them a possibility to improve the profit 
from the projects (Christensen & Gordon, 1998). Once a project has been decided upon and the 
planning and execution has begun, changes will often reduce the efficiency of the project. Change 
orders are also a source of major disagreements between different actors in projects. 
Morris & Hough (1991) specifically argue against concurrency between development and production. 
Miller & Lessard (2000) point out the irreversibility of large engineering projects and the importance of 
bold commitment from key stakeholders, arguing against flexibility once the front-end phase is over.  
Flexibility commonly is seen as undesirable in the execution phases of projects. The high and 
unpredictable cost of change orders is the key argument against flexibility. The negative consequences 
of the use of flexibility in projects are also emphasised by project stakeholders that are responsible for 
the execution of projects, such as contractors. The potential for utilising flexibility in civil engineering 
projects is seen as limited, due to their indivisibility and irreversibility. Arguments such as “we do not 
build half a bridge” are used. There is also the possibility that visualising flexibility in a project, such as 
the openings for later adjustments or even cancellation, will reduce the likelihood that the project will 
be approved and carried out as planned. In such a perspective, commitments, not adjustability, are 
required to communicate credibility to affected parties.   
The case in favour of project flexibility 
Kreiner (1995) points out that the traditional focus on stability in project management becomes 
challenged under uncertainty, which creates what he calls “drifting environments”. A number of 
scholars, including Mintzberg (1994) and Bettis & Hitt (1995), argue that flexibility is necessary in 
order to face the changes, uncertainty and turbulence in the business environment.  
The real options paradigm (for example Amram & Kulatlaka, 1999) illustrates that uncertainty can 
increase the owner’s value of a project, as long as flexibility is preserved and resources are not 
irreversibly committed. 
Miller & Lessard (2001) lists "late locking" as a key success criterion for large engineering projects, 
along with an exploring, iterative front-end process. Hall (1980) suggests a risk-avoiding strategy, 
based on minimal commitments at each stage where decisions are necessary. He argues for an 
incremental or adaptive approach, rather than creating new projects. He suggests enlargements and 
adaptation of existing projects rather than building new ones, whenever possible.  
Modern approaches to development of IT-systems include functional specifications and iterative 
development. This is described by authors such as Poppendieck & Poppendieck (2003) and Boehm & 
Turner (2003).  
Most authors agree on the value of flexibility in the front-end phase of projects. Flexibility is also 
generally seen as an advantage in industrial development project (Verganti, 1999). Clark & Fujimoto 
(1991) and Midler (1995) illustrate this based on the automotive industry. The benefits of flexibility are 
easier to visualise and implement in industrial development projects than in more standardised civil 
engineering projects.  Flexibility is more valued by the stakeholders that have a responsibility for the 
overall profitability or societal benefit of a project, compared to those who are only responsible for the 
cost side of the project.  
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3. CONCLUSIONS 
What seems to be implied by authors quoted above is that flexibility is primarily useful to improve 
effectiveness of projects rather than efficiency. The arguments in favour of flexibility emphasise the 
possibility for increased effectiveness while the arguments against highlight the problem of reduced 
efficiency. Flexibility is often seen as a threat to delivering the project on time and within budget. In 
such a perspective, a project needs to be clearly defined in the front-end phase and executed according 
to the plans with as few adjustments or remaining decisions as possible, in order to maximise 
efficiency. On the other hand, flexibility is also seen as a help to achieve the project’s purpose. A 
project with sufficient flexibility to utilize opportunities to increase the value for owners and users 
might in the end prove to be more effective.  
The literature gives indications as to whom and when flexibility is beneficial or harmful:  
x The financing party or owner is more likely to be interested in flexibility than the contractor  
x On average, flexibility in the front-end phase increases the probability of success 
x The active use of flexibility in the execution phase is likely to reduce efficiency  
x Industrial development projects, including IT system development, are more likely to benefit 
from flexibility than civil engineering projects are 
x Flexibility appears desirable in high uncertainty environments and less important in situations 
with low uncertainty 
Change orders are not popular and flexibility may increase the probability of changes. However, a 
change requires that something already has been decided. The logic behind late locking of projects and 
that a decision shall not be taken until it really has to means that changes should be reduced by locking 
solutions as late as possible.   
Flexibility appears as a double-edged sword: the flexibility for one project stakeholder can be another's 
risk. The case against project flexibility highlights the negative effects of changes along with the 
possibilities for frustration due a lack of decisions and commitment. Flexibility can thus be used to 
justify the opinion that decisions do not need to be taken or can always be revised. On the other hand, 
the case for project flexibility emphasises the possibility to utilise opportunities that arise and to 
manage the uncertainty, particularly in the front-end phase of projects. 
Finally, project flexibility is found to not necessarily be a question of good or bad, right or wrong. With 
proper precaution and knowledge, the drawbacks of flexibility might be avoided or reduced and the 
benefits utilised.   
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ABSTRACT  
This paper presents a case study focusing on process analysis as input to the design of new buildings at a 
Norwegian university hospital. The process analysis was also intended to spur organizational change. We study 
whether the process analysis provided the necessary input to the design of the hospital while also facilitating 
organizational development. As a framework, four key success factors in hospital projects are identified:  
efficiency, effectiveness, user involvement and flexibility. Separate sets of research material have been used. The 
most important information sources are project documentation and quantitative information such as statistics 
along with participating observation. The process analysis appears to have been torn between different output 
needs. Other ongoing activities may also have reduced the impact of the process analyses.
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INTRODUCTION
Large hospital construction projects are planned up to ten to twenty years ahead and face the 
challenge of providing buildings for equipment, technology, activities and patient care that 
may be radically different in the future. High uncertainty and changing prerequisites, 
technology and treatment methods create a need for flexibility.
In 1993, the Norwegian government gave the go-ahead for the plan to replace the old regional 
hospital in Trondheim with a new one. The project was divided into two phases. On  28th of 
May 2002 the parliament decided to build the university hospital at it’s current location based 
on the plans for Phase 1 of the building programme. The first phase of the construction of the 
new hospital in Trondheim is almost finished at the time of writing.  
To obtain background information about capacity needs at the hospital, St Olavs Hospital 
chose to initiate an Organisational development project along the lines of Business Process 
Reengineering (BPR). The initiative of St Olavs was dubbed a process analysis project, and 
was influenced by a Scandinavian management tradition developed through the works of Trist 
and Bamforth (1951) and Emery and Thorsrud (1976), among others. In this tradition, user 
involvement is commonly regarded as a key success factor in projects involving 
organisational change. The process analysis at St Olavs Hospital had the dual purpose of 
spurring organizational change, efficient work processes as well as providing background data 
and material about future capacity of the hospital. Keeping in line with the terminology of this 
specific project, we use the term process analysis for the whole initiative. This differs from 
traditional BPR literature where process analysis refers to one step in a BPR initiative. 
In this paper we use the process analysis of the second phase of the St Olavs Hospital project 
as a case study to address two research questions: 
1. Did the process analysis provide the necessary input regarding future capacity needs 
for the new hospital buildings? 
2. Did the process analysis facilitate user involvement and organisational development? 
We discuss these two research questions in light of four key success factors in hospital 
construction projects: efficiency, effectiveness, flexibility and user involvement. A project’s 
ability to produce its immediate outcome can be measured in terms of efficiency. It is a 
question of doing things right and producing project outputs in terms of the agreed scope, 
quality, cost and time. Hence, it is a measure internal to the project and restricted to the 
project management or contractor’s perspective. The longer-term effects of the project can be 
measured in terms of effectiveness - or in other words doing the right things. In relation to the 
construction project, it is an external measure. Eikeland (2001) relates effectiveness to how 
the results of a project contribute to value added for owners and users. 
Flexibility in a project can be associated with the project’s decision process or the final 
product. The intention with flexibility in the decision process is to be able to incorporate new 
needs and prerequisites throughout the project. Flexibility in the product means that the 
physical design of the hospital facilitates changes in type of activity and required capacity, as 
well as other changes which might require changes in physical structures. 
PROCESS ANALYSIS IN HOSPITALS 
Like other enterprises, health care organisations such as hospitals can be viewed as a number 
of processes organised in many different process-hierarchies. Each process-hierarchy in an 
organisation has a specific purpose, with clear objectives, goals and methods, and may also 
have many variants, depending on the enterprise’s needs to characterise, categorise and 
classify knowledge (Browne and Doumeingts 1997). In health care, patients, professionals as 
well as managers increasingly value aspects of processes as much as final clinical outcomes 
(Calnan and Ferlie 2003). 
There are a number of different definitions and meanings of process. Badiru and Ayeni (1993) 
choose to define a process as “a collection of interrelated activities that are designed to 
generate specific outputs based on the application of specific inputs”. A process can consist of 
only one task or a number of tasks in sequence. Such tasks are characterised by that people, 
tools, materials, and environment act together to perform one or more operations which cause 
one or more characteristics of a product to be altered or generated (Badiru et al.1993). 
Another distinctive feature of a process is that it is indifferent to departments and functional 
areas in that it may spread across several or be contained within one specific department. 
With the development from the traditional focus on departments towards process-oriented 
organisations, process analysis has emerged as a tool for gaining organisational insight and 
for improving the performance of the organisation. Process analysis typically involves both 
quantitative and qualitative techniques. Visual graphical representations of process data are 
particularly useful in process analysis as they allow for simultaneous representation of a large 
number of dimensions and are useful in showing precedence, parallel processes and the 
passage of time (Langley, 1999).  
Enterprises embarking on process analysis need to strike a balance between quantitative and 
qualitative techniques in their approach. Moreover, they must choose to what extent the 
process analysis will be “bottom-up” and “top-down”. Badiru et al. (1993) suggested that 
underlying processes must be improved bottom-up. Others, such as Henriksen and Myrbostad 
(2004) emphasised the importance of both leadership and employee involvement, suggesting 
that a combination of the two approaches may be appropriate in health care organisations and 
that it is necessary to evaluate to what extent one should focus on either in each specific case. 
Badiru et al.’s (1993) approach seems somewhat categorical, yet employee involvement is 
clearly important, as is leadership involvement. However, it is possible to have a committed 
and involved leadership even when resorting to a bottom-up approach. It seems both top-
down and bottom-up approaches may be suitable for process analysis purposes in health care.
METHODOLOGY
This study is a case study based on trailing research (Finne et al. 1995). In the terminology of 
Yin (2003), this is a single case study. Separate sets of research material have been used, 
particularly a combination of personal qualitative experience and quantitative decision 
support information. The most important information sources are: 
x Project documentation and quantitative information 
x Participating observation during the process analysis  
Participating observation was carried out during the process analysis, as two of the authors 
were involved as facilitators. Being involved as facilitators provided insight to the 
preparations, execution and the following use of results. The combined role as facilitator and 
researcher of the same phenomenon has strengths and weaknesses.  The authors’ involvement 
was separated in time, which provides an opportunity to reflect on each other’s experiences, 
without the bias of direct personal involvement. 
As facilitators for process analysis, the authors had access to a wide range of documentation, 
including presentations and minutes of meetings, formal reports, data that provided input to 
prognoses, aggregated decision support data and other types of supporting information. All 
this information was stored in a database, primarily to support the facilitation of process 
analysis. The database has also served as a reference database during the research, enabling 
the researchers to validate later claims against documentation from each phase of the process 
analysis. Such an approach was particularly important as personal experiences may be subject 
to judgmental subjectivity. 
PROCESS ANALYSIS IN THE PLANNING OF THE NEW ST. OLAVS HOSPITAL 
The new hospital in Trondheim was originally planned according to a clinical centre model. 
Capacities and functions in each of the six clinical centres were planned based on ICD-10 
diagnostic groups.  Each centre was to a large extent meant to be self supporting in terms of 
clinical support resources and competence. The implementation of the project New St. Olavs 
hospital has been divided in to two planning and construction phases. Our experience is based 
on involvement in the process analysis for one centre in the second phase. Figure 1 illustrates 
different steps in a construction project such as the New St. Olavs hospital.
Figure 1. Generic steps in a construction project 
The construction project together with the initiatives for organizational change and 
improvement were intended to give significant gains in productivity (including quality 
improvement), and the process analysis had goals to (Myrbostad 2003): 
x Ensure a good quantitative and qualitative basis for hospital activity, capacity and 
organisation, as input for design and construction 
x Identify improvement potential in work processes. Start up the planning and 
implementation of possible actions independent of the new buildings. 
x Establish interaction between employees in the hospital, primary health care and the 
patient organizations.  Process analysis was also intended as a tool for future 
improvements. 
In the St. Olav hospital project, important premises were expressed in a conceptual design 
document, HFP (the Norwegian acronym). HFP documented activities, capacities, functional 
content and operational principles of the new hospital. During the process analysis of the 
second phase of the project, the HFP were under revision and main elements of the 
framework were still not finalised. This means that the process analysis was to a large extent 
carried out in parallel with the development of the conceptual design. 
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A project such as the new St. Olavs hospital has a need for specific and detailed knowledge of 
today’s activities and capacities, as well as possible avenues towards improving conditions for 
the future. Obtaining such knowledge requires involvement of employees and specialists from 
different levels and places in the organization. This argues for a bottom-up approach to 
creating an enterprise map and to identifying areas for improvement.  
On the other hand there is also a need to make decisions and priorities that trigger the relevant 
changes and ensure that the project is working towards common goals. Moreover, 
construction projects of the size of the St Olavs project (200.000 m2) involve important 
discussions on policy and strategy regarding e.g. the distribution of resources, implying the 
need for elements of a top-down approach.      
In the process analysis of each of the clinical centres at St Olavs Hospital, different 
approaches were used. Initially, process analysis was largely along the lines of a bottom-up 
approach, where individuals from the higher organizational levels in the centres were engaged 
mainly at the early and the latest stages (stage 1 and 5 in Figure 2).
Figure 2 illustrates the plan for process analyses. As we see there were intensive group-work 
sessions where employees and experts on the relevant patient groups or patient pathways were 
the main resources.  
Figure 2. Process analyses bottom-up 
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The modelling conference was a session assembling both leadership and employees at 
different levels in the organization aiming to get a common overall picture of the processes in 
the centre. Ambitions and goals related to the process analyses, and to some extent 
training/guiding in process approach, is also a part of the modelling conference. 
The stages 2-4 represent much of “the traditional” BPR activities and produces much of the 
facts/basis for decisions in the future project work. In this model, the priority conference is 
the most important arena for decision making regarding new and/or improved processes  
Our case was one of the first process analyses in the second phase and represented important 
learning for everybody involved. In the process analyses in this particular centre there were 
continuous discussions regarding the HFP that was under revision. The consequence of this 
was that the HFP was not regarded as an absolute constraint. The HFP 2 is regarded as the 
final framework for expected patient volume for each centre as well as allocation of space. In 
the working groups, focus was on activities, functions, functional proximity requirements, 
other requirements and number of patients in the future. The translation into area, rooms and 
concrete specifications was mainly an exercise done by the facilitators as a part of the 
reporting from each group. 
Table 1 illustrates the consequences in number of patients and area for some functions 
described at different stages of the process analysis: 
 PA 1= Results from the group work 
 PA 2= Results from the priority conference 
 HFP 1= functional strategic program from 1999 
 HFP 2= the revised strategic functional program from 2003 
The figures in table 1 are indexed to the HFP from 1999. The main variables that influenced 
need for room and area in the new hospital were number of patients, lay time and whether the 
patients needed beds or could be treated at daytime, e.g policlinic. In the process analysis 
group work, a key issue was to identify enablers for reduced lay time and alternative 
pathways. Despite this the group reports all concluded in need for area that exceeded the HFP 
1 by more than 78%. This was mainly caused by an increased estimate of number of future 
patients.
Table 1: Patients and needs for some functions expressed in the process analysis 
Number of patients Area 
Functions
HFP
1
PA
1
PA
2
HFP
2 HFP1
PA
1
PA
2
HFP
2
Beds  100 245 233 158 100 178 202 162 
Day treatment 100 344 198 183 100 319 184 142 
Policlinical rooms 100 211 92 220 100 - - 134 
The priority conference represented an important arena for decisions regarding future activity 
in the hospital. The people involved has to focus on common goal and not only focus on own 
(short term) interests. There was naturally a need for facts and information of high quality 
from the earlier stages in the project (e.g the group reports).
As we see from Table 1, there was a reduction in need for beds and rooms during the priority 
conference despite an upward adjustment of the number of patients. This reduction was 
mainly a result of working with variables such as lay time and daytime treatment.  
During this latter phase of the process analyses the revised HFP (HFP 2, from 2003) was 
presented. It represented a considerable upward adjustment of the number of patients and area 
compared to the previous HFP. Figure 3 illustrates that the conceptual design (HFP) were 
done in parallel to the process analysis. If we just study the number of beds and patients 
(hospitalization) we see that the number of patients increased by 58% in the revised HFP, but 
was still only 68% of the estimations from the priority conference. The priority conference 
was some extent was an arena for policy and strategy making, because both leadership and 
employees at different levels in the organization were gathered. However, the conference was 
not intended as an arena for building consensus on quantifications of future hospital capacity. 
Figure 3. Relation between conceptual design, process analysis, organisational development 
and the design of the hospital 
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The process analysis appears torn by different output needs. With reference to Figure 3, the 
process analysis should provide input to both building design and organisational development. 
To provide fruitful input to building design, results from process analysis were often too 
general. Efforts had to be made to quantify the output, using experience data and prognoses. 
As the results from process analysis were formatted to provide relevant input to the building 
design, they appear to have become less suitable to serve as a basis for organisational 
development. Finally, results from process analysis lost some of its edge when the conceptual 
design (HFP) were developed in parallel. Moreover, the HFP2 provided a more definitive 
output in terms of available area, standards and similar parameters. 
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION  
In this paper we discussed how the process analysis contributed to four key success factors in 
hospital projects: efficiency, effectiveness, user involvement and flexibility. The first research 
question was related to what extent the process analysis provided the necessary input to the 
hospital design. The second research question addressed to what extent process analysis 
facilitated user involvement and organisational development. 
The process analysis should provide input to both building design and organisational 
development. Regarding input to building design, the conceptual design (HFP) delivered a 
more definitive output than the process analyse.
The process analysis did achieve user involvement. However, the experiences from the 
bottom-up approach pointed to the need to establish a strategic framework for the analysis. 
User involvement also generated expectations. All desired features and volume of the new 
hospital building was not possible to combine within the allocated recourses. As a result of 
this the process analyses of the second phase had more elements of a top-down approach with 
more intensive involvement of leadership in the first steps to define goals, priorities etc, and 
an emphasis on providing more facts when starting the group work. The group work was also 
more focused due to a more defined mandate owing to focus on critical aspects and processes.
The learning curve for all parts involved in the process analyses in phase 2 was quite steep. 
One insight was that there was need of more defined direction, priorities and goals in the early 
steps of the process analyses. This also includes consensus related to facts and definitions 
such as in the HFP.  
The transfer from analysis to decision making proved challenging for two reasons: Firstly, 
user involvement also generated user expectations. Secondly, the decision process required a 
higher level of detail, while the process analysis by nature was more conceptual. On a 
conceptual level, most stakeholders could agree on desirable solutions. As the level of detail 
increased, so did the awareness of different group interests. The pressure to summarise 
process analysis results into straight forward decision supporting facts was related to project 
efficiency. The design and construction project needed clarifications to be able to continue. 
Lack of clarifications meant delays and increased project-related costs. Project efficiency is a 
key issue when explaining why the process analysis was carried out as it was.
An overall objective of the process analysis was effectiveness in terms of a suitable future 
hospital building.  One aspect of effectiveness of a hospital building project is the cost and 
quality level of the operation in the new building (the processes within a new hospital). The 
same cost and quality measures will be related to efficiency of the hospital, when the new 
buildings are taken into use. In other words, the efficiency in the hospital (once it is built and 
taken into use) is one dimension of effectiveness of the construction. 
Effectiveness in the future hospital was measured and interpreted in many ways by the 
different involved stakeholders. Future cost of operation was one aspect. Ability to 
accommodate future patient volumes was another key issue. Suitable working conditions for 
hospital staff was yet a concern. Given the long time frame and present rate of change in 
health care, flexibility is another aspect of effectiveness in hospital buildings. Regarding 
flexibility, our experience is that extensive user involvement does not necessarily ensure 
future flexibility. Especially in the “locking phase” when the results from the process analysis 
were converted to hard facts for decision support, the reference point to most stakeholders 
was the present situation; do we get more or less than we have now; are present trends taken 
into consideration?  
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Abstract
Project flexibility means a capability to adapt to new, different or changing requirements. The paper 
proposes a framework for understanding project flexibility. The framework for analysis consists of project 
flexibility categorisations, perspectives of analysis, flexibility drivers and enablers. The proposed framework 
can serve at least two purposes. First, it can work as a checklist for aspects that are to be included in an 
analysis of project flexibility. Such analyses may be carried out as a part of ex-ante project preparations, ex-
post project evaluations or during projects. Second, the relation between different aspects in the framework 
can be analysed to gain an understanding of interaction between the aspects.  
1. Focused and flexible - a project management dilemma 
Traditionally, projects tend to strive for increased predictability and robustness, by managing details and 
attempting to bring all variables under control. However, experience shows that the chance of realizing a 
plan without major amendments decreases with increasing time horizon, which point to a need for flexibility, 
or adaptability. A key message in this paper is that successful projects are characterized by a firm and 
realistic strategy in combination with sufficient tactical flexibility. Strategy and tactical flexibility need to be 
carefully addressed in front-end management of projects.  
Project flexibility is part of a fundamental dilemma in project management. On one hand, projects need 
stability and control to be executed efficiently, typically measured by time, cost and meeting specifications.  
In this perspective, flexibility shall be minimized. On the other hand, important decisions in projects must be 
taken based on limited information in an unpredictable world, creating a need for flexibility options. 
The results presented in the paper are based on a diverse sample of large public investment projects. Several 
different information sources have been used and analysed, including both quantitative and qualitative 
information. The main data set used in this paper covers 18 Norwegian large engineering projects, which 
have been analyzed regarding project flexibility.  
The paper proposes a framework for understanding project flexibility. Like previous researchers, this 
research has documented that the potential drawbacks of flexibility, both on efficiency and effectiveness, are 
substantial. However, the main drawback of project flexibility that has been observed in our research is not 
flexibility itself, but flexibility applications in projects that lacked structure and preparation for flexibility. 
This indicates that if a structural framework for a project is established, flexibility options could be utilised 
without destabilising the project organisation.  
2. Project flexibility 
According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, being flexible is “characterised by a ready capability to adapt 
to new, different or changing requirements". This means that project flexibility includes preparations to 
manage both internal and contextual uncertainty, such as: scope change management, iterative decision 
process, adjustments related to uncertain funding in general and budget reserves in particular. This paper 
does not aim at covering the issue of uncertainty in a broad perspective. However, the distinction between 
the two types of uncertainty that Karlsen [1] and Christensen & Kreiner [2], among others, discuss has 
implications on the analysis of project flexibility. This paper will use the terms contextual uncertainty and 
internal uncertainty. Internal uncertainty is related to operational uncertainty [2] or task uncertainty [1].  
Real options represent one approach to project flexibility [3], [4]. Real options illustrate the value of 
flexibility based on theory related to financial options. Flexibility is compared to owning an option - the 
right, but not the obligation to take an action in the future [3].  
3. Research approach 
In this paper, one phenomenon – flexibility – is analysed in a complex environment with several influencing 
factors. Investigating project flexibility from different angles has provided a multi-dimensional view of the 
subject. A combination of qualitative and quantitative information has been used. Case studies included in 
the paper apply a research methodology based on the works of Yin [5]. Three important principles in the 
research have been: (a) multiple sources of information, (b) use of case study databases to assemble evidence 
related to the cases, and (c) maintaining a chain of evidence with links between the questions asked, data 
collected and conclusions drawn.
This paper presents some analyses of 18 Norwegian large engineering projects, which have been analyzed 
regarding project flexibility. A main data source has been independent project evaluation reports of the 
projects. The same data set has also been used by Olsson [6] and Olsson & Samset [7]. These references 
provide additional information about the used data. 
In addition, the paper has benefited from analyses of other data sets, which are listed below along with 
references for further information about each data set.  
x Front-end assessments of 48 Norwegian governmental investments, related to transportation 
infrastructure, defence, public buildings and IT system implementation, [8] and [9]. 
x Two Norwegian hospital projects, [10], [11] and [12].  
x Four Norwegian railway projects, [13]. 
While the proposed framework benefits from all information sources mentioned above, this paper also adds 
some new results from continued analysis of the first data set, the one which consist of 18 projects.  
4. Analytical framework for flexibility in projects 
This paper proposes a framework for analysis of project flexibility, shown in Figure 1. The framework for 
analysis consists of project flexibility categorisations, perspectives of analysis, flexibility drivers and 
enablers.
Flexibility
categorisations
Planned vs. actual flexibility
Internal vs. external flexibility
Decision process vs. products
Enablers
Redundancy
Incentives
Modularity (micro and macro)
Project phases
Stakeholders
Efficiency vs. effectiveness
Perspectives
of analysis Drivers
Uncertainty
Duration
Conflicts
Insufficient preparations
Flexibility options 
Figure 1. Framework for analysing project flexibility. 
4.1 Flexibility categorisations 
Four categorisations of project flexibility are; planned flexibility vs. actual flexibility approaches, internal 
flexibility vs. external flexibility, flexible decision process vs. flexible final products as well as modularity 
on macro and micro level.  
Approaches to project flexibility has been analysed over time. In these studies, there was a need to make a 
distinction between planned and actual approaches to flexibility. Approaches to flexibility changed during 
the projects. Actual approaches turned out to be different from planned approaches.  
Another distinction was also made between internal and external project flexibility. When flexibility is 
discussed in literature and in general, it is most often related to external flexibility, referring to adjustments 
of project scope. Project internal flexibility relates to flexibility within defined scope - how requirements 
shall be met. Particularly analyses of stakeholder approaches to flexibility are highly depending on whether 
internal or external flexibility is the subject of discussion. Internal and external flexibility are responses to 
contextual and internal uncertainty. However, internal flexibility is not limited to being a response to internal 
uncertainty. External flexibility can be a response to contextual uncertainty, but all combinations of internal 
and external flexibility versus internal and contextual uncertainty can be found. 
Project flexibility was divided into flexibility in the decision process and the product. Flexibility in the 
decision process is based on an approach where decisions and commitments in the projects are made 
sequentially over episodes. The use of decision gate models provides a successive commitment to a project, 
as shown by Eskerod & Östergren [14]. Flexibility in the product means that the design of the final product 
(what the project shall produce) has taken into consideration possible future changes in use or requirements.  
4.2 Perspectives of analysis 
Project flexibility is seen from the perspective of different stakeholders, in different project phases and 
related to efficiency and effectiveness.  
The flexibility for one project stakeholder can be another's risk. According to McElroy & Mills [15], project 
stakeholders are persons or groups of people who have a vested interest in the success of a project and the 
environment within which the project operates. In a study of large engineering projects, Olander & Landin 
[16] found that it is important for a project management team to identify stakeholders that can affect a 
project, and then manage their differing demands throughout the project stages. Stakeholders may be 
organisations or individuals.  
Project flexibility can be studied from both efficiency and effectiveness perspectives. A case in favour of 
flexibility emphasise the possibility to increase a project’s effectiveness.  Effectiveness is primarily 
addressed by external flexibility. Project scope is adjusted to utilise benefit opportunities. Regarding 
efficiency, such adjustment of project scope typically causes change costs. The net effect come form a 
balance between the values of benefit opportunities and incurred change cost.  
4.3 Project flexibility drivers 
In this context, drivers are factors that create needs or pressure on projects to be flexible.  Uncertainty is the 
key driver for project flexibility, and arguable the only one. The other drivers mentioned below are in fact 
only highlights of selected types of uncertainty. In this paper uncertainty is defined as a gap between the 
amount of information needed to make a decision the amount of information available (based on Galbraith 
[17]). In order to manage this information gap, flexibility is primarily a way of reducing the amount of 
information needed. Other project management approaches may focus on increasing the available amount of 
information. 
The longer duration a project has, the more likely it is that some pre-requisites are not longer valid. Long 
duration is likely to result in more or less suppressed need for scope changes. Both cost and demand 
estimates are more uncertain the longer the time perspective is.  What is “long” duration is highly depending 
of the type of project. Experiences from previous projects of the same type provide indications of for how 
long prerequisites are likely to stay stable enough.  
Flexible projects can contribute to conflict solutions. However, conflicts that arise during the preparation or 
execution of a project have also created a need for projects to be flexible, as a response to conflicts. Project 
flexibility can also be an issue of conflict. Stakeholders who benefit from the initial decisions are less likely 
to favour a continued flexible decision process. Flexible decision processes are likely to be valued by those 
who do not prefer an initial decision. In this way, availability of flexibility options and redundant resources 
can serve as an invitation to adjustments.  
4.4 Project flexibility enablers 
This paper refers to ‘enablers’ as factors that contribute to making it possible for projects to be flexible. 
Sager [18] presents redundancy as an enabler for flexibility. According to Landau [19], redundancy is 
created by repetition, duplication and overlap. Galbraith [17] points out that slack resources constitute an 
additional cost to an organisation. In a project perspective, redundancy can be applied for flexibility in both 
the product and decision process. Flexibility in the product may be achieved by over-specification of future 
functionality. A flexible decision process calls for redundant recourses and time to perform analyses of 
alternative project concepts. The rationality behind the use of redundancy is that this use of resources is cost 
effective compared to later major changes.  
Incentives faced by stakeholders affect their approaches to project flexibility. Incentives for different project 
stakeholders are strongly related to the contracting structure of a project and other financial obligations. A 
common tool for achieving flexibility in projects in the use of option based contracts, which enables a 
continuous locking of the projects. Flexibility has a value for those that can benefit from adjustments, and it 
is a cost for those who have to adopt. The fewer restrictions on their part of the project, the better 
opportunities there are to any stakeholder to optimise the use of available resources.  
Modularity is presented as an enabler for flexible project management. Modularity is related to the 
possibility to divide a project into more or less independent sub-units. On a micro level, design modularity is 
a tool for efficiency, because it may reduce negative effect of changes. Design modularity is a common 
approach to achieve flexibility [20], [21]. Thomke [21] claims that modularization in product development 
projects is primarily a tool to improve project efficiency. On a macro level, modularity can be an enabler for 
flexible decisions processes because decision makers can make the incremental commitments. An approach 
of minimal commitment at each decision stage is a part of the “anti-disaster methodology” proposed by Hall 
[22].  
5. Applying the framework on selected aspects 
The proposed framework can serve at least two purposes. First, it can work as a checklist for aspects that are 
to be included in an analysis of project flexibility. Such analyses may be carried out as a part of ex-ante
project preparations, ex-post project evaluations or during projects. Second, the relation between different 
aspects in the framework can be analysed to gain an understanding of interaction between the aspects.  
5.1. Modularity versus planned and actual flexibility in decision process  
The relation between modularity and flexibility in the decision process has been analysed for 18 projects, as 
shown in Table 1 and Table 2. 
Low Medium High
High 1 1 3
Medium 5 0 0
Low 7 1 0
  Planned flexibility in decision 
process
Modularity
Table 1. Modularity and planned flexibility. N=18 
Low Medium High
High 0 1 4
Medium 0 2 3
Low 2 3 3
Modularity
  Actual flexibility in the decision 
process
Table 2. Modularity and actual flexibility. N=18 
Table 1 indicates that a high modularity was related to a high planned flexibility in the decision process. 
Table 2 illustrates that highly modular projects frequently were related to a high actual flexibility in the 
decision process. A combination of high modularity and low actual flexibility in the decision process was not 
observed. Results support the suggestion that modularity can be an enabler for flexible decision processes. In 
this project sample, highly modular projects were likely to have highly flexible decision processes.  
5.2. Flexibility in decision process vs. flexibility in product 
Olsson and Samset [7] analysed flexibility in decision process and flexibility in product. Figure 2 is a 
graphical illustration of such an analysis. Each project is represented by two marks; grey for planned 
flexibility and black for actual flexibility. The two mars for each project are connected with an arrow to 
illustrate any shift in flexibility approach. The arrows pointing to the right illustrate a shift from low planned 
flexibility in decision process, to medium or high actual flexibility in decision process. This shift was 
observed for projects with all degrees of flexibility in the product (low, medium or high). 
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Figure 2. Flexibility in product versus planned and actual decision process. 
The majority of the projects (16 out of 18) had medium or high actual flexibility in the decision processes. 
All three projects that were prepared for highly flexible decision process also experienced highly flexible 
decision process during the course of the projects. Seven projects did not have an observed shift in the 
flexibility approach (indicated in Figure 2 by a black and grey dot lying close to each other). Note that five of 
the seven projects had a medium or high planned flexibility in decision process. These projects where 
prepared for a flexible decision process. Of the 13 projects that had a low planned flexibility in the decision 
process, only two projects had also a low actual flexibility in decision process. None of the projects had 
lower actual than planned flexibility in the decision process. 
Related to efficiency, Olsson and Samset [7] found that highly flexible decision processes resulted in more 
than 100% cost overrun, compared to the initial budgets, regardless of the flexibility in the product, Most 
projects were subject to changes, extensions and iterations (summarized as “flexibility in the decision 
process”).
6. Concluding discussion 
A framework for understanding project flexibility has been presented. Based on the framework, the paper has 
discussed flexibility to selected aspects individually and in two-dimensional combinations. With larger 
samples, this type of analysis would benefit from regression analysis along the different aspects. In the 
following, the results presented in the previous section are briefly discussed and some implications for 
projects management practice are proposed.  
6.1. Flexible decision processes – intended or safety valve?  
In the beginning of this research, it was expected that the decision process related to the project can be fairly 
straight forward if flexibility in the product was high, because the result of the project was prepared for 
alternative use. Furthermore, it was assumed that a low flexibility in the product could be combined with 
high flexibility in the decision process because scope definitions could be postponed in order to gain as much 
knowledge as possible. These assumptions are only partially confirmed by the study.  
Two explanations are proposed to this result: 
1. If there are possibilities for flexible decision processes, they are highly likely to be utilised 
2. Flexible decision processes can always be applied in response to unforeseen events  
Regarding the first alternative explanation, possibilities for flexible decision processes may come from 
planned flexible decision processes. There are indications that flexible product designs also serve as enablers 
for flexible decision processes, not a substitute for.
The second alternative explanation means that even though it comes at a cost, and frequently at a high cost, 
plans can be changed. While the degree of flexibility in the product generally must be established at an early 
stage in a project, a flexible decision process may either be indented or ad hoc. Flexibility in the product is to 
a large extent an attribute that is designed into a delivery in the front-end of a project. On the other hand, a 
highly flexible decision process can be achieved even if it not prepared for. It may therefore work as a kind 
of “security valve” for unforeseen development. This is similar to Galbraith’s [17] notion that if a firm fails 
to actively create other strategies to address uncertainty, a slack resources strategy will occur by default. 
Even if Figure 2 indicates that projects are likely to apply both flexible product designs as well as flexible 
decision processes, the two dimensions of flexibility are of a different nature. This distinction can be 
valuable to have in mind when preparing a project. 
6.2. Flexibility preparations 
Several of the projects in Figure 2 experienced a shift from low to medium or high actual flexibility in the 
decision process. Projects frequently need to be more flexible than they have prepared for. This means that 
projects either cannot isolate themselves from contextual uncertainty in order to avoid iterations and changes, 
or have not mange to prepare for proper flexibility.  As a response to uncertainty, projects can either isolate 
themselves in order to execute the defined task efficiently, or prepare the project to manage flexibility. A 
third, often unintended strategy occurs when projects plan for isolation, but cannot maintain the isolation. 
Projects are then forced to be more flexible than they have prepared for. Both of the first mentioned 
strategies have advantages and disadvantages. The research that this paper is based on indicates that this third 
strategy (“plan for isolation – experience forced flexibility”) mainly is has disadvantages. The choices of 
flexibility strategy are to a large extent made during the front-end phase. This discussion points to both 
project flexibility and project front-end as key success factors for projects.
One indication from the analyses is that project flexibility requires a structure. In the referred studies, the 
potential drawbacks of flexible projects are substantial both on efficiency and effectiveness. It has also been 
shown that the drawbacks are the largest when projects did not prepare for flexibility. To avoid cost 
overruns, but also to obtain desirable benefit from a project, it is advised that flexible decisions are supported 
by a structural framework of strategies and guidelines. Such framework is preferably established in the front-
end of projects. Related to the framework proposed in Figure 1, this means that the flexibility drivers shall 
be identified in order to judge the need, or likelihood, for flexibility.  
The enablers proposed in Figure 1 are key elements in a structural framework for project flexibility. Figure 3 
shows how one of these enablers; redundancy, can be seen in relation to either prepared for isolation and thus 
to avoid changes, or to prepare to manage changes. In Figure 3, ‘precision’ is used to indicate low 
redundancy and ‘slack’ to indicate high redundancy.   
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Figure 3. Flexibility strategies in relation to redundancy and change management. 
Changes can be avoided by having slack resources in a project. Redundancy can be achieved by over-
specification of future functionality, so that future needs may be met without physical changes. Such needs 
may emerge during the project execution, or after the project has been delivered. Redundancy can also 
enable front-end analyses of alternative project concepts, which require recourses and time but may avoid 
later changes.  
Changes can also be avoided by precision in the project preparations, thus reducing the need for slack. 
Aiming at a clear agreement on scope represents a traditional project management approach – to zoom in on 
project scope and then execute. After establishing the scope, project management aims at minimising 
external flexibility.  
Changes can be managed if there is slack in a project organisation. High redundancy indicates a general 
capacity to manage a wide range of changes. Such slack can include budget reserves, time slack in plans and 
organisation capacity to manage changes. On average, this increases project cost. However, it may still prove 
cost effective if the alternative is that the project will face changes which it does not have the resources to 
manage.
Finally, changes can be managed even with low redundancy, but it requires precision. In the process of 
locking specifications, certain parts are locked later than others. Low redundancy requires an ability to 
identify and hedge areas exposed to changes. The late locking items must therefore be well defined and of a 
limited relative size.  
6.3. Flexibility options as flexibility drivers 
In the framework proposed in Figure 1, flexibility options where listed as flexibility drivers. This is 
supported by the discussion above. Of the studied projects, projects with a high planned flexibility in the 
decision process also had a high actual flexibility in the decision process. Availability of flexibility options 
and redundant resources can serve as an invitation to adjustments. If there are possibilities for adjustments 
and iterations, it is likely that flexibility options will be utilised. This means that the presence (or knowledge) 
of flexibility enablers can work as a flexibility driver. 
6.4. Front-end as a key phase 
Flexible the front-end phases are the least controversial aspect of project flexibility. This is particularly 
related to external flexibility. Results presented in [7] indicates that minimizing external flexibility after the 
front-end phase increases the likelihood to deliver projects on time and budget and according to 
specifications. One objective of front-end management is to provide a well defined framework for efficient 
project implementation, including the identification of flexibility drivers, and appropriate introduction of 
flexibility enablers.  
References 
[1] Karlsen, J. T, (1998), Mestring av omgivelsesusikkerhet Ph.D. Thesis, the Norwegian University of 
Science and Technology.
[2] Christensen, S. & Kreiner, K. 1991. Prosjektledelse under usikkerhet. [Project Management under 
Uncertainty.] Universitetsforlaget, Oslo. 
[3] Amram, M. & Kulatlaka, N. 1999. Real Options: Managing Strategic Investment in an Uncertain 
World. Financial Management Association Survey and Synthesis Series, Harvard Business School 
Press, Boston. 
[4] Brennan, M.L. & Trigeorgis, L. 2000. Project Flexibility, Agency, and Competition: New 
Developments in the Theory and Application of Real Options. Oxford University Press, New York.  
[5] Yin, R.K., 2003a. Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 3rd edition, Sage Publications. 
[6] Olsson, N.O.E. 2006. Management of flexibility in projects. International Journal of Project 
Management 24:1, 66–74. 
[7] Olsson, N.O.E. & Samset, K. 2006. ‘Front-End Management, Flexibility and Project Success’. Paper 
accepted for presentation at PMI Conference, 17-19 July 2006, Montreal, Canada.
[8] Magnussen, O.M. & Olsson, N.O.E. 2006. Comparative analysis of cost estimates of major public 
investment projects. International Journal of Project Management 24:4, 281–288. 
[9] Olsson, N.O.E. & Magnussen, O.M. 2006. ‘Projects trapped in their freedom: Flexibility aspects of 
front-end quality assurance of major projects’. Paper submitted to Project Management Journal. 
[10] Henriksen, B., Olsson, N. & Seim, A. 2006. ‘Adjustments, effectiveness and efficiency in 
Norwegian hospital construction  projects’. Paper accepted for presentation at CIB W70 Trondheim 
International Symposium on Changing User Demands on Buildings, 12–14 June 2006, Trondheim, 
Norway.
[11] Løken, A. 2005. Endringshåndtering i prosjekt Nytt Rikshospital. [Change management in hospital 
development projects.] Project report. Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 
Trondheim.  
[12] Bergsland, K. (2004) ’Nytt Rikshospital tre år etter – Hva har nytt bygg betydd for driften?’, 
SINTEF Unimed, Trondheim, Norway. 
[13] Olsson, N.O.E. 2006. ‘Impact analysis of railway projects in a flexibility perspective’. Accepted for 
publication in Transport Reviews. 
[14] Eskerod, P. & Östergren, K. 2000. Why do companies standardize projects work? Project
Management 6:1, 34–39. 
[15] McElroy, B. & Mills, C. 2000. Managing stakeholders. In: Turner, R.J. & Simister, S.J. (eds.) Gower 
Handbook of Project Management. Gower, Aldershot.
[16] Olander, S. & Landin, A. 2005. Evaluation of stakeholder influence in the implementation of 
construction projects. International Journal of Project Management 23:4, 321–328. 
[17] Galbraith, J.R. 1973. Designing Complex Organizations. Adison-Wesley, Reading, MA. 
[18] Sager, T. 1994. Communicative Planning Theory. Ashgate Publishing Company, Brookfield, 
Vermont. 
[19] Landau, M. 1969. Redundancy, rationality and the problem of duplication and overlap Public
Administration Review 29:July-August, 346–358. 
[20] Hellström, M. & Wikström, K. 2005. Project business concepts based on modularity – Improved 
maneuverability through unstable structures. International Journal of Project Management 23:5, 
392–397. 
[21] Thomke, S.H. 1997. The role of flexibility in the development of new products: An empirical study. 
Research Policy 26:1, 105–119. 
[22] Hall, P. 1980. Great Planning Disasters. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London. 
